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Abstract 
In this dissertation, we set out to examine empirically the impact of commercial Peer to Peer 
(P2P) lending on the finance of small business ventures.  Since, this is the first study that looks at 
the funding of small business ventures by commercial P2P lending website; we have collected 
and created a new and unique data set taken from Prosper.com, one of the dominating P2P 
lending websites; which formed the basis of our analysis. These data offer a unique opportunity 
to test theory - looking at information asymmetry problems and the mechanisms adopted to deal 
with them within a new context. The thesis comprises of three empirical chapters; we follow 
entrepreneurial finance literature in raising some of the key questions concerned mainly with: 
credit extension, the cost of credit and modeling default. We use robust analysis methods 
specifically:  Probit, Tobit and 2-stage Heckman models to check for factors that drive credit 
allocation, factors driving the cost of credit and determinants driving default for small business 
loans.  
General insights from our first empirical study  shows that P2P lending depicts a new small 
business venture loan market, where previously underserved early stage entrepreneurs and those 
looking for small amounts are able to access unsecured credit through the relaxation of collateral.  
Although collateral is not required, we find that the supply of loans tends to flow to the least 
risky entrepreneurs; those who are homeowners, with high credit ratings.  In our findings, we 
also demonstrate that firm level characteristics have little impact on loan supply while reducing 
information asymmetries through giving volunteering information improves access to loans. In 
general, our findings are both interesting and important as they suggest that P2P lending is a low 
risk form of debt finance. In this sense, lenders act like traditional debt financiers. However, the 
way in which they appraise funding opportunities characterise typical decision making of equity 
investors such as Business Angels and VC, who tend to focus more on people, rather than the 
business itself. 
Findings from the second empirical study suggest that at an average lending of between 18 
percent and 20 percent; P2P lending is a very expensive form of debt finance. Banks typically 
refuse to extend credit given such high interest rates as this tends to alter the borrower pool such 
that only the riskiest of borrowers have projects that generate returns that are high enough to be 
  
 
 
able to re-pay these interest rates.  In effect, the bank supply curve is backward bending above 10 
percent on conventional terms of lending.  Consequently, if we were to characterise P2P lending 
we would effectively conclude that it is typically a high cost finance with required returns 
expected to be likely in the levels of Business Angels and VC equity investments. 
Finally, In terms of lender return and default, we find that the expected return to lenders is 3.26 
percent, which is above the opportunity cost of capital in the US. Therefore, P2P lending is 
profitable from the investor point of view, albeit in a narrow sense. In general, the results suggest 
that average lenders on P2P platforms are amateurs, who actually have a higher risk tolerance. 
For these lenders, the risk of losing a small proportion (as little as $25) per investment in the 
overall portfolio of loans is offset by the potential gain from high interest rates charged for loans. 
Interestingly, our results show that return from the top 5 percent of lenders average at 6.1 percent 
per annum. Given the fact that P2P lending is generally a young market, and the fact that 
majority of lenders attracted to P2P lending are relatively uninformed amateurs in making 
investment decisions, the results suggest that if the amateur lenders do indeed learn, it then 
becomes plausible that in time the returns in this market may generally converge to be better 
(and gravitate towards the 6.1 percent achieved by top 5 percent). However, if the P2P lending 
platforms continue to attract a pool of amateur lenders, the average returns of 3.26 percent may 
render the market somewhat unsustainable in the long run.     
Overall, our findings are novel, namely that P2P lending depicts a new venture loan market 
where previously underserved early stage ventures and those looking for small amounts are able 
to access credit; with the relaxation of typical collateral requirements. The big lesson however 
about P2P lending as a form of small business finance is that it really comes down to personal 
features rather than business features. Put another way, our findings suggests that the decision to 
extend credit and the pricing of loans in this context may possibly be relatively idiosyncratic - 
depending more on personal reputation of the small business owner than on the observed 
characteristics of the firm. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
1.0 Introduction 
To successfully launch and grow a small business venture, business owners require adequate 
funding. The economics and finance literature provide strong evidence that sufficient starting 
capital is a binding constraint for potential small business owners. Entry into self-employment 
increases with a sudden increase in personal wealth, for example through inheritance (Holtz-
Eakin et al, 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Burke, Fitzroy and Nolan, 2000). Likewise, 
absences of funds limit individuals to start businesses (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989), using the National Longitudinal survey from the United States, estimate that 
new business owners are limited by 1.5 times the size of their initial assets in starting a new 
business. Finance is thus a crucial element to new business entry.  
The development and application of advanced information technology is altering the finance 
market (Han and Greene, 2007). Over the past few years, commercial peer-to-peer (P2P) lending 
websites have become a new innovative approach to mobilise and disseminate small business 
capital. Individuals, wishing to gain interest from their investment, extend credit to small 
business ventures directly, through the internet, without intermediation of traditional financial 
institutions like banks. Loan level data provided by Prosper.com (henceforth Prosper) and 
LendingClub.com (henceforth LendingClub) – the largest P2P lending sites – indicate that the 
dollar volume of P2P lending grew by nearly 300 percent between 2008 and 2011 (Figure 1-1).  
 
...........Figure 1-1 goes around here........... 
 
The total dollar amount that went to small business ventures has also seen an increase. Since 
2008, LendingClub and Prosper have been responsible for over $100 million in small business 
loans (Table 1-1). Although the total dollar volume of P2P lending market is small relative to 
traditional sources of small business finance
1
, this market is growing quickly and may represent 
an important niche in areas of external sources of small businesses funds. For Prosper, business 
                                                          
1
 According to the US Small Business Association, $588 billion in small business loans was outstanding as at 30 
June  2012 
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loans represent 16.1 percent of all dollars lent over the period 2008 – 2011 coming from 2 
million investors. For LendingClub, business loans are 5.6 percent of loan dollars, extended by 
just under 1 million individuals
2
. Prosper and Lending Club report that typical credit requests 
range from $1,000 to $35,000; while interest rates paid by borrowers normally range between 5 
percent and 35percent. 
 
...........Table 1-1 goes around here........... 
 
Traditional lending institutions (banks, business angels, venture capitalists) face problems with 
regards to extending finance to small business ventures. Literature explains these problems 
largely to be accounted for by information asymmetries in capital markets, where borrowers are 
assumed to have more information about their prospective projects than lenders (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Ang, 1991; 1992; Avery et al, 1998). If lenders are unable to determine the quality 
of the business venture because they lack full information, they raise average price of capital 
(interest rates in the case of banks). Because of the average high interest rates offered, low risk 
borrowers (knowing their worth) lack the incentive to access finance; they may opt to go look 
elsewhere. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks may therefore find it optimal not to raise 
interest rates in conditions of access demand because by so doing, they will worsen the quality of 
the borrower pool, a phenomenon known as adverse selection. This arises because only high risk 
borrowers can pay higher interest rates.  
The change in interest rates may also influence borrowers to undertake riskier project, a 
phenomenon known as moral hazard, given that if the initiative becomes successful 'the business 
owner takes all'. Banks do not share in the profits or success of the undertaken project. If the 
initiative fails however, it is the banks that lose the funds they have extended to the business 
owners. Consequently, banks may opt to ration credit instead as an alternative of charging high 
interest rates.  Since business start-ups and young small firms are the most likely to be 
                                                          
2
 www.prosper.com and www.lendingclub.com 
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'unknowns' to the banks, the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard would seem to be 
particularly acute for this cohort of business ventures.  
Information asymmetries may also  be problematic because of the relatively high fixed costs of 
gathering information lenders may incur for small transactions (especially in the case of venture 
capitalists and business angels); consequently lenders may opt to not extend credit to businesses  
looking for small amounts of capital.  
To date, much of the research has focused on two main approaches by which traditional lending 
institutions attempt to cope with challenges caused by information asymmetries when extending 
finance to small firms: signalling and relying on social ties. The signalling approach emphasises 
the facilitative role played by:  
 Collateral to distinguish between borrower types and to mitigate the risk of moral hazard 
when borrowers do not put enough effort into the business (Bester, 1985; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1987);  
 Close relationships established between lenders and borrowers, which serve to improve 
information flow used to appraise credit risk (Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998);  
 Human capital of the business owner; typically proxied by the owner’s education level 
and work experience; in influencing the future prospects or performance of the business 
(Bates, 1991; Cressy, 1996). 
In general, it is expect that individuals with access to collateral, with pre-existing relationships 
with lenders, who have greater work experience, education and knowledge of the market, signal 
better credit quality and hence are likely to access credit from lenders.  
The social ties approach emphasises the facilitative role played by the small business owner’s 
direct and indirect connections to potential capital providers (e.g. Hall and Hofer, 1993; Steier 
and Greenwood, 1995) and demonstrates that endorsements and social alliances with prominent 
third parties, which serve as a reputation gesture, can assist small firms in gaining access to 
finance (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999). Venture capitalists look for these endorsements when 
making funding decisions (Baum and Silverman, 2004); while microfinance institutions look to 
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social ties to be able to implement joint liability lending (Hartley, 2010). 
Despite mechanisms that may help overcome information asymmetries, theoretical arguments 
suggest that there are, nonetheless, a number of categories of small business ventures that could 
still be affected by information issues (Deakins et al, 2008; Coleman, 2000).  For example  
business start-ups and young firms,  because of their ‘newness’,  may have little or no access to 
the aforementioned mechanisms available to indicate their credibility; yielding conditions under 
which serious information asymmetries prevail. Hence a funding gap develops. This realisation 
has prompted various forms of public policy interventions such as the loan guarantee schemes 
aimed to increase the supply of finance to small businesses. It remains unclear however if public 
policy can solve this funding gap issues (Storey, 1994). Hence, an innovation like P2P lending is 
of interest.  
1.1 How small business start-ups are typically financed 
The consequence of the aforementioned problems faced by traditional lenders in extending credit 
to small business ventures, especially firms in the early stages, is summarised in a framework put 
forward by Berger and Udell (1998) as illustrated by in Figure 1-2.  Berger and Udell (1998) 
assert that in a typical distribution of business start-ups (in the US and elsewhere), for a 
significant proportion of firms, business capital comes from the 4Fs: first the Founders 
themselves reach deep into their own pockets for initial funds; next they turn to Family, Friends, 
and Foolhardy investors (also known as business angels).  
 
...........Figure 1-2 goes around here...........  
 
Bygrave and Quill (2007) confirm this trend through a study that was carried out across 42 
countries.  They find that 62 percent of the start-up finance came from the Founder(s) of the 
business; who self-fund through savings, second mortgage, credit cards etc. The remaining 38 
percent of start-up funds came from external sources. For the proportion of business owners that 
receive start-up funds from external sources, the distribution is such that they predominantly 
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obtain (equity) funds from family and friends. According to Bygrave et al (2003), 33 percent of 
the ‘fastest growing’ Inc. (500) companies in the US reported to have raised start-up funds from 
family and friends in the year 2000. Preston (2007) indicates that the amount that friends and 
family invest is modest, usually defined as less than $25,000. This form of finance typically 
represents the very first funds needed to finish the business plan, create a prototype, or conduct 
validating research.  
A small proportion of business start-ups are able to raise finance from business angels - 
individuals with disposable wealth, who typically invest their own money into strangers’ 
businesses. When business angels invest in early stage firms however, they typically target very 
high rates of return - as high as 25 percent to 47 percent (Lambert, 2010); which may preclude 
firms that do not fit these preferences of business angels. Some scholars (see for example Sohl, 
1999) say that firms need to have the potential to create at least $10 million in sales after five 
years to be appropriate for angel investment.  Consequently, business angels concerned with 
maximising returns, have sought to redistribute funds away from early stage ventures towards 
growth stages as shown in Figure 1-2 (Amatucci and Sohl, 2007). In terms of the size of 
investment, business angels typically provide funds in the range $25 000 to $500 000 (Shane, 
2008; Benjamin and Margulis, 2000). 
An even smaller proportion of small business ventures will raise start-up funds from primarily 
banks.  Most banks tend not to make loans to new or young businesses because of the lack of 
assets, operational track record and other factors of inherent risk. But as shown in       Figure 1-2, 
when the start-up firms grow, gain further experience and become less information opaque– 
banks are able to make lending decisions; hence they become more able to extend credit to these 
firms. 
Lastly, only a miniscule number of small business ventures will ever tap into venture capital as a 
source of funds for their start-up business. Bygrave and Reynolds (2004) stipulate that as little as 
1 in 10,000 small firms are able to attract venture capital in general; this dynamic is even more 
exaggerated for business start-ups and young firms (than in the whole population of small 
businesses ventures). Venture capitalists are more attracted to arguably even higher rates of 
returns than those expected by business angels. Given that the majority of small business 
ventures are not managed to pursue a growth strategy, which precludes the type of high-growth 
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prospects that are so attractive to venture capitalists (Berger and Udell, 1998); these lenders tend 
to avoid business start-ups and young firms. Venture capitalists typically invest in the regions of 
over $500,000 with some deals in the range well over $10 million (GEM, 2004: 17). 
Therefore for business owners looking for capital to start a business, it is likely that they will 
have to put up a large percentage of the funds from their own pockets. For those that look to 
external investors, informal investors in the form of friends and family seem to be the best bet; 
and if their businesses survives and reach the (post seed and) growth stage – informal investors 
in the form of business angels would be next in line to approach for funding. Then possibly after 
a while, when the start-up has built credit history and the strength of their books, banks may 
become a plausible source of funds.  Eventually, if the start-up reaches growth phase, then it may 
or may not get venture capital. 
Berger and Udell (1998) eloquently summarize the above argument as depicted in Figure 2-1. 
They show that small businesses can be placed on a size/age/ information continuum. Smaller 
and younger firms – more likely to face information asymmetry problems - lie near the left end 
of the continuum, indicating that they must rely on owner finance, friends and family, and/or 
angel finance (collectively known as informal equity). 
1.2 Research motivation 
Since Berger and Udell (1998) proposed their framework however, alternative small business 
funding mechanisms such as P2P lending have since entered the financial landscape. P2P lending 
is an alternative credit market that allows individual borrowers and lenders (who are strangers) to 
engage in credit transactions without going through traditional financial institutions like banks. 
Mostly, transactions take place through websites (known as platforms). These P2P websites 
provide capital for a variety of financial needs, including the provision of capital to small 
business owners
.
 It is typically a form of unsecured debt finance. Unsecured debt finance is not 
typical at seed/start-up stage for small business ventures; finance at this stage is dominated by 
(informal equity). Hence, P2P lending is an innovation that may possibly open up the option of 
external debt finance to early stage ventures; especially if this market continues to grow.  
In Figure 1-3, we show the typical typology of P2P lending. To obtain a loan, small business 
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owners create a profile on the P2P lending websites, providing a small amount of information 
about their business. On most websites, the borrower stipulates (to potential lenders) the amount 
of money they wish to borrow and the interest rate they wish to pay for the loan. On some 
websites, the lenders make those determinations. Loan size can vary between $1,000 and 
$35,000; while interest rates can vary between 5 percent and 36 percent. On all websites, 
potential lenders decide how much, if any, funding to offer. In the case where lenders decide to 
offer funds, generally they spread their risk by backing a portion of each funded loan. 
 
...........Figure 1-3 goes around here........... 
  
The P2P lending landscape differs in at least three ways when compared to traditional lending 
institutions like business angels, banks, and venture capital. First, on P2P lending websites 
individuals extend loans to small business ventures without ever physically meeting the business 
owners; all transactions take place online. In traditional lending, however, the role of both 
physical contact and site visits (if need be) forms an important and integral aspect in credit 
extension; decreasing information asymmetries. It may be argued therefore that information 
asymmetries in the particular case of P2P lending might logically be expected to be even more 
severe. 
Second, hundreds of potential lenders assess and screen the credit requests from small business 
venture at any given time.  It could be argued therefore that individuals understand each other’s 
business better than traditional lenders.  For example, some individuals may have knowledge 
about the area where the borrower wishes to start the business, others might have expertise in the 
product or the technology or the feasibility of the business. Hence, information asymmetries may 
potentially be less severe on P2P websites. 
Third, traditional lenders like bankers are trained experts in conducting due diligence and 
assessing credit risk. In contrast, lenders extending credit to small businesses on P2P websites, 
although they have basic financial knowledge, it is questionable whether they have the 
sophistication and training to conduct efficient due diligence. Hence one might argue therefore 
that lenders on P2P websites may possibly be less informed in appraising credit risk and making 
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investment decisions. It is plausible that they may be amateurs in appraising credit risk and 
making investment decisions.   
Given these differences, are the aforementioned problems faced by traditional lending 
institutions in allocating finance to small businesses better or worse in the P2P lending 
context? This question is topical because it has yet to be established at an empirical level 
whether P2P lending merely crowds out traditional small business finance or whether it actually 
provides finance to businesses that otherwise would not get it (i.e. business start-ups and young 
firms; or businesses looking for small amounts of capital – unable to raise funds from business 
angels and venture capitalists). 
1.3 Main aim of the dissertation, research questions and summary of findings 
In this dissertation we explore the potential viability of P2P lending in the financing of small 
business ventures. Despite the continued growth of this phenomenon (i.e. millions of dollars 
from millions of individual lenders being extended to small business ventures), even basic 
academic knowledge of the dynamics of P2P lending in the financing of small businesses is 
lacking (outside of the still uncommon analysis of particular crowdfunding efforts see  Burtch et 
al, 2011; Agrawal et al, 2011).  For example, we know very little on the types of small business 
ventures this market serve, as well as the dynamics governing successfully raising funding in this 
context. We do not know whether P2P lending efforts reinforce or contradict existing theories 
about how small business ventures raise capital. There is also uncertainty about the long term 
sustainability of this market.   
What’s more, policy makers have also showed keen interest in P2P lending. For example, 
According to Solon (2012), the British government invested over $150 million in small business 
ventures through P2P lending websites in 2013, with the aim of “creating a more diverse 
financial infrastructure which better serves the needs of small and medium-sized 
companies” (Solon 2012:49).  Similarly, the US government has recently passed a new 
legislation under the JOBS ACT in order to nurture and encourage growth of the P2P lending 
sector. The JOBS ACT allows start-ups and small businesses to seek funding of up to $1million 
per annum through P2P lending websites (The Economist, 2012). In short, this growing area of 
small business finance and government action is understudied; even as both practice and policy 
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continue to rapidly advance.  
1.3.1 Main research objectives 
In this subsection, we outline the main research objectives. To put the main research objectives 
into perspective; we look to the area of entrepreneurial finance for some of the big research 
questions tackled (within the traditional ‘offline’ lending context). There are a finite number of 
big questions tackled in the entrepreneurial finance literature. There are questions concerned 
about which firms get funded and which firms don’t; with the objective to look at where funding 
constraints take effect (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; 
Bester, 1987; Storey, 1994; Cressy, 1996; 2002; Parker, 2002; 2009; Cowling, 1997; Cowling et 
al, 2012; Mallick and Chakraborty, 2002). There are also issues or questions concerned about the 
cost that small ventures or early stage ventures pay for funding and what factors drive these costs 
(Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995;  Cowling, 1997; Cole, 1998; 
Burke and Hanley, 2003; 2006,) and then there is literature around modeling default of small 
business ventures (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Berger et al, 2005; Agarwal et al, 2007; 
DeYoung et al, 2007;  Berger and Gleisner 2009). In this dissertation we follow these three 
streams as a basis to set up our research agenda. 
To the extent that the problems of information asymmetries and perhaps the effectiveness of 
mechanisms to counteract them might possibly differ in P2P lending, then the decision to 
allocate credit, the cost of credit and factors driving default may also differ. Due to the novelty of 
the phenomenon, currently there are no established mechanisms of coping with asymmetric 
information that have been identified among lenders financing small business on P2P websites. 
We argue therefore that if P2P lending responds to known signals established in traditional 
lending markets, it reinforces both the validity of these mechanisms in predicting borrower 
quality and the ability of ‘amateur’ lenders to select small businesses risk; which may render the 
market somewhat viable in extending small business loans.     
Some of the mechanisms may not be available, for example P2P small business loans are 
unsecured – hence collateral in the form of Bester (1985, 1987) might not be available in this 
context. Also, loans are online – relationships with lenders as in the form of Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) are not available in this context. However, there are options available rendering new 
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mechanisms of coping with asymmetric information that traditional lending institutions do not 
use. For example, large number of lenders which can aggregate the conducting of due diligence 
and lessen information asymmetries; as well as the wealth of personal and contextual 
information provided by the websites and the borrowers. These new mechanisms may be a 
source of advantage for P2P markets in reducing asymmetric information; hence rendering the 
market somewhat viable in disseminating credit to small business ventures. 
Furthermore, in traditional markets many of the mechanisms available for existing firms are not 
available to new firms. This is a particularly important distinction as start-ups are widely 
perceived to be the riskiest class of small firms (Bates and Nucci, 1999; Evans, 1987; Dunne, 
Roberts and Samuelson 1989).  Hence, we aim to distinguish whether mechanisms used to cope 
with information issues differ between new business start-ups and existing firms in the P2P 
lending context. We contend that if mechanisms  used to cope with information asymmetries are 
no different for new business start-ups when compared to existing businesses in the P2P lending 
context, perhaps P2P lending may be introducing small business finance to a new market of 
small business ventures; previously under-served. 
Overall, following entrepreneurial finance literature, one of the key objectives of the dissertation 
is to examine the determinants of credit allocation for small business loan on P2P lending 
websites. More specifically, in the first empirical study (Chapter 4) we address the question (i) 
what factors drive the probability of funding for small business owners in the P2P lending 
context? Since previous research has established that credit allocation to small business ventures 
is not only about extending funding, but also about the cost of funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Cressy and Toivanen, 2001; Burke and Hanley, 2003; 2006); in the second empirical study 
(Chapter 5), we raise the question (ii) what factors drive interest rates paid by small business 
owners in the P2P lending context? Understanding both the issue of access to P2P funding and 
the cost of funding gives us the ability to ascertain whether P2P lending merely crowds out 
traditional small business finance or whether it actually provides finance to businesses that 
otherwise would not get it. 
In addition to the credit allocation issues, another key objective of the dissertation is to shed light 
on the long term sustainability of the P2P lending market. The long term success of the P2P 
market primarily relies on the lenders’ willingness to extend funds and the returns that they get 
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for their effort. Rational, risk neutral and profit oriented lenders will only extend credit if they 
obtain at least as good a return in comparable alternative investments. Given the continued 
growth of P2P lending in general and an increase in the volume of small business loans in 
particular; a thorough analysis of loan default and loan profitability is needed so as to assess the 
future business potential of P2P lending websites. A question needs to be raised therefore of 
whether investing in P2P small business loans is beneficial for lenders.  Hence, looking at the 
default activity in comparison to lender returns, (iii) is it worth it for lenders to invest in small 
business ventures in this market?  We address this question in the third empirical study found in 
Chapter 6. 
1.3.2 Summary of findings 
The first empirical study titled: Factors driving small business loan approval in P2P lending: 
who gets credit that doesn’t focuses on the determinants of access to credit in this new type of 
credit market.  Specifically, we study data from Prosper.com. Because Prosper is the oldest and 
dominant P2P lending site, it is likely to serve as a broadly useful model for examining P2P 
lending efforts in financing small business ventures. The study is found in Chapter 4.  To 
conduct the analysis, we use bivariate analysis and multivariate Probit regression models, based 
on a random sample of 12,526 loans requests issued between August 2007 and August 2013.  
By way of preview, the bivariate results indicate that the typical firms approaching this market 
for small business funds are started or owned by borrowers who are less than premium credit 
risk
3
. These owners seem to be pursuing the business venture either as a side-line to their 
existing work or as a hobby given the fact that 60 percent of the sample indicate full time 
employment as their labour force activity. In terms of personal wealth, almost half of the 
business owners own their homes.  New firms make up around 30 percent of businesses 
approaching this market; the remaining 70 percent is made up of already established businesses. 
Relative to a representative sample of US small firms of which new ventures form around 10 
percent, new firms are over represented in the P2P context, suggesting that P2P lending may be 
catering to the funding gap experienced by early stage ventures. In terms of industry distribution, 
                                                          
3
 Over 60% of borrowers have had previous delinquencies and 1 in 3 have failed to meet previous loan obligations 
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82 percent of the sample is found in the retail, services, or finance industries. This seems typical 
of the sample of U.S. small businesses; as 87 percent of U.S. firms are represented in these 
sectors
4
. Finally, on average these firms are looking for small amounts of money ($10,430); they 
are willing to pay a high price for credit (24 percent) with the majority (55 percent) looking for 
working capital.  
The general insights from our first empirical study reveals that only 11 percent of loan requests 
manage to get funded in this market. Although collateral is not required, we find that the supply 
of loans tends to flow to the least risky entrepreneurs; those who are homeowners, with high 
credit ratings. Hence, reputation is the single most important determinant of loan supply. In our 
findings, we also demonstrate that firm level characteristics (including age of the firm) have little 
impact on loan supply.  Overall, these findings are both interesting and important as they suggest 
that P2P lending depicts a new small business venture loan market, where previously 
underserved early stage entrepreneurs and those looking for small amounts are able to access 
unsecured credit through the relaxation of collateral.  Our results also suggest that P2P lending is 
a low risk form of debt finance. In this sense, lenders act like traditional debt financiers. 
However, the way in which they appraise funding opportunities characterise typical decision 
making of equity investors such as Business Angels and VC, who tend to focus more on people, 
rather than the business itself.   
Interestingly, with regards to the mechanisms unique to this context we introduce a new feature 
in the form of ‘crowds’ that do indeed help to reducing information asymmetries and adverse 
selection issues. Prospective lenders perceive loan requests attracting a large number of potential 
lenders to have conducted a great amount of due diligence. Furthermore, our findings suggest 
that the loan supply in this context may also possibly be relatively idiosyncratic, depending more 
on lender peculiarity like philanthropy. This observation is supported by evidence we found that 
the way P2P lenders generally appraise funding opportunities is more focused on people rather 
than the business itself. These findings are both interesting and important as they suggest new 
mechanisms of dealing with information asymmetries previously not considered by theory.  We 
also find interesting results to the information in the pictures. All else equal, we estimate that 
                                                          
4
 Following traditional small business literature See ole,1998; we defined industry based on 1 digit SIC code 
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requests from borrowers that include a picture are 2 percentage points more likely to receive 
funding. Compared to the average probability of funding of 11 percent; this represent an almost 
20 percent increase in the likelihood of receiving funding. Perhaps this emphasizes the 
importance of humanising the lending process on P2P websites. 
Our results from the first study have key implications to theory. To recap, Stiglitz and Weiss put 
forward four key parameters underpinning their theory of information asymmetry and adverse 
selection: collateral, conducting due diligence, refraining from high interest rates to avoid moral 
hazard and adverse selection issues, and the inferred face to face borrower-lender interactions. 
From our results, we find that some weights of these parameter values are likely to change in 
Stiglitz-Weiss model.  
First, the general insight we get from our first study is that borrower reputation, stipulated by 
credit grades, is the single most important determinant of credit allocation .The significance of 
using the credit grade helps to reduce the problem of adverse selection. The cost of defaulting 
will result in poorer scores – which are quantifiable to 24 percent in reduction of probability of 
funding.  Moreover, with the advancement of internet, reputations which were previously limited 
within the 1-to-1 lending typology from banks, where if a borrower defaults on credit in one 
region or country for example, would not have an effect if the borrower were to move to another 
country has since  have completely changed.  But with internet age loan default may quickly go 
viral. The consequence of 1-to- many borrower-lender interactions relative to reputation over the 
internet and the ease with which default may go viral makes reputation to be a very important 
aspect within the P2P lending context. 
Second, we see from our results that collateral, which was such an important determinant in 
reducing adverse selection issues in Stiglitz-Weiss theory, in the P2P lending it is unimportant.  
Third, the general insight we get from our first study is that due diligence, although still an 
important factor, in the P2P lending context is conducted by the ‘crowd’. This new feature, 
unique to P2P lending was not taken into consideration in the Stiglitz and Weiss framework – 
where credit risk appraisal was done by relatively one person. Consequently we introduce 
collecting intelligence as a means of eradicating information asymmetry and adverse selection 
issues. Furthermore, our results shift focus from 1-to-1 physical interactions between borrowers 
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and lenders inferred in Stiglitz-Weiss theory and highlights the 1-to many borrower lender 
typology over the internet. Effectively rendering physical contact, which was previously seen an 
important aspect of reducing information asymmetry and adverse selection issues in theory, 
relatively less important. 
Furthermore, In terms of due diligence, the crowd also introduces another distinctive change 
based in the notion that lenders in this context may have philanthropy ambitions which they may 
consider when appraising credit risk. For example, a lender taking into consideration 
philanthropic ambitions may look for different credit risk when compared to a lender whose sole 
ambition is to maximise returns. This may effectively alter access to credit and subsequently the 
P2P borrower pool. 
In sum, we contend that the lessons we leant from our results about asymmetric information and 
adverse selection issues are quiet different to those developed in Stiglitz-Weiss model.  
Reputation is very important in this market (this was not highlighted by Stiglitz). We learn that 
physical contact and collateral becomes less important in reducing information asymmetries. We 
also learn about the importance of three key new features: collective intelligence of the crowd, an 
aspect of philanthropy present when appraising credit risk and the general element of fun which 
may drive lenders when choosing to allocate credit. We contend that Stiglitz-Weiss model will 
have to be updated to take into consideration the facts raised above in their theory of information 
asymmetry in order to reflect our finding.  
Our results also have key practical implications. The fact that P2P lending relaxes collateral 
requirements and the fact that reputation is the single most important variant in P2P lending 
renders our results generalizable to the microfinance institutions, especially those in developing 
countries. The relaxation of collateral makes P2P a viable alternative to small business funding 
in developing countries, especially given the fact that it is in these regions where the wealth 
distributions tend to be skewed unfavourably. The importance of reputation simply highlights 
infrastructure that already exists, used by microfinance in developing countries. Hence this 
renders our results somewhat generalizable. The fact that the internet is an underlying layer in 
operationalizing P2P lending in developing countries, perhaps there is scope of using mobile 
smart phones instead of traditional computers – given that this technology is already entranced in 
developing countries. 
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The second empirical study titled: Factors driving the cost of credit in P2P lending is found in 
Chapter 5. The main purpose of the second study is to investigate the determinants driving the 
interest rate paid by small business loans on P2P websites. We adopt a Tobit model to assess the 
factors that drive interest rates paid based on a sample of 1417 funded loans from Prosper, issued 
between August 2007 and August 2013.   
The general findings from the second empirical study suggest that at an average lending of 
between 18 percent and 20 percent; P2P lending is a very expensive form of debt finance. Banks 
typically refuse to extend credit given such high interest rates as this tends to alter the borrower 
pool such that only the riskiest of borrowers have projects that generate returns that are high 
enough to be able to re-pay these interest rates.  In effect, the bank supply curve is backward 
bending above 10 percent on conventional terms of lending.  Consequently, if we were to 
characterise P2P lending we would effectively conclude that it is typically a high cost finance 
with required returns expected to be likely in the levels of Business Angels and VC equity 
investments. 
Further insight we get from our second study is that borrower reputation, stipulated by credit 
grades is the single most important determinant of the cost of credit .The significance of using 
the credit grade helps to reduce the problem of moral hazard. The cost of defaulting will result in 
poorer scores – quantifiable to an increase of 80 basis points.  Second, we see from our results 
that collateral, which was such an important determinant in reducing moral hazard in Stiglitz-
Weiss theory, in the P2P lending it is unimportant. The fact that P2P lending relaxes collateral 
requirements and the fact that reputation is the single most important variant in assessing the cost 
of credit on P2P websites, highlights some of the facts that were not previously considered by 
previous theory. That is, moral hazard may be solved by other means in the form of credit scores. 
So, looking at the results of the first and second study collectively, if within the P2P lending 
market it is the relatively low risk borrowers who get the loans, then a natural question to address 
is why couldn’t these low risk borrowers’ access conventional bank loans? Moreover, why were 
they willing to offer high interest rates?  One probable explanation is the condition of the credit 
market. Our analysis is based on data covering the period 2008 - 2013, arguably characterised as 
the height of the recession. According to SBA (2012) small business lending from banks 
constricted during this period. Suddenly, businesses who were perfectly good risk able to access 
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credit from banks during buoyant economic times, were suddenly unable to tap into bank lending 
because banks tightened their lending standards to small firms. Subsequently, borrowers, keen to 
have access to capital, were hoping to attract possible lenders with their good credit record and 
high interest rates; just so they can keep their businesses afloat. Consequently, we find that P2P 
lending platforms provided an alternative form of venture finance in times of recession, when 
traditional financiers were unavailable.  
The third and final empirical study titled: Factors driving small business loan default: is it worth 
it worth it for lenders to invest is found in Chapter 6.  The objective of this study is to shed light 
on the long term sustainability of the P2P lending market. For P2P lenders, it is difficult to judge 
the quality of the deal offered beforehand, because lenders bear the default risk and they are not 
trained experts in risk management.  Moreover, lenders on P2P websites tend to demand 
relatively high interest rates (average 18.5 percent) in order to compensate for credit risk.  In the 
study, we address the raised issue by investigating the determinants of loan default for a cross 
section of 1417 small business loans.  
Overall, the results show that on average 1 in every 4 loans funded in this market will result in 
default. Our analysis suggests that the most important determinant of whether borrowers repay 
their debts is the loan size they take up, the interest rates paid; their credit grade and whether 
they shared extra information upfront (in the form of pictures). In general our results also find 
that, contrary to the hypothesis that new business are a more riskier class, new firms are no more 
likely to default when compared to existing firms in this context. We also find that default does 
not vary across different types of industries such that P2P lending becomes sustainable only in 
some parts of the small business sector and not in others – all else equal; industry variables are 
insignificant determinants of default.  
So, is it worth it for lenders to extend funds to small businesses in this market? In terms of lender 
return, we find that the expected return to lenders is 3.26 percent, which is above the opportunity 
cost of capital in the US. Therefore, P2P lending is profitable from the investor point of view, 
albeit in a narrow sense. In general, the results suggest that average lenders on P2P platforms are 
amateurs, who actually have a higher risk tolerance. For these lenders, the risk of losing a small 
proportion (as little as $25) per investment in the overall portfolio of loans is offset by the 
potential gain from high interest rates charged for loans.  However, default is found to be related 
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to risk as predicted by conventional theory, in both formal credit rating and also additional 
information and track records.  
Moreover, a key finding is that default seems to also be associated with the cost of credit, which 
presents an interesting dilemma for lenders. Consequently, at a first glance, we inferred from our 
finding that lenders would have to consider a potential trade off between lowering the interest 
rates they charge borrowers in order to circumvent default. However, it is also plausible that 
some lenders extend credit to entrepreneurs in this context for idiosyncratic reasons – for 
example as some form of gambling. In this case, lenders would simply accept loan requests from 
borrowers offering high interest rates knowing that if the borrowers pay back the loan, they win 
big. However, if some of the loans in the portfolio result in default, the loss is not too big.  
Likewise, some lenders way choose to extend credit to entrepreneurs in this context driven by 
philanthropic desires, knowing that extending credit to the entrepreneurs would simply be 
helpful to their course. 
Interestingly, our results show that return from the top 5 percent of lenders average at 6.1 percent 
per annum. Given the fact that P2P lending is generally a young market, and the fact that 
majority of lenders attracted to P2P lending are relatively uninformed amateurs in making 
investment decisions, the results suggest that if the amateur lenders do indeed learn, it then 
becomes plausible that in time the returns in this market may generally converge to be better 
(and gravitate towards the 6.1 percent achieved by top 5 percent). However, if the P2P lending 
platforms continue to attract a pool of amateur lenders, the average returns of 3.26 percent may 
render the market somewhat unsustainable in the long run.    Given all that has been presented so 
far, P2P lending may come across as an inefficient use of resources. For example, if we were to 
follow the line of argument that lenders may choose to engage in P2P lending for idiosyncratic 
reasons such as fun or gambling etc and philanthropic reasons, it then becomes reasonable to 
infer that perhaps P2P lending may possibly result as an inefficient use of resources. However, 
the fact that P2P lending is profitable for an average, risk loving, uninformed lender, may 
suggest that this instrument may somewhat be an alternative form of financial instrument (albeit 
with some form of inefficient tendencies).  
The third study makes key contributions. First, we shed light on the determinants of default in 
the P2P lending context; highlighting that borrower reputation continues to be the single most 
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dominant determinant of default. Second, we find that the breed of investors extending credit to 
entrepreneurs in this context are amateurs, who have high risk tolerance, with a completely 
different utility function to that of lenders inferred in the model by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
This study sheds some light that P2P lending may be availing a different type of investor to that 
previously seen in the small business lending literature. Finally, Caution will to be exercised 
when ascertaining whether our findings can be generalised to developing countries for example. 
As it stands, P2P lending does not have other mechanisms at its disposal such as peer pressure 
and a sense of community, which help keep default rates down when extending microfinance. 
Given that relationships in this context are very weak at best, since lending takes place online, 
default rates may therefore sky rocket in the context of Microfinance institutions, thus rendering 
P2P lending an unsustainable form of extending credit to small businesses.  
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we review the literature, 
and set the context of the research; position the research questions and developed hypotheses. In 
Chapter 3 we discuss the data source and data set used in the analysis; then we put forward 
details of the methodology adopted in analysing the data. In Chapter 4 we present the first 
empirical study - concerned with the determinants driving the credit extension decision. Next in 
Chapter 5, we present the determinants driving the interest rates paid; whilst Chapter 6 presents 
factors driving default activity. Finally, in Chapter 7, offer final conclusions, contribution of the 
study and limitations of the study. 
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Table 1-1: Small business lending by Prosper and Lending Club, 2008 – 2012 
Number of loans (thousands) and dollar amount (millions) disseminated to small business ventures by 
Prosper.com and Lending Club, the two largest P2P websites for the period 2008 - 2012 
Lender and Year Number of loans Dollar amount  of loans 
 
Prosper   
2008 1714 15,240,122 
2009 212 1,165,140 
2010 550 3,098,768 
2011 1198 9,132,100 
2012 1682 15,051,086 
 
Lending Club   
2008 127 1,683,250 
2009 358 4,392,125 
2010 466 5,384,875 
2011 975 13,861,950 
2012 1386 22,502,666 
      Data source: www.prosper.com and www.lendingclub.com 
  
Figure 1-1: Funded loans on Peer-to-Peer lending websites 2008-2011 
Small business loan composition (relative to general loans) for the period 2008 - 2011 on the two largest 
P2P lending websites, Prosper and Lending Club 
 
        Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Report to congress on availability    
           of credit to small businesses (2012: pp. 40) 
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Figure 1-2: Sources of small business finance 
Different sources of finance for small business ventures by firm size, firm age and level of information 
availability across the business lifecycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
Source: Adopted from Berger and Udell (1998) 
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Figure 1-3: P2P Lending Landscape 
Typical P2P lending landscape where the loan for a single borrower is characteristically funded by 
combining multiple lenders who contribute a small amount each without intermediation from 
traditional institutions like banks, in return they receive a pro-rata interest rate on their investment  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.hacktrix.com/social-lending-websites-to-get-peer-2-peer-p2p-loans 
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Chapter 2 Literature 
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2.0 Introduction 
This Chapter reviews literature on mechanisms typically used to mitigate the problems caused by 
asymmetric information in financing small business ventures. An extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature exists that considers mechanisms that may be used by prospective lenders to 
distinguish between borrower types and to mitigate the risk of moral hazard (when borrowers do 
not put enough effort into their businesses). These mechanisms include the provision of collateral 
that lenders can seize if borrower default (Bester, 1985, Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Bester, 
1987); the development of close relationships between the lenders and the borrowers to improve 
information flow (Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998) 
and signals regarding the future prospects for the business based on borrower human capital 
(Cressy, 1996).  
To put this literature into perspective, we draw from some of the big issues or questions raised in 
entrepreneurial finance literature. The literature is typically organised around 3 major issues as 
shown in Table 2-1:  there are issues or questions concerned about which firms get funded and 
which firms don’t; with the objective to look at where funding constraints take effect (section 
2.1); there are issues or questions concerned about the pricing or cost of small firm finance - how 
much small ventures or new ventures pay for funding and what determines   these costs (section 
2.2); and then there is literature around default (section 2.3). In Table 2-1 the three fundamental 
issues are listed along with the smaller questions related to each stream.  Each of these research 
streams is discussed and key papers are described highlighting mechanisms adopted to mitigate 
information issues.  
 
...........Table 2-1 goes around here........... 
 
The second part of the Chapter discusses P2P lending literature (section 2.4). Since research in 
this area is relatively new, the concept of P2P lending itself does not enjoy a unique definition in 
the literature. Therefore we start in section 2.4.1 by defining the concept of P2P lending, and 
then we identify the benefits and costs entailed by the lenders and the borrowing firms. Next, in 
section 2.4.2 we briefly review some of the literature concerned with P2P lending and small 
businesses finance. We conclude the Chapter by indicating the research gap which then sets the 
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scene for raising our key research questions. 
2.1 Credit extension and small business ventures 
In this subsection we discuss mechanism typically used by lenders to attenuate information 
asymmetries when making credit extension decisions. A large literature exists that stipulates that 
personal wealth held by business owners may influence how a business is funded (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Wette, 1983; Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Avery et al, 1998). 
Information on personal wealth (usually proxied by collateral) can improve underwriting 
decisions and lessen the extent of exposure for the lender. For example, with potential adverse 
selection where borrowers have superior information to that of the lender, creditworthy 
borrowers can use collateral as a signal of their quality (Bester, 1985). Likewise, if borrower 
effort creates moral hazard risk, then collateral may mitigate the incentives for unnecessary risk 
taking as borrowers realise that their personal wealth is at stake.  
Theoretical models focusing on the signalling function of collateral follow from early 
contribution by Bester (1985) with modifications by Besanko and Thakor (1987). Given the 
variability in individual default risk, these studies show that borrowers with low probability of 
default (i.e. low risk borrowers) will reveal themselves by accepting collateral, which would be 
unattractive for high risk borrowers as collateral is costly. A similar argument holds in the case 
of moral hazard where collateral requirements serve as an incentive mechanism because higher 
collateral enforces borrowers to select less risky projects.  
Some theoretical studies consider the effect of collateral in isolation (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Wette, 1983); while contributions by Bester (1985, 1987) and Chan and Kanatas (1985) show 
that by treating collateral requirements together with variations in interest rates, collateral is 
negatively related to the borrower’s risk. Hence, all else equal, borrowers with high probability 
of default prefer contracts with higher interest rates and lower collateral than borrowers with low 
default risk. The reason being that high risk borrowers can afford to pay higher interest rates. 
Moreover, they are also more likely to lose their collateral if their project fails. 
The studies by Bester (1985, 1987) are based on the assumption that collateral is readily 
available to borrowers.  Besanko and Thakor (1987) relax this assumption and show that credit 
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rationing resurfaces when the borrowers face constraint on collateral availability. However, their 
model confirms  that collateral nevertheless hold as a signalling devise as it does reduces 
rationing, even if it cannot eliminate rationing all together.  In a companion paper, Besanko and 
Thakor (1987b) permit loan size to be used as a signal in conjunction with collateral and loan 
interest rates and show that the loan size is increasing in the borrower’s (truthfully) revealed 
success probability. 
The empirical evidence based on the above theories examining the association between borrower 
risk (broadly defined) and collateral is mixed. Studies by Berger and Udell (1990; 1995); Leeth 
and Scott (1989); and Boot et al, (1991) found that it is the riskier borrowers who are likely to be 
asked to provide collateral. Berger and Udell (1995), using interest rate premium as a measure of 
borrower risk, find that collateral is associated with higher risk premiums among small business 
loans. This result seems counter to the prediction of the theories put forward by Bester (1985) 
and others as argued above that high quality borrowers pledge collateral and opt to pay low 
interest rates. However, Berger et al (2011) put forward that it may be the case that collateral 
differences  more often reflects  observed quality differences, rather than unobserved differences 
between borrower types. Studies by Machauer and Weber (1998) report that collateral is 
independent of borrower type; while a recent study by Jiminez et al (2006) show that collateral is 
negatively related to ex post default on loans offered to young firms. The authors argue that ex 
post default may reflect high unobserved risk and hence ex ante information asymmetries. 
Whatever the reason behind the mixed results and the lack of practicality of some of the models 
that describe the relationship between collateral and credit risk, there is sufficient empirical 
evidence to indicate the importance of collateral in credit markets with asymmetric information.   
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show that absences of funds inhibit individuals to start businesses; 
similarly,  studies by Holtz-Eakin et al, (1994); Blanchflower and Oswald, (1998);  and Burke et 
al, (2000) show that entry into self-employment increases with a sudden increase in personal 
wealth.  
Another mechanism available to reduce information problems when extending credit to small 
firm is through relationship lending (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger 
and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998). According to this literature, lenders 
acquire information over time through contact with the firm, and/or its owner and use this 
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information in their decision to extend credit. The premise is based on the fact that borrowers 
will be able to build a reputation over time where lenders are able to observe their repayment 
behavior.  Hence, firms with a strong relationship with their prospective lenders are more likely 
to receive credit.   
Traditionally, these studies measure the strength of the relationship in terms of its length, for 
example, the amount of time the bank has provided loan or other services to the firm (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Scott and Dunkelberg, 1999).  In general these studies report that strong 
ties with lenders lead to greater availability of credit for small firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; 
Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Körting, 1998).  The studies by Cole (1998) and Machauer 
and Webber (2000) put an emphasis however that it is not only the strength of this relationship 
that is important, but the simple presence of the relationship between the lender and the small 
business that matters in the credit allocation decision.  
Banking literature has demonstrated that observable characteristics of the small business and 
those of the business owner are also found to be highly valuable in reducing information 
problems. This is especially true for new business start-ups or small businesses at early stages of 
firm development when owners are usually the major (and probably the only) decision makers  - 
suggesting that owner’s patterns of financial services mimic those of the firm (Cassar, 2004). 
Borrower credit rating, education, age, and business experience are some of the most common 
attributes studied to evaluate the impact of the owner’s characteristics on access to finance 
(Berger et al, 2005; Berger and Frame, 2007; Cressy, 1996; Burke et al, 2000).  The general 
consensus in this literature is that educated borrowers, with high credit ratings and industry 
experience, who are much older (and therefore have longer track records and perhaps even 
possible savings), are likely to be extended credit. Likewise, Cole (1998), based on US data and 
Coleman (2010), based on UK banking data, report that firm age and firm size (measured in 
different ways) also  influence credit allocation such that older firms  and bigger small firms 
were more likely to be extended credit relative to new and smaller firms.  
We sum up the discussion so far as shown in Table 2-2. The reviewed literature on lending under 
asymmetric information  predicts that wealthier business owners (with access to collateral); with 
a good credit history (proxied by high credit ratings), who have previous existing relationship 
with potential lenders; who also have greater work experience, and are educated; generally signal 
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better credit quality and hence are likely to access small business funds from lenders. Moreover, 
there is also evidence that suggests that firm age and size affects credit access such that older and 
larger small firms will have more access to credit. 
 
...........Table 2-2 goes around here........... 
 
Previous research has established that lending to small business ventures is not only about 
extending funding, but also about the cost of funds i.e. the interest rates paid (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Cressy and Toivanen, 2001; Burke and Hanley, 2003; 2006). Therefore it remains 
relevant to gain an understanding of what drive the cost of credit for small firms. We now move 
on to discuss this literature in the next session. 
2.2 The cost of small firm finance 
Studies concerned with factors that influence interest rates paid by small business borrowers 
postulate that closer relationships with creditors improve information flows which may allow 
more accurate assessment of risk; and reduce information asymmetries which leads to lower 
rates of interest (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cowling, 1997; Harhoff and 
Körting, 1998; Keasey and Watson, 2000; Cressy and Toivanen, 2001).  
Petersen and Rajan (1994) are among the first to examine empirically how bank-firm 
relationships affect the cost of funds using a sample of small privately held firms. The data 
comes from the 1988 National Survey of Small Business Finance conducted by the U.S. Small 
Business Administration and the Federal Reserve. They use three different measure of strength 
of relationships, namely: duration, the number of financial services (scope) and the number of 
lenders. They find a reduction of the interest rate among those enterprises that work with fewer 
institutions, although they didn't find a significant link between the duration and scope of the 
relationship and the price of debt. Berger and Udell (1995) use the same dataset as Petersen and 
Rajan (1994) but restrict the sample of loans to lines of credit. The reason is that lines of credit 
are more likely to be relationship loans than other types of loans. They find that borrowers with 
longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates (and are less likely to pledge collateral). 
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Studies by Keasey and Watson (2000) and by Cressy and Toivanen (2001), both based on data 
derived from a representative UK banks, also find that existence of a relationship with a creditor 
enables small firms to be charged lower interest rates. Contrary to the studies above, Harhoff and 
Körting (1998), based on survey data from 1509 German SMEs, find that interest rate is not 
significantly affected by duration of the relationship. The proxies of strength of relationship used 
are duration, the number of lenders and qualitative response in which firm managers indicate to 
what extent they consider their bank relationship as being characterised by mutual trust.  
There is evidence that the interest rate charged to small firms incorporate whether the borrower 
provides collateral; such that borrowers who provide collateral are afforded lower interest rates. 
Burke and Hanley (2003, 2006) argue however that the collateral-interest rate relationship is not 
necessarily linear. Based on UK banking data and estimated with OLS regressions, they observe 
a U shape relationship between wealth and interest rates such that the cost of a loan becomes 
more expensive for borrowers whose personal wealth exceeds the collateral value and for those 
on the other extreme end of the spectrum  who are less wealthy.   
There is also evidence that interest rate charged by lenders incorporates firm specific 
characteristics such as firm industry, firm size and firm age (Keasey and Watson, 2000; Cressy 
and Toivanen 2001; Cowling, 1999). Keasey and Watson (2000) study the pricing of small firm 
loans based on UK bank data, and opt to include industry dummy variable so as to ascertain 
whether interest rates are driven by the industry the small business operates in. They find that 
none of the individual coefficients on the industry dummy variables influence the interest rate 
paid by small businesses. In terms of loan characteristics (i.e. loan size, loan purpose and loan 
term); studies by Cressy and Toivanen (2001) and Burke and Hanley (2006), all based on UK 
bank data, report a negative relationship between loan size and interest rates paid by 
entrepreneurs. Cressy and Toivanen (2001) however reports a reversed sign when endogeniety is 
considered in two stage equations. In terms of loan purpose, studies by Cressy and Toivanen 
(2001), Cowling and Mitchell (2003) and Burke and Hanley (2006) find that working capital 
loans exhibit higher default rates; hence they observe a positive significant relationship between 
working capital loans and interest rates paid. 
Information about the cost of second round finance has also been presented in literature. A 
number of theoretical papers predict the relative cost of finance in the second borrowing period 
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(Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Greenbaum et al, 1989; Sharpe, 1990; 
Diamond, 1989). Diamond’s (1989) multi-period model postulates that a bank will reward 
survivors (those who chose lower risk projects or who were ex ante lower risk borrowers) by 
reducing their interest margins on second round finance. If entrepreneurs are aware of this 
incentive, then a bank should draw a safer pool of applicants for finance (reduced adverse 
selection) and borrowers will be persuaded to choose lower risk projects (reduced moral hazard). 
Boot and Thakor’s (1994) model predictions concur with the description of cheaper second 
round finance.  
However, other theoretical models predict that second round finance will be more expensive. 
Greenbaum et al (1989) and Sharpe (1990) outline models predicting rising costs as a firm’s 
reputation becomes established. Sharpe describes an exploitative bank relationship where a bank 
exploits its information monopoly on a borrower, when information about a borrower’s 
reputation cannot be observed by competing banks. This information monopoly is reflected in an 
interest margin hike for second-round finance. Sharpe (1990) argues that this interest margin 
hike is due to the entrepreneur being “informationally captured” by their lender. 
Empirical studies by Binks and Ennew (1998) based on US survey data, show that longer 
relationships can lead to increased interest rate charges due to banks taking advantage of the 
firms’ lock-in to the relationship. Similarly Hanley and Crook (2005), explicitly consider the 
impact of relationship on the cost of funds (while controlling for collateral) using a dataset for 
1409 commercial loans in the year 1998 provided for a UK retail bank. They propose a two 
equation model for the joint determination of collateral and interest rates. They report higher 
interest rates for follow-up loans, that is, when there is an on-going relationship with the lender. 
They interpret this result, similar to Sharpe (1990), as evidence of a lock in effect.  
Using a quite different dataset, Athavale and Edmister (2004) examine the pricing of a sequence 
of loans provided by the same bank in the U.S. This way they avoid using proxies for 
relationship strength. Based on OLS regressions, they find that the interest for follow up loans 
decrease with respect to the first loan. They interpret this result as support that lending 
relationships resolve information asymmetries between the bank and the borrower.  
Some recent papers examine the effect of relationship lending on the simultaneous determination 
  
31 
 
of various loan contract covenants. This approach allows incorporating the interdependencies 
between contract terms. Although a very appealing research direction, all of these studies are 
subject to an identification problem; which requires for instance, identifying instrumental 
variables that affect the determination of the interest rate but not collateral. Dennis, Nandy and 
Sharpe (2000) propose a four equation model for the interest rate, collateral, fees and maturity 
that is estimated for a sample of 2634 bank revolving contracts. Data comes from LPC Dealscan 
database. The proxy for relationship strength is loan concentration, defined as the amount of 
borrowings in the deal relative to the borrower's total debt. They find that interest rate increases 
as a relationship develops. 
Brick and Palia (2005) use a simultaneous equation approach to account for the fact that 
collateral requirement is endogenously determined with interest rate. They find that the length of 
the relationship does impact upon both the probability of posting collateral and the level of the 
loan interest rates; however, the economic impact is relatively small. 
D'Auria, Foglia and Marullo-Reedtz (1999) examine a panel dataset of Italian bank-firm 
relationships during the period 1987-1994, corresponding to 2300 large and medium-sized firms. 
They find that a main bank (measured as percentage of loans from main bank over total firm 
loans) provides credit at a lower interest rate and that increasing the number of bank 
relationships decreases the interest rate. Cosci and Meliciani (2002) also provide evidence from 
Italy. They find that the number of bank relationships has a positive effect on credit availability 
but has no effect on interest rates. With data of 18,000 loans supplied by one of the largest 
Belgian banks, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find an increase in the interest rate and a 
decrease of collateral with the duration of relationship. All these studies are summarised  
in Table 2-3. 
...........Table 2-3 goes around here........... 
2.3 Default literature 
In the main, the financial intermediation literature on small business lending mainly focused on 
the determinants and costs of credit access. There has been however little research examining the 
repayment behaviour of small firms that actually received loans. This was previously attributed 
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to data limitations (Glennon and Nigro, 2005; 2008). To date, two strands of research in 
literature have focused on modeling default activity for small business ventures. The one strand 
has its foundation in financial ratio analysis based on financial statements and industry data (see 
for example studies by Altman and Sabato, 2007; Fidrmuc and Hainz, 2010; Behr, Guttler and 
Plattner, 2004 and Dyrberg-Rommer, 2005).  The key motivation of these studies was to show 
the significant importance (for banks) of modeling credit risk for small firms separately from 
large firms. In general these studies build default predicting models based on financial ratios 
derived from large firms to determine whether these models can help predict default in small 
business ventures. In general, these studies find that models designed for large firms perform 
poorly in predicting small business default. They also show that a small number of financial 
ratios tailored to small firms namely: indebtedness, liquidity, profitability and sector-specific 
effects are important determinants of default. Hence, these studies conclude that banks should 
develop credit risk models specially addressed to small business ventures.  
A key limitation has been identified in adopting the financial ratio analysis method when 
modeling small business default. Most of the small business ventures in these studies are actually 
‘larger’ small firms (with sales of $50 million). In cases where financial statement data does not 
exist - typically early stage ventures such as business start-ups and young firms - financial ratio 
analysis technique cannot be applied; hence the problem of modeling default risk specific to 
small businesses remains. 
A second strand of literature models small business default activity based on credit information 
of the principal business owner (see for example Berger et al, 2005; Agarwal et al, 2007; 
DeYoung et al, 2007; Berger et al, 2009). This strand of literature asserts that the personal credit 
history or indebtedness of small business owners is highly predictive of the loan repayments of 
their business. This is especially true for businesses at early stages of firm development, when 
business owners are usually the major (and probably the only) decision makers (Cassar, 2004).  
Agarwal et al (2007) study the impact of borrower credit scores vs. business credit scores in 
predicting small business default risk. They find support for modeling small business risk based 
on credit information of the business owner; they show that business owners’ personal credit 
scores lower loan default vs. business credit scores.   
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Berger et al (2005) examine the effects of credit rating
 
on the availability, price and default risk 
of small business credits. They compare small business loans granted before adoption of credit 
rating to those granted after the adoption of credit rating in managing credit risk. They find that 
the adoption of credit rating is associated with expanded quantities, higher average prices, and 
greater default risk for small business loans. One explanation that Berger et al (2005) put 
forward for their observation is that adopting credit rating as a mode of predicting default risk 
expands credit to some relatively risky ‘marginal borrowers’ that would otherwise not receive 
credit. The study by Berger and Frame (2007) compare banks that have adopted the use of credit 
rating to manage default risk to those who have not.  They find that banks that use credit rating 
tend to have no more loan performance problems than other banks, despite the observed increase 
in lending to presumably more marginal borrowers.  
It is plausible that lenders could be experienced (hence efficient) in appraising default risk, such 
that credit rating is not necessarily a key driver of default; lenders may opt to compensate for 
default risk by simultaneously adopting other instruments, such as requesting collateral that can 
be seized in the event of default (Berger and Udell, 1995) or by charging higher interest rates 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Indeed theoretical papers by  Bester (1985), Chan and Kanatas 
(1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Chan and Thakor (1987) assert that collateral pledged 
helps align the interests of both lenders and borrowers, avoiding a situation in which the 
borrower makes less effort to ensure the success of the project for which finance was given. 
Hence these studies predict a negative relationship between the provision of collateral and loan 
default. It is also likely however that by the mere presence of collateral, lenders might apply less 
rigor when appraising loans that offer collateral; thus leading to an increase in default risk. 
Other studies in the literature  predict that the use of soft qualitative information, such as firm 
age and information gathered through contact over time (based on relationships), attenuates 
adverse selection and moral hazard issues; hence prove to be critical in loan approval decision-
making and loan-pricing processes (Cole, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 
1995). It follows then to ask whether firm age and relationship variables help predict default risk.  
Previous research has shown that firm age has a strong influence on loan default. For example, 
Bates and Nucci (1999), Evans (1987) and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) have found 
that in the U.S, the probability that a firm will fail over a given period of time decreases with 
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firm age. Studies by Good and Graves (1993) and Honjo (2000) state that new firms fail at 
higher rates than established firms (all else equal); which leads to the supposition that new firms 
are statistically more likely to default than established firms. Cowling and Mitchell (2003) also 
find that start-up businesses had higher default rates. They report that over time however start-
ups were no more likely to default than existing firms. Glennon and Nigro (2005) also report that 
borrowers that are less than 3-year old at loan origination were more likely to default on their 
loans than more mature small businesses. Larger firms were shown to be more likely to default 
(Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Glennon and Nigro, 2005, 2008). 
It remains vague however whether relationships do indeed lead to loans that performs better in 
terms of default. Matteo et al (2012) report that the acquisition of new customers about whom 
less information is available - adverse selection mechanisms and the potential reduction of 
selection criteria - produce a higher level of bad debts for bank loans. This evidence emphasises 
the role of soft information and knowledge of the borrower in terms of strategies and 
intermediation models that consistently try to obtain and maintain the high quality of loan 
portfolios. Jimenez and Saurina (2004) tested factors driving default for 3 million bank loans 
during the period 1988–2000. Their analysis shows that as the number of banking relationships 
grows the probability of default decreases. 
Finally, Studies by Cowling and Mitchell (2003); Glennon and Nigro (2005, 2008) observe 
significant effects on default risk across industrial sectors. Glennon and Nigro (2005; 2008) note 
that small firms in the manufacturing and retail sectors had significantly higher default rates and 
that firms in the transport and communications sector had significantly lower default rates than 
all other sector. Similarly, Cowling and Mitchell (2003), based on UK data, also find that loans 
to firms in the retail sector are more likely to default (all else equal). They further report that 
firms in the service sector are less likely to default relative to firms in other industries - a result 
that reflects the higher default rate for retail firms and the lower default rate for service firms. 
To sum up the discussion so far, we have reviewed literature on the determinants of small 
business loan credit allocation, cost of credit and factors driving loan default. We now move on 
to discuss these key issues within the P2P lending context in the next session. 
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2.4 P2P lending 
The concept of P2P lending is fairly recent and novel; hence literature on the topic in general, 
and specific to small business ventures, is scant.  Since research in this area is relatively new, the 
concept of P2P lending itself does not enjoy a unique definition in the literature. Therefore we 
start in section 2.4.1 by defining the concept of P2P lending, and then we identify the benefits 
and costs of P2P lending. Next, in section 2.4.2 we briefly review some of the available literature 
concerned with P2P lending and small businesses finance. 
2.4.1 Defining P2P lending 
In this dissertation, P2P lending is defined as a way of attracting funds directly from multiple 
investors using the internet. Individuals lend money to others directly, without intermediation of 
traditional financial institutions like banks. Lending takes place predominantly through websites 
(known as platforms). It is typically a form of unsecured debt finance, rather than equity.  P2P 
lending in this context is not restricted to specific relationships such as entrepreneurs lending (or 
borrowing) funds to other entrepreneurs. In addition, P2P lending is not restricted between 
individuals who share similarities in terms of wealth, gender, race or ethnicity transacting with 
each other. Instead, P2P lending explicitly defines a lending mechanism such that any individual 
may transact with any other individual over P2P lending websites. 
As illustrated in Figure 2-1, P2P lending is a subset of crowdfunding.  In one of the few 
published overviews of the topic, Mollick (2013: 3) defines crowdfunding within an 
entrepreneurial context, as “the effort by entrepreneurial individuals and groups (cultural, social; 
for-profit) to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from relatively 
large number of individuals using the internet, without standard financial intermediaries”.  There 
are four main contexts in which individuals fund projects on crowdfunding websites as 
illustrated in Figure 2-1 namely: donations based context, rewards based context, lending based 
context and equity based context (Mollick, 2013; Massolution, 2013). The fundamental 
distinction between these four types of providing finance is the lender’s intention and/or 
expectations concerning returns.  
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...........Figure 2-1 goes around here........... 
The donations based crowdfunding follows a patronage model placing lenders in the position of 
philanthropists. Here lenders donate small loan amounts to small business ventures in 
economically underdeveloped regions in the world; and expect no direct returns for their efforts. 
One such example is Kiva.com (the largest donations based crowdfunding website) which has 
reportedly disseminated to date just under $400 million for entrepreneurs in developing countries 
(Massolution, 2013). Lenders who engage in rewards based crowdfunding receive a (non-
financial) reward for backing entrepreneurial projects. Rewards include whatever product the 
small firm is selling (or intends to sell); for example electronic gadgets, CDs, t-shirts, beer etc. 
(Massolution, 2013). Rewards based crowdfunding may also treat lenders as customers - 
allowing them access to the products produced by the funded project at an earlier date or at a 
cheaper price (Massolution, 2013). Mollick (2013) in one of the few studies published in 
crowdfunding asserts that pre-selling of products to earlier customers is a common feature of 
those crowdfunding projects that more resemble entrepreneurial ventures, such as producing 
novel software, hardware, or customer products.  Kick-starter is the largest rewards based 
crowdfunding website; with over $380 million lent trough this site.  
Individuals who engage in the equity based context and the lending based context do so with an 
intention of receiving a reasonable return as compensation for taking a risk of extending funds. 
As of mid-2013,  however, equity based lending is generally not permitted in the United States 
and still relatively rare worldwide, making up less than 5 percent of all crowdfunding investment 
(Massolution, 2013). This is due to the fact that equity crowdfunding is subject to high levels of 
regulation (Heminway and Hoffman, 2010); hence the eventual adoption of this approach 
(relative to other forms of crowdfunding) is still uncertain. Finally, the lending based model is 
one in which funds are offered to potential borrowers as a loan, with the expectation of a rate of 
return on capital invested. Lendingclub.com and Prosper.com are the largest P2P lending 
websites in the world; they have originated over $2 billion unsecured loans. For the most part, 
P2P lending functions on the basis of trust, albeit trust between people that have only met on the 
internet. The sites match individual borrowers with individual lenders and provide lenders with 
both financial and nonfinancial information to facilitate due diligence. Borrowers post their loan 
requests on the websites, share (voluntary) information about themselves - both personal and 
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financial - and lenders decide whether or not to contribute to their loan request. Every loan is 
underwritten by multiple individual lenders, each committing a fraction of the loan until it is 
funded in full. Once fully funded, the loan is originated and the lenders receive a pro rata share 
of the principal and interest payments until the loan reaches maturity or until the borrower 
defaults. The websites generate their revenue via service fees, which they collect from borrowers 
as well as lenders (Klafft, 2008). Borrowers are afforded an opportunity to include text 
description in their loan request, which lenders can utilise to make a compelling case for why 
they should extend credit to these borrowers. In addition, most P2P lending websites allow 
borrowers to include a picture when requesting for a loan. 
Some of the benefits of P2P lending (over traditional lending institutions) for small business 
borrowers this includes include: 
 Access to millions of individual lenders at one time - which increases the chance of 
receiving funding for small business ventures;  
 Relaxation of collateral requirements since the loans are unsecured - which previous 
research has shown to be one of the reasons for persisting credit rationing (Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989);  
 Quick turnaround times of obtaining the loan - on average it currently takes around 7 
days to get a loan on P2P lending websites with minimal paper work.  For lenders - P2P 
lending provides better returns, which seem to outperform banking returns (albeit given 
relatively higher risk). 
Moreover, given that lenders can diversify their investment to be as little as $50 per transaction; 
this limits the impact of loss.  As with just about every financial model, there are also 
disadvantages to P2P lending as well; particularly for lenders. First, there is very little 
reassurance that investments will be paid back on time (if at all). Second, unlike traditional 
institutions, given that loans in this context are unsecured and can be as little as $50, there are 
few methods of recourse for non-payment. If a lender loses $50 it may not be worthy to chase the 
borrower. 
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2.4.2 P2P lending and small business finance 
Despite the potential of P2P lending being a viable method of funding small business ventures, 
there has been very little published peer reviewed work to date on P2P lending and small 
business finance – apart from a small stream of studies focus solely on rewards based 
crowdfunding (Agrawal et al, 2011; Mollick, 2013; 2010; Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012). In 
general rewards based lending studies are concerned with the assessment of quality of early stage 
entrepreneurial ventures based on signals of quality that venture capitalists typically look for in 
their selection process. For example, Agrawal et al, (2011), based on data from Kickstarter.com, 
used a market of musicians seeking crowdfunding to understand whether crowdfunding relaxes 
geographic constraints on fundraising that are typical of venture capital firms.  Mollick (2010) 
uses data from Kickstarter.com to examine crowd funded projects that match characteristics of 
more traditional venture capital backed seed ventures to determine what role geography and 
gender play in new venture finance within a crowdfunding regime. Other studies examine 
aspects of efficient communication and networking as determinants of early stage venture 
funding success (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012). Finally, the study by Mollick (2013), also 
based on data from Kickstater.com, offers one of the first generic analyses of how rewards based 
crowdfunding works; sharing insight on the ways in which the characteristics of (potential) small 
business owners and the way they present their ventures can affect entrepreneurial financing 
outcome. 
Looking specifically at P2P lending research, so far almost all existing literature is typically 
concerned with understanding P2P lending dynamics for general loans;  investigating 
determinants of funding outcome on the basis of: perceived trustworthiness (Duarte et al, 2010; 
Klafft, 2008), taste-based discrimination (Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Ravina, 2008), borrowers' 
identity claims in the stories that they tell (Herzenstein et al, 2011; Sonenshein et al, 2011), and 
interest rates ( Iyer et al., 2010). Another stream of research examines the social network aspect 
of P2P lending, such as how social networks affect loan performance (Freedman and Jin, 2008), 
how  social networks relate to loan default risk (Everett, 2010), and how the strength and 
verifiability of relational networks influence funding outcomes and loan defaults (Lin, 
Viswanathan and Prabhala, 2011).  
In Tables 2.4 to Table 2.6 we review each of these studies in detail; highlighting what has been 
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studies in terms of variables and what might still need further investigations. As shown in the 
review tables, In general these studies are based on large samples in the thousands, mostly 
gathered from Prosper based in the US; and include data related to a range of personal and 
background characteristics affecting the key dependent variables of interest. Moreover, a variety 
of operational definitions and analysis procedures are utilised in the different studies mostly 
developed from (linear) multivariate regression models. We found that a subset of studies 
concerned with understanding P2P lending dynamics for general loans included a binary variable 
in the analysis, where they compare funding outcome, or cost of finance, or default behavior 
between general loans and business loans (see for example see Ravini, 2008; Pope et al, 2011; 
Weib et al., 2010; Barasinska, 2010 and Duarte et al., 2010).   
 
...........Table 2-4 to Table 2-6 goes around here........... 
 
Ravini, (2010) was among the first to analyse P2P lending data. The working paper strived to 
determine the role of beauty and physical appearance on both credit extension and the cost of 
credit.  They use data from Prosper; covering general loans over a one month period from March 
- April 2007. To analyse the data, liner Probit regressions were used to estimate credit allocation 
and OLS regressions were used to estimate factors driving interest rate. The study includes a 
variable to compare the funding success of entrepreneurs in this context based on the self-
reported employment status of each borrower. They report that borrowers who are full time 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be funded when compared to their counterparts who report that 
they are in full time employment. They find a positive but insignificant result for the interest rate 
estimation. 
Pope and Sydnor, (2011) in a published paper, analyse Pictures to determine the role of 
discrimination in affecting access to credit, cost of credit and loan default behaviour. The study 
is based on sub sample of data from Prosper; covering general loans over a one year period from 
2006 to 2007. To analyse the data they use liner Probit regressions to estimate credit allocation; 
OLS regressions to estimate factors driving interest rate and a Cox hazard model to estimate 
default. In their analysis, Pope and Sydnor (2011) include a control variable to compare the risk 
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of general loans in relation to that of business loans. They report that small business loans are 
less likely to be funded, are more likely to pay higher interest rates and are more likely to result 
in default. These results cannot be generalised however to the whole population of loans on 
Prosper, as they are based only on a subsample of loan requests that include pictures. Inclusion 
of pictures is optional; hence there results may be biased due to selection effects.  
The working paper by Weib et al (2010) analyses the impact of non-verified information vs. 
verifiable information in determining both credit extension and the cost of credit. They 
hypothesise that the verification of certain borrower characteristics significantly affects funding 
success and interest rates paid for the loans. The study is based on data from Prosper; covering 
general loans over a three month period; from July to October 2009. To analyse the data, they 
use a multinomial logic regression (credit allocation) and a standard OLS regression for the 
interest rates estimation.  In both estimations, the business variable is insignificant.  
Duarte et al, (2010) analyse the role of trust in financial decisions; concerned with assessing the 
extent to which people in general use impressions of potential counterparties’ trustworthiness 
when making financial decisions. They construct the measure of trustworthiness based on the 
pictures included in the loan requests.  The study is also based on data from Prosper; covering 
general loans over from 2006 to 2009. They use liner Probit regression to estimate credit 
allocation and Cox hazard model to estimate default. They find that business owners s who are 
perceived to be less trust worthy are less likely to have their loan request funded; however they 
find that their loans are no more likely to default than those who are perceived to be less 
trustworthy. More specifically, they find that borrowers who include business premises in their 
loan request seem to be perceived to be more trust worthy - hence they are likely to be funded.  
Barasinska (2010) models the role of gender in affecting credit access. The study is based on 
data from Smava, a German P2P lending company; covering general loans over a one year 
period from 2006 to 2007. They use liner probability models to estimate credit allocation. 
Similarly, this study reports that small business loans relative to general loans are more likely to 
be funded.  
Overall, given the diverse operational definitions and procedures adopted, as to be expected, we 
found a number of conflicting results. That is, there were a few cases where one study finds 
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significant positive effect between general loans and business loans and the other a significant 
negative effect. Some of the observed patterns are non-complementary. These findings are 
summarised in Tables 2-4 to Table 2-6.  
2.5. Research gap  
We summarise our discussion of the literature by illustration with reference to Table 2-7. 
Starting at the top left corner of Table 2-7 and moving  counter-clockwise, the literature on 
traditional lending offers a broad understanding on some of the big questions asked by 
researchers in entrepreneurial finance, which help set the agenda of this dissertation. This 
literature also offers theory on mechanisms typically used to lessen information asymmetries; 
which we seek to test in this new context. It is important to understand whether information 
asymmetries issues are attenuated by the same underlying mechanisms as other forms of 
traditional lending or if there are some other mechanisms adopted. This is an important topic 
because it has yet to be established at an empirical level whether P2P lending merely crowds out 
traditional small business finance or whether it actually provides finance to businesses that 
otherwise would not get it.  
 
...........Table 2-7 goes around here........... 
 
Moving to the bottom left hand corner of Table 2-7, the literature on general loans from 
traditional institutions does not inform this study. 
Next, the broad literature on P2P lending is mostly concerned about general loans. A subset of 
this literature however includes a binary variable to distinguish credit risk of business loans in 
comparison to general loans. Although this literature offers valuable contributions in 
understanding a new way of mobilising finance; none of the reviewed studies code for business 
loans specific data. Hence, little is known about the type of business ventures that come to this 
market for funds as well as the dynamics governing successfully raising funding in this context. 
We also don’t know whether this new form of credit favours specific industries; or even whether 
this market is sustainable in the long run.  Consequently, we have collected and created business 
loan specific data; introducing new key variables to help us study small business loans within the 
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P2P lending context. Hence this positions our research in the top right corner of Table 2-7.  Since 
P2P lending is novel and potentially disruptive to traditional approaches of funding small 
business ventures, we follow entrepreneurial finance literature and P2P lending literature by 
formulating the following key research questions:  
 What factors drive the probability of funding for small business loans in the P2P lending 
context?  
 What factors drive the cost of credit for small business loans in the P2P lending context?  
 Looking at the default activity in comparison to lender returns, is it worth it for lenders to 
extend small business loans in the P2P lending context? 
Collectively, the first two questions will help determine whether P2P lending merely crowd out 
traditional banking finance or whether it offers finance to those who are traditionally 
underserved; whilst the third question will help determine whether  P2P lending is sustainable in 
the long run. 
In order to operationalise these research questions, the basic intuition behind the analysis is 
based on the fact that due to the novelty of P2P lending, currently there are no established 
mechanisms of coping with asymmetric information that have been identified among lenders 
financing small business ventures in this context. We test the proposition that if P2P lending 
responds to known signals established in traditional lending, it reinforces both the validity of 
these mechanisms in predicting borrower quality and the ability of ‘amateur’ lenders to select 
small businesses risk; which may render the market somewhat viable in extending credit to small 
business ventures.   If on the other hand the mechanisms used by traditional lending institutions 
are not predictive of borrower quality and the ability of lenders to select small businesses risk in 
P2P lending, this may suggests that either the signals sought by traditional lenders are 
ceremonial in nature and are not generally predictive of entrepreneurial credit allocation outside 
the traditional ‘offline’ lending market; or that P2P lending relies on other (unique) mechanisms.  
Additionally, in traditional lending, many of the mechanisms available to already established 
firms may not necessarily be available to new business start-ups. Hence, we test the proposition 
that if mechanisms  used to cope with information asymmetries are no different for new business 
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start-ups when compared to established businesses in the P2P lending context, perhaps P2P 
lending may be introducing small business finance to a new market of business ventures; 
previously under-served. This is a particularly important distinction as new firms are widely 
perceived to be the riskiest class of small business ventures (Bates and Nucci, 1999; Evans, 
1987; Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989).   
In terms of the data aspects, when reviewing P2P lending studies we found that almost all 
empirical studies on loan performance were based on loans that were current, given that the loans 
had not yet reached full maturity during the period of study (with the exception of Duarte et al, 
2010). In many settings, there is no ex post performance data. Consequently, these studies 
operationalised default based on the assumption that all loans which were delinquent or late (and 
not current) would eventually result in default (Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Ravini, 2008; Everett 
2010; Kumar, 2007). Unlike the reviewed studies, our data set incorporates loan performance 
data that includes at least three cycles of loans which have reached full maturity. This enables us 
to model loan performance founded on actual default observed.  Hence, given the availability of 
this loan performance data, we were able to validate whether ‘amateur’ lenders were indeed 
efficient (or not) in appraising credit risk. We test the proposition that investing in small business 
loans associated with higher (lower) risk will manifest in poorer (greater) returns for lenders. We 
also test whether the proposition puts forward by theory that new firms are more risky than 
established firms is supported by loan performance data in the P2P lending context..  
In terms of methodology, we found that in almost all reviewed P2P lending studies, the 
estimation of the interest rate (OLS) and default equations (Probit) are based on funded loans 
selected non-randomly from the sample of all loan requests.  If selectivity exists, the coefficients 
observed from the estimations may be biased (Greene, 1997). Therefore, we follow these studies 
however, we also account for selectivity by adopting 2 stage models (Cressy, 1996).  Finally, all 
reviewed P2P lending studies employ linear multivariate models. We follow these studies and 
adopt a similar approach in our empirical analysis. However, unlike the P2P lending studies, we 
also account for non-linearity of some of the key variables of interest (Cole, 1998; Cowling, 
1997; Burke and Hanley, 2006).   
Lastly, we follow P2P lending literature and control for non-verified information in the form of 
text elaborations (Weib, 2010; Herzenstein et al, 2011; Sonenshein et al, 2011); borrower’s 
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labour force activity (Ravini) and pictures (Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Ravini, 2008; Duarte et 
al.,2010). We also control for geographic location (Agrawal et al, 2011). 
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
The entrepreneurial finance literature offers a broad understanding on some of the big questions 
asked by researchers in entrepreneurial finance, which help set the agenda of this dissertation. 
This literature also offers theory on mechanisms typically used to lessen information 
asymmetries. The broad literature on P2P lending is mostly concerned about general loans. 
Although this literature offers valuable contributions in understanding a new way of mobilising 
finance; none of the reviewed studies code for business loans specific data. The lack of empirical 
studies specific to small business ventures and the availability of the data from P2P lending 
websites motivated us to investigate the impact of P2P lending on the finance of small business 
ventures.  
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Figure 2-1: P2P lending as a subset of Crowd-funding typology 
P2P lending is one of four common forms of attracting small business capital from a group of strangers 
encompassed under the crowd – funding family. Lenders extending capital to small business ventures 
through P2P lending are motivated by interest rates expected on capital invested. 
 
 
       
 Source: Adapted from Massolution, 2013 
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Table 2-1: The overarching research issues in small business finance 
This table highlights the key issues and related smaller questions motivating the small business finance research agenda 
The big issues Related smaller questions 
(1) Credit allocation: Which firms get 
funded which firms don’t 
 Why do banks routinely deny credit rather than charge higher borrower prices 
 How does collateral affect  credit allocation   
 Is there ethnic discrimination in the market for small business credit 
 What is the role of information and bank- relationships on credit allocation 
 Is there gender discrimination in the market for small business credit 
 Can credit contract innovations resolve the problems that bring about credit rationing 
 Is credit rationing a static or dynamic phenomenon 
 
(2) The pricing/cost  of small firm finance: 
What are the determinants of loan 
premium  (or interest rates) for small 
business credit  
 What are the effects of collateralisation on bank loan premium 
 What is the role of information and bank- relationships on bank loan premium  
 Is second round loan finance cheaper or costly for small business venture 
 
(3) Determinants of small business default   What are the determinants of loan default; 
 What is the importance of owner and business credit risk characteristics in 
determining default behaviour of small business loans 
 What factors determine default probability over time 
 Is there a difference in default rates in different sectors 
Source: Compiled by author through literature research 
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Table 2-2: Theoretical and empirical studies of asymmetric information and Credit allocation in small business finance 
This table summarises the main findings in the theoretical and empirical literature on the risk of asymmetric information and credit allocation to small 
business ventures. For the empirical studies we further describe the data source, sample size and the adopted method of analysis. 
 
Theoretical Studies 
Author Summary of findings 
Bester (1985) Bester   concludes that collateral can help sort a priori indistinguishable borrower. Bester concludes that the low risk loan applicants try to 
differentiate themselves from high risk applicants by accepting higher collateral as collateral is costly. 
Bester (1987) Studies collateral and its impact on moral hazard. Bester concludes that an increase in interest rates results in  a negative effect over the 
repayment probability;  whereas an increase in collateral results in a positive effect, i.e. an increase in collateral makes a risky project less 
attractive 
Chan and Kanatas 
(1988) 
They also conclude that collateral can help sort a priori indistinguishable borrowers  
Besanko and Thakor 
(1987) 
Examines the role of collateral in diminishing credit rationing when lenders do not know lender’s default probability. In this paper the 
authors study  loan contracting under asymmetric information within a multidimensional pricing scheme (i.e. they look at collateral, interest 
rates and loan quantity) and the possibility of rationing. In both cases, Besanko and Thakor find a positive relationship between borrower 
quality i.e. low quality borrowers (high risk)  put up less collateral than high risk (low quality borrowers). 
Empirical Studies 
 
 
Author 
 
Sample 
Description 
 
Data Source 
 
Method of 
analysis 
 
Summary of findings 
Cressy (1996) Sample of 2048; 
period:  1988 
UK start-up 
businesses 
Two stage 
regressions 
 Typical firm unconstrained by finance, instead by human capital. They find a that older 
borrowers,  with more  work experience, who are educated are more likely to have 
access to collateral and therefore are more likely to have access to credit 
Harhoff and Körting 
(1998) 
1509 German 
SMEs 
Survey data Regressions This paper finds that collateral decreases with relationship duration. They also find 
that the availability of credit decreases with number of lenders 
Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) 
3404  sample of 
firms with fewer 
than 500 
employees 
1987 US 
National 
Survey of Small 
Business 
Finance 
Regressions There is a positive relationship between the length of pre-existing relationships and 
access to credit. If the borrower has multiplier suppliers of finance the availability of 
finance will decrease 
Table 2-2 continues  
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Author 
 
Sample 
Description 
 
Data Source 
 
Method of 
analysis 
 
Summary of findings 
Empirical Studies 
 
Berger and Udell 
(1990) 
 
 
1 million 
commercial loans 
from 460  US 
banks: 
period:1977-
1988 
 
  
Federal 
Reserve’s 
Survey of 
Terms of Bank 
lending 
 
 
Regression; 
cross section 
 
 
They test Bester (1985)’s theory that better risk borrowers pledge collateral by 
comparing secured vs. unsecured loans. This paper finds that contrary to Bester’s 
theoretical model, Collateral associated with higher credit risk.  Their results suggest 
that borrowers who pledge collateral are riskier than borrowers who do not. As 
evidence of this – they show that borrowers with secured loans vs. unsecured loans 
tend to have more non-performing loans (delinquencies, re-negotiated etc. Berger and 
Udell, 1990: 40). This  correlation can be explained in the context of symmetric 
information (in the case of the bank as  mentioned by de Meza), with the 
entrepreneur’s over optimism about their projects 
Boot , Berger and 
Udell (1991) 
Proof of Chan 
and Kanatas 
model that 
collateral 
resolves private 
information and 
moral hazard 
problem 
Federal 
Reserve’s 
Survey of 
Terms of Bank 
lending 
Regressions Their analysis generalises the results of the papers by Bester (1985); Chan and Kanatas 
(1987); to the case of both moral hazard and adverse selection. This study thus 
explains collateral variations within observationally indistinguishable group of 
borrowers as well as cross-sectionally distinct groups. They find that higher quality 
borrowers do not necessarily post more collateral. 
Hanley and Girma 
(2006) 
466 new 
ventures. period: 
1998 - 1999 
UK retail bank 
(identity not  
disclosed) 
2 stage 
regression 
Report a positive and significant relationship between collateral and access of credit. 
They also report that lenders reject borrowers looking for smaller loans – which they 
interpret as the possibility that lenders are likely to reject lower credit requests if 
these projects are synonymous with underinvestment and hence pose a higher risk of 
failure. This low success rate is reflected in the higher interest margins these loans are 
associated with. 
Berger and Udell 
(1995) 
3400  sample of 
firms with fewer 
than 500 
employees 
1987 US 
National Survey 
of Small 
Business 
Finance 
Regressions Test Boot and Thakor (1984) theory on bank lender relationship. Evidence in this paper 
shows that small firms with longer  banking relationships are less likely to pledge 
collateral relative to other small firms. These results suggest that banks accumulate 
information over the length of the relationship that is used to reduce information 
asymmetries. Therefore for small firms, the alleviation of collateral requirements 
increases access to credit.  
Cole (1998) Nationally 
representative 
sample of 5356 
small businesses; 
period: 1991-
1994 
1993 US 
National Survey 
of Small 
Business 
Finance 
Logit 
Regressions This paper extends Petersen and Rajan (1994), and puts an emphasis that it’s the 
existence of a relationship (and not necessarily the length of relationship) that 
influences credit allocation. The paper also finds that multiple borrowing has a 
negative on the availability of credit, along with firm age, business/personal 
delinquencies and  business/personal judgements  
Table 2-2 continues  
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Table 2-3: Theories and evidence of the factors driving interest rates for small business loans 
This table summarises the studies that look at factors that drive the cost of finance for small business ventures. The table highlights studies that put 
forward the theories underpinning the predicted relationships between interest rates and collateral, interest rates and pre-existing relationships as well 
as theories underpinning the predicted relationship between interest rates and access to follow up loans. 
 Theories underpinning the studies Empirical evidence which support this correlation 
Predicted relationship between  
interest rates  and collateral 
  
Negative Bester(1985); Besanko and Thakor (1987) Cressy (1996); Cressy and Toivanen (2001); Keasey 
and Watson (2000) Cowling,(1999) 
Positive De Meza and Southey (1996) Berger and Udell (1990)  
Convex  U – Shape 
 
Cressy(2000), Burke and Hanley (2003) Burke and Hanley (2006) 
Predicted relationship between  
interest rates  and pre-existing 
relationships  
  
Negative  Berger and Udell (1992); Berger and Udell (1995) 
No relationship 
 
 Petersen and Rajan (1994); Harhoff and Körting 
(1998) 
Predicted relationship between  
interest rates  and second period 
loans  
  
Positive Greenbaum et al, (1989); Sharpe (1990); Wilson 
(1993)  
 
Hanley and Crook (2005); Binks and Ennew (1998) 
Negative Diamond (1989); Boot and Thakor (1994);  
Petersen , Rajan and  Raghuram (1995) 
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Table 2-4: Analysis of factors affecting credit allocation on P2P lending websites 
This table summarises the main findings in the P2P lending empirical literature on determinants driving credit allocation. We report the sign of the effect 
of the respective factors on credit allocation as positive and significant +; positive and insignificant (+); negative and significant -; variable not reported ? 
And variable not included x. 
 
Probability of funding estimation: 
 
Y = α + β X + ε 
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Variables              
Listing Characteristics              
# listings before current x -*** x x x x x x x x x x x 
$ amount  requested - *** -*** -*** -* -*** -* -*** -* -*** -*** -** -* - *** 
($ amount requested)
2              
0ffer Interest rate + *** +*** +*** +* +*** +*** +** +** +*** +*** +** +** + *** 
(offer interest rate)
2              
# words - loan description  x x +* (+) +*** +* +*** x +*** +* x +* x 
Close when funded x -*** x x  x  x x x -** x x 
Auction Format x x x x +*** x +*** x x x x x +*** 
Loan Characteristics              
Loan Duration (60mnths) x x x x x x x x -*** x x x x 
Business loans (relative to general loans) - *** +** -** x x -* (-) x +** -** +* (-) x 
Loan Purpose              
Working Capital              
Start-up costs               
Purchasing building              
Table 2-4 continues  
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# lenders  funding loan x x x x x x +*** x x x x x +*** 
Borrower Characteristics              
Debt to Income - *** x -*** (-) -*** -** -*** -* x -*** -*** _*** -* 
Bankruptcy (last 10 yrs.)  ? -** x x x x x x x x x _*** x 
Bankruptcy (last 2 years) ? x -* -* x x -* x x -* x _*** x 
Bankruptcy (last 12m) ? (+) X x x x x x x x x _*** x 
Ever default (last 7 years) ? -** -* -** -** x x -* x -* -** _*** x 
# credit lines ? (-) (-) x x x x (-) x (-) X _* x 
Revolving credit Balance ? (-) (-) x x x x (-) x (-) -** _* x 
Revolving Credit amount ? x (-) x x x x (-) x (-) -** _* x 
Verified bank account ? +***  +** +*** x x x x x x x x 
Credit Rating               
AA  + *** + *** + *** Base Base + *** + *** + *** Base + *** + *** + *** + *** 
A + *** + *** + *** -** -*** + *** + *** + *** -*** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
B + *** + *** + *** -** -*** + *** + *** + *** -*** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
C + *** + *** + *** -** -*** + *** + *** + *** -*** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
D + *** + *** + *** -** -*** + *** + *** + *** -*** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
E + *** + *** + *** -** -*** + *** + *** + *** -*** + *** + *** + *** + *** 
HR Base  Base Base -** -*** Base Base Base -*** Base Base Base  Base 
Borrower Income ? x +* x x x x + *** x +* +* +* +* 
Borrower Income range              
$25,000- $49,999 ? + *** x x x x + *** + *** x x x x x 
$50,000- $74,999 ? + *** x x x x + *** + *** x x x x x 
$75,000- $99,999 ? + *** x x x x + *** + *** x x x x x 
$100,000+ ? + *** x x x x + *** + *** x x x x x 
Employment Status              
Self employed ? (+) x x x x (+) (+) (-) x x (-) x 
Employed part time ? (-) x x x x (-) (-) X x x (-) x 
Unemployed ? +** x x x x +** +** -*** x x +* x 
Retired ? +*** x x x x +*** +*** -*** x x (-) x 
Length of Employment Status ? (+) x x x x (+) (+) x x x (+) x 
Home Ownership ? +** + + x x +** +** x + x (+) x 
Education X 0 x x x x 0 0 x x x x x 
Picture              
     Gender Male (base group) base base base x x x base x (-) base x (-) x 
Female + *** (+) (+) x x x (+) x base (+) x base x 
     Age (base group 35yrs – 60 yrs) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Table 2-4 continues  
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Young(less than 35yrs) + * (-) (+) x x x (-) x x (+) x x x 
Old (more than 60) - * (-) (-) x x x (-) x x (-) x x x 
    Race  White (base group)              
Black - *** (-) (-) x x x (-) x x (-) x x x 
Hispanic (-) (-) (-) x x x (-) x x (-) x x x 
Asian (+) (+) (+) x x x (+) x x (+) x x x 
    Beauty              
           Attractiveness/Beauty x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Very attractive (+) +**  x x x +** x x x x x x 
Very unattractive (-) (-) x x x x x x x x x x x 
           Happiness/smile x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Happy (+) (-) x x x x (-) x x x x x (+) 
Unhappy - * base x x x x x x x x x x - * 
           Weight x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Somewhat overweight (+) +*** x x x x +*** +*** x x x x x 
Very overweight -* (-) x x x x  x x x x x x 
           Professionally dressed (+) (+) x x x x (+) x x x x (+) x 
          Signs of Military involvement + *** x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Group Participation              
Belong to a group x x +** - +*** +** x x x +** x +* x 
Religious x x x x +*** x x x x x x x x 
Alumni x x x x +*** x x x x x x x x 
Geography x x x x +*** x x x x x x x x 
Group leader recommendation x x + + +** +** x x x + x +* x 
Group Leader funding x x +*** + +** +** x x x +*** x x x 
Group Size x x x x -** x x x x x x x x 
Firm Characteristics              
   Industry SEC codes              
   Age of Business ( new firm or existing firm)              
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Table 2-5: Analysis of factors affecting cost of credit on P2P lending websites 
This table summarises the main findings in the P2P lending empirical literature on determinants driving the cost of credit. We report the sign of the 
effect of the respective factors on credit allocation as positive and significant +; positive and insignificant (+); negative and significant -; variable not 
reported ? And variable not included x. 
P2P Related Studies: 
 
Effects of borrower and loan characteristics 
on the final interest for funded loans - OLS 
 
IFinal = α + β X + ε 
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Data Used: 
Platform name (country) 
Key: 
Positive and sig:                    + 
Pos and insig:                       (+) 
Negative and sig:                  - 
Negative and insig:              (-) 
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Variables                
Listing Characteristics                
# listings before current  ? (-) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
$ amount requested +*** +*** +*** +*** +** +** +** +** +** +** +*** +** +** +*** +** 
($ amount requested)
2                
Offer interest rate                
Default loan (ex post - binary 0 or 1)                
Close when funded  ? +*** x +*** x +** x x x x x x x x x 
Auction ? x -*** x x x x x -** x x x x x x 
Loan Characteristics x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  
 Business loans (relative to general loans) +* x x x x x x x x x x (+) (+) x x 
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Loan purpose                
Working Capital                
Start-up costs                
Purchasing Building                
Borrower Characteristics                
Debt to Income ? x +***  +** +* +** +** +** +** +** +** +** +** +* 
Bankruptcy (last 2months)  ? +** x x x x (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) x x 
Bankruptcy (last 10 yrs.)  ? (+) x x x x +*** +*** x x +** +*** x x x 
Ever default (last 7 years)  ? +*** x x x x +*** +*** +*** x x +*** x x x 
# credit lines ? +*** x x x x (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) x +*** x 
Revolving credit Balance ? (+) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Revolving Credit amount ?  x x x x (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) x x x 
Bank card utilization rate ? (-) x x x x +** +** +** +** +** +** x x x 
Credit Rating                
AA  ? - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** Base - *** - *** base x 
A ? -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** - *** - *** - *** +*** - *** -*** +*** x 
B ? -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** - *** - *** - *** +*** - *** -*** +*** x 
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C ? -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** - *** - *** - *** +*** - *** -*** +*** x 
D ? - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** +*** - *** - *** +*** x 
E ? - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** - *** +*** - *** - *** +*** x 
HR ? base base base base base base base base base +*** base base +*** x 
Between  AA – A x x x x x x -** x x x x x x x x 
Between  A – B x x x x x x -** x x x x x x x x 
Between  B – C x x x x x x -** x x x x x x x x 
Between  C – D x x x x x x -** x x x x x x x x 
Between  D – E x x x x x x -** x x x x x x x x 
Between  E – HR x x x x x x -** x x x x x x x x 
Borrower Income x x x +* x x +* +* +* +* +* +* +* x x 
Borrower Income Range                
$25,000- $49,999 x (-) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
$50,000- $74,999 x (-) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
$75,000- $99,999 x -** x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
$100,000+ x -** x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Employment status                
Entrepreneur ? +*** x x x x x -*** x x x x x x x 
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Employed part time ? (-) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Unemployed ? (+) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Retired ? (+) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Length of Employment Status ? (+) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Home Ownership ? (+) (-) -** x x (+) (+) x -** x (+) -** x x 
Picture ? -*** -*** x x x x x x x x x -*** x (-) 
     Gender Male (base group) base base x x x x x x x x - *** x x base base 
Female - *** (+) x x x x x x x x base x x - *** -*** 
     Age (base group 35yrs – 60 yrs.) Base base x +** x x x x x x (-) x x base x 
Young(less than 35yrs) (-) (-) x base x x x x x x (+) x x (-) -* 
Old (more than 60) (+) (+) x ? x x x x x x base x x (+) x 
    Race  White base base x x x x x x x x + *** x x base x 
Black + *** (+)** x x x x x x x x base x x + *** x 
Hispanic (+) (+) x x x x x x x x (+) x x (+) x 
Asian (+) (-) x x x x x x x x - *** x x (+) x 
 Beauty                
       Attractiveness                
Very attractive +* -*** x x x x x x x x x x x +* x 
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Very unattractive +** base x x x x x x x x x x x +** x 
      Happiness/smile                
Happy (-) (+) x x x x x x x x x x x (-) (-) 
Unhappy (+) base x x x x x x x x x x x (+) base 
      Weight                
Somewhat overweight +* (-) x x x x x x x x x x x +* x 
Very overweight (+)  x x x x x x x x x x x (+) x 
    Professionally dressed +** (+) x x x x x x x x x x x +** x 
    Child with Adult in picture + *** x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Group Participation                
Belong to a group x x -*** -** -** x x x x x x x x -** -*** 
Group Membership fee                 
Pay fee to join x x -*** x x x x x x x x x x x  
Don’t pay fee to join x x -*** x x x x x x x x x x x  
Firm Characteristics                
Industry (2dig sic codes)                
New or existing firm                
Table 2-5 continues  
Table 2-5 continues  
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Table 2-6: Analysis of factors affecting default on P2P lending websites 
This table summarises the main findings in the P2P lending empirical literature on determinants driving 
loan default. We report the sign of the effect of the respective factors on credit allocation as positive 
and significant +; positive and insignificant (+); negative and significant -; variable not reported ? And 
variable not included x. 
 
P2P Related Studies: 
 
Probability of default: Hazard 
Model of Default 
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o
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Data Used: 
Platform name (country) 
 
Key: 
Positive and sig:                    + 
Pos and insig:                       (+) 
Negative and sig:                  - 
Negative and insig:              (-) 
Variable not included:        X 
Variable did not survive:    0 
Not reported                        ? 
New variable:                     (red)  Empty  row     
Significant  level                  *** 1% ** 5% *10%     P
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Variables     
Listing Characteristics     
# listings before current ? +* x x 
$ amount requested ? (+) +*** +** 
($ amount requested)
2     
# words - loan description  ? 0 x (+) 
Close when funded ? +** +*** x 
Loan Characteristics     
 Final Interest rate paid ? (+) +*** +** 
(Final Interest rate paid)
2     
Loan Duration ? x x x 
Business loans (relative to general 
loans) 
+** x x x 
# lenders  funding loan ? x -*** x 
Loan age x x +*** x 
Borrower Characteristics     
Debt to Income ? x x x 
Bankruptcy (last 2yrs) ? (-) x x 
Ever Default ? (+) x x 
Ever default (last 7 years ) ? x x x 
# credit lines ? +/- x x 
Revolving credit Balance ? (+) x x Table 2-6 continues 
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P2P Related Studies: 
 
Probability of default: Hazard 
Model of Default 
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Data Used: 
Platform name (country) 
 
Key: 
Positive and sig:                    + 
Pos and insig:                       (+) 
Negative and sig:                  - 
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Variable not included:        X 
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Revolving Credit amount ? x x x 
Credit Rating      
AA  -** -*** x x 
A (-) (-) x x 
B (-) (-) x x 
C (-) (-) x x 
D (-) (-) x x 
E (-) (-) x (x) 
HR base base x x 
Borrower Income ? x -*** x 
Borrower income range     
$25,000- $49,999 ? (-) x x 
$50,000- $74,999 ? (-) x x 
$75,000- $99,999 ? -*** x x 
$100,000+ ? (-) x x 
Employment Status     
Entrepreneur ? +/- x x 
Employed part time ? (-) x x 
Unemployed ? (-) x x 
Retired ? (-) x  
Length of Employment Status  (+) x X 
Home Ownership  (+) (+) (+) 
Picture  (+) x x 
     Gender Male (base group) base base x x 
Female (+) (-) x x 
     Age ( 35yrs – 60 yrs.) (-)  -*** x 
Young(less than 35yrs) (-) (-) x x 
Old (more than 60) base (-) x x 
    Race Whites base base x x 
Black +*** (-) x x 
Hispanic (+) (+) x x 
Asian (+) (+) x x Table 2-6 continues 
Table 2-6 continues 
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P2P Related Studies: 
 
Probability of default: Hazard 
Model of Default 
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Data Used: 
Platform name (country) 
 
Key: 
Positive and sig:                    + 
Pos and insig:                       (+) 
Negative and sig:                  - 
Negative and insig:              (-) 
Variable not included:        X 
Variable did not survive:    0 
Not reported                        ? 
New variable:                     (red)  Empty  row     
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    Beauty  +*** x x 
           Attractiveness  x x x 
Very attractive (-) x x x 
Very unattractive (+) x x x 
           Happiness   x x 
Happy (-) (+) x x 
Unhappy +*  x x 
           Weight   x x 
Somewhat overweight (+) (+) x x 
Very overweight base base x x 
           Professionally dressed (+) (+) x x 
          Signs of Military involvement +* x x x 
Group Participation     
Belong to a group  x +*** +* 
Group Membership fee  x x x x 
Pay fee to join x x x +* 
Don’t pay fee to join x x x x 
Group Rating x x x x 
Group leader recommendation x x x + 
Group leader reward x x +*** +* 
Ratio loans funded by group 
members 
x x -***  
Group Size  x x +** +* 
Mandatory review by group leader x x X x 
Group relationship x x -*** x 
Friend Endorsement x x x x 
Borrower geographic location x x -*** x 
Firm Characteristics     
Industry (2dig sic codes)     
New or existing firm     
Table 2-5 continues 
Table 2-6 continues 
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Table 2-7: Summary of literature and identified research gap 
This table presents the summary of literature on small business venture finance from traditional off line 
markets, P2P lending literature on general loans and subsequently identifies a research gap in the area 
of P2P lending and small business loans 
 
 
Traditional lending literature on small 
business ventures 
 
Three key literature streams examine: - 
 Determinants of credit extension, with the view 
to understand where credit constraints kick in 
 Determinants of  cost of credit  
 Default modelling 
Theory that underpins this work asymmetry of 
information. 
 
P2P lending literature on small business 
ventures 
 
Research Gap 
We do not have an empirical study about the impact 
of P2P lending websites on the finance of small 
business ventures. 
 
 
 
 
 
P2P lending literature on general loans 
Literature Examines: - 
 Determinants of credit extension 
 Determinants of  cost of credit  
 Very few studies on Default 
 Limited studies on the sustainability of the 
market 
Studies include a binary variable to compare general 
loans and business loans within the three streams of 
literature.  
Theory that underpins this work asymmetry of 
information 
Traditional Lending           Peer to Peer Lending 
Small Business 
Loans 
General 
Loans 
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Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 
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3.0 Introduction 
In this Chapter we present a description of our data and the methodology that we employ in our 
empirical Chapters. First, we describe the dataset and sample used in the study.  Next, we put 
forward the econometrics methods adopted for the analysis of the data. Although different 
methods are employed in different empirical Chapters; on the whole Probit and Tobit models 
form the basis of the key econometric method adopted in data analysis. Key variables used in the 
study are also briefly described and finally, we conclude the Chapter by putting forward some of 
the limitations of the data and the adopted methods of analysis.  
3.1 Data 
This study is the first empirical study that looks at small business loans in the context of P2P 
lending. To test the hypotheses derived we have created a new and comprehensive dataset based 
on secondary data, extracted from the publically available electronics archives of Prosper.com 
(henceforth Prosper). Because Prosper is the oldest and dominant P2P lending site; it is likely to 
serve as a broadly useful model for examining P2P lending efforts in financing small business 
ventures. The data are cross-sectional in nature and they include all the information seen by 
potential lenders when making the lending decisions. The unit of observation is the individual 
loan as opposed to a firm. Because these are personal loans for business purposes, Prosper 
primarily underwrites them based on the owners’ credit profile as opposed to the firm’s credit 
profile.  
In Figure 3-1 we show an example of a typical loan requests from Prosper while Table 3-1 
summarizes all the variables collected from the loan request information. Overall there are four 
general types of information available in the data. First, the bulk of the data consists of the main 
credit information that Prosper obtains from the credit bureaus’ reports (Experian); indicating 
borrower’s credit history and their typical payment behavior of any previous debt obligations 
(including external credit scores, mortgage payments and any delinquencies or judgements). 
With the exception of credit scores, all other credit information is publicised on the website. 
Instead of the raw credit scores obtained from credit reports, Prosper assigns an internal 
generated credit grade to each potential borrower based on their credit score and credit history, 
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and publishes this internally generated credit grade on the website. 
 
...........Figure 3-1 goes around here........... 
 
Second, the data contains two types of self-reported information shared by the potential 
borrowers on the website: (i) obligatory information which includes employment status and 
stated income of the potential borrowers; which is verified by Prosper and (ii) optional 
information in the form of a pictures and a free-form text elaborating as to why potential 
borrowers are good loan candidates; which is not verified by Prosper.  This optional information 
often includes items such as intended use of the proceeds and explanation of poor credit grades.  
Because there are no small business specific demographic data available from the data, such as 
firm age, firm size, industry distribution of firms etc.; we used the optional data to create some of 
the demographics variables. For example, we were able to code the optional content for industry 
classification of the small business ventures and the firm age (classified only as a binary variable 
new firm or existing firm). We were able to classify the data according to loan purpose (for 
example working capital, capital investment etc.); and we were also able to create two additional 
variables (include picture and elaboration) as indicators of whether the potential borrower has 
availed additional information to attenuate information asymmetries.  
Third, the data also contains loan specific information including loan amount, interest rates 
offered by the potential borrower, the interest rates paid by those who manage to get funded, as 
well as an indication of any previous loans attained through Prosper (a variable which we use as 
a proxy for reputational effects). 
Finally, we have information on the lending decision outcome (loan funded or rejected). We 
were also able to obtain full information on the default activity of all funded loans from Prosper. 
The loans have a fixed maturity (36 months or 60 months) with repayments divided in equal 
monthly instalments. If the monthly payment is made on time, the loan status for that month is 
considered current. If a monthly bill is not paid, the loan status will be changed to 1 month late, 2 
months late etc. If a loan is late for 60 consecutive days (but less than 90 days), it is sent to a 
collection agency. If a loan is late for more than 90 days, it is considered to be in default. All 
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defaulted loans are reported to credit reporting agencies and can affect borrowers' credit scores. 
Borrowers who default on their loans are not permitted to borrow using Prosper again.  
...........Table 3-1 goes around here........... 
 
3.2 Sample 
In total, we have a population of 28,904 loan requests, 4,046 (13%) of which were successfully 
funded and 24,858 (87%) of which were rejected. The analysis that follows, however, is based 
on a sample of 14,537 loan requests. We use a sample rather than the entire population because 
the short and long text descriptions from each loan request must be read and hand-coded when 
developing key variables. We adopted a simple random sampling technique, where every second 
case was randomly selected from the population. With simple random sampling, there is an equal 
chance that each unit from the population could be selected for inclusion in the sample. 
To obtain the coded variables (industry, firm age and loan purpose), 5 postgraduate students 
were employed to code the sample of 14,537 loan requests (i.e. total 6 coders all sitting in 1 
room for 30 days). As a starting point, approximately 10 percent of the data (1251 cases) were 
selected from the sample and coded by all 6 coders together to determine the unified code for 
each variable.  Coders were then paired for cross referencing and inter-coder reliability purposes, 
resulting in three groups of two coding the remaining 90 percent of the data (per pair coded 
approximately 3750 cases). In instances where the pair of coders disagreed about classifying data 
– the case was brought to the attention of the team, discussed then classified. Ten percent of each 
group’s coded cases were checked for accuracy by a second pair of coders. On the rare occasion 
that coders made a large number of errors, they were asked to redo the coding and a second 
accuracy check of all recoded cases was performed.  
In cases where there were no agreements even after discussion of cases, the case was dropped. 
We applied the following filtering criteria based on missing values: 766 cases (5 percent of 
initial sample) were dropped as they could not be classified by industry; 929 (6 percent of initial 
sample) were dropped as they could not be classified by firm age; 202 cases (1 percent of initial 
sample) were dropped as they could not be classified on the loan purpose; and 104 cases (0.7 
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percent of initial sample) were dropped as they had unidentifiable pictures. This resulted in a 
final sample of 12526 loan requests (from 7834 small firms) of which 1417 (11 percent) were 
funded loans. Table 3-2 shows the coder’s agreement for the 1250 cases based on Feiss Kappa 
agreement measurement.  Fleiss kappa values range from .66 to .96, which indicate substantial 
agreement (based on the interpretation guide offered by Landis and Koch (1977: pp13 - 17) 
while Table 3 shoes the correlation matrix – depicting the correlation between all variables. 
 
...........Table 3-2 goes around here........... 
...........Table 3-3 goes around here........... 
 3.3 Methodology 
To analyse our data we use a number of bivariate and multivariate analyses. Bivariate 
associations were tested using t-tests and chi-square tests. For multivariate analysis we 
essentially relied on Probit and Tobit regressions in determining the impact of our explanatory 
variable of concern on the dependent variables. We now describe the broad approach used for 
our estimations. 
3.3.1 Economic framework 
The study is based mainly on two different econometric frameworks. For the first and third 
empirical studies, we utilize probit models explaining the determinants of credit allocation and 
determinants of loan default. For the second empirical study, we use Tobit models. The 
following subsection describes both methodological approaches in detail. 
Basic probit framework  
The P2P lending market has two types of participants: borrower (firm) indexed with j and 
lenders indexed with . Borrowers specify the desired loan amount Lj, and interest rate Ij they are 
willing to pay. The desired loan amount of applicant j is funded if there are at least N lenders 
willing to provide funds such that     Li = Lj. The willingness of the lenders to extend credit 
to borrower j depends largely on the borrower’s probability of default pj. Lenders do not observe 
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pj; they may however infer pj from potential borrower’s observable characteristics captured in 
vector xi. Likewise, the inclination of the borrower to repay the loan may be inferred from their 
observable characteristics. As a starting point, in the model of credit extension/default, let Yi be 
the indicator that denotes which option has transpired [eg if the loan was approved = 1, else 0; 
and whether the loan defaulted=1 else 0]. The probit model can be expressed as follows: 
                                                                        yi*  = β xi + ui                                                                  (3 -1) 
 
                                                                            yi =   
 
yi* is the unobserved utility of the decision maker. It is a function of a systematic component β x, 
where xi is a vector of independent variables, β is a vector of parameter estimates which may 
change across choices (extend/reject; default/repay), ui is a random unobserved disturbance term.  
Since we observe only the systematic component of utility, we cannot predict with certainty the 
choice of each decision maker. We can only try to assess the probability that the decision maker 
will choose each alternative. 
The parameters of the probit model are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
Since yi * is equal to β xi + ui, the probability that yi > 0 is equal to the probability that β xi > 0, or, 
equivalently, the probability that (ui > - β xi). Therefore, we can write the probability that yi  is 
equal to one as the probability that (ui > - β xi) such that:  
 
 
                   Pr (yi = 1| xi)    
                                      
                                      
                             
 
 
 
                             
  
 is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (we use   = 1 above; implied by the 
standard normal distribution). The likelihood function for this model is: 
1    if    yi * > 0 
0    if    yi * ≤ 0 
= Pr (yi * > 0| xi) 
= Pr (β xi + ui > 0| xi) 
= Pr (ui > - β xi) 
= 1– N ( ) [integrate] 
=  (β xi)                                               (3-2) 
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Basic Tobit framework  
In the second empirical study, the dependent variable is censored at zero because lenders will 
always ensure that positive return is earned from extending credit. Standard regression analysis, 
while feasible, assumes that the data is uncensored and therefore the format of the dependent 
variable suggests a standard Tobit model. The Tobit model is expressed using a limit of zero 
(which will be the case for our analysis) is defined with the following standard equation: 
 
                                                           yi*
 = β0 + β1xi + u                                                                          (3-3) 
 
                                                                 yi  = 
  
  
Where: yi is the dependent variable interest rate; xi is a vector of independent variables; βi is a 
vector of estimable parameters, and u is a normally and independently distributed error term.  
The parameters of the Tobit model are estimated by the maximum likelihood method. If the 
interest rate is positive (i.e., for borrowers who were funded), yi*=yi, accordingly ui= yi - β0 - β1xi . 
As a result, the likelihood function for a funded borrower is given by the height of the density 
function: 
 
 
 
 
For loans with negative interest rates (may also typically result from borrowers who were not 
funded), we only know that y*≤0. Thus, the likelihood function is the probability that y*≤0, 
which is given by: 
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In sum, 
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If we let Di be a dummy variable that takes 1 if yi>0. Then, the above likelihood function can be 
written as. 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic robustness test framework  
For all empirical studies with discreet dependent variables, we conduct further robustness checks 
of our estimations based on marginal effect estimations.  Conducting marginal effects allows us 
to evaluate the economic impact of all factors that we have discovered to be statistically 
significant.  
For a continuous variable: marginal effects often provide a good approximation to the amount of 
change in the dependent variable (y) that will be produced by a 1 unit change in  the independent 
variable (xi.). 
Marginal Effect of xi = limit [Pr y=1|x, xi + ∆) - Pr (y=1|x, xi )/ ∆]                         (3-5) 
          as ∆ gets closer and closer to zero 
                   (3-4) 
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For a discreet variable: With binary independent variables (xi), marginal effects measure discreet 
change, that is, how do the predicted probabilities change as the binary independent variable 
change from 0 to 1. 
 
Marginal Effect of xi = Pr (y=1|x, xi =1) - Pr (y=1|x, xi =0)                               (3-6) 
 
Furthermore, for some of the regressions we also controlled for potential sample selection bias 
and/or endogeniety bias by using some variant of the Heckman sample selection regressions.  
Sample selection bias refers to the problem where the dependent variable is only observed for a 
restricted, non-random sample (Heckman, 1978); as in the case of estimating determinants 
driving interest rates and loan default for funded loans only. In terms of the basic set up, the 
Heckman selection model is a two equation model. First there is the selection regression, 
followed by the outcome regression taking the following form:  
Selection equation: 
                                                          zi*
 = β0 + β1xi + u                                                                          (3-7) 
 
                                                                zi  = 
  
and a basic outcome equation: 
                                                           yi*
 = β0 + β1xi + u                                                                          (3-8) 
 
                                                                 yi  = 
  
1
 
    If    zi * > 0 
0     If    zi * ≤ 0 
β1xi + ei    If    yi * > 0 
-               If    yi * ≤ 0 
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3.3.2 Variables 
In this subsection we describe the variables used in the analysis and explain how they 
operationalise our hypotheses. We initially discuss the independent variables. We then move on 
to discuss all explanatory variables and control variables (drawn from literature) which relate to 
the factors that drive the credit extension decision, cost of finance and default activity.  
 Dependent variables 
The first empirical analysis (Chapter 4) is concerned with factors that drive the probability of 
funding in this market. Similar to previous studies (e.g. Cowling, 1997; Cole, 1998; Coleman, 
2000), the dependent variable used to measure credit allocation is a decision of whether to 
approve credit or not (Approve). This decision takes a binary form; assigned to 1 for approved 
loan requests and 0 for rejected loan requests. Prosper is an ‘all or nothing’ market; in order for 
prospective borrowers to raise funds, their loan request must attract 100 percent of the requested 
loan amount. Thus, in this study, we measure funding success when loan requests raise 100 
percent of the requested loan amount; partial funding was not available to potential borrowers. 
The second empirical analysis (Chapter 5) is concerned with factors that drive the cost of credit 
in this market. The dependent variable used in the analysis is the final interest rate paid by small 
business owners (Interest rate). Following previous studies (Cowling, 1999; Burke and Hanley, 
2006) the interest rate was adjusted according to the prime rate to provide the interest rate 
premium so as to allow for a reliable comparison between data collected at different points in 
time. 
In the third empirical analysis (Chapter 6) in order to answer the questions related to lender 
returns we first analysed determinants driving default. The dependent variable used to measure 
default takes a binary form of 1 if a loan defaulted or 0 if the loan has been repaid (Default). For 
the purpose of the analysis, we consider default to have occurred when the principal loan amount 
plus calculated interest remains (partially) unpaid when the loan reached the full maturity date. 
Explanatory variables 
We now turn our focus to the explanatory and control variables. Following from the theory 
section (Chapter 2), we grouped explanatory variables into the following categories:  Owner 
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attributes, Firm attributes and Information attributes. We also control for Loan attributes as well 
as Industry and Macro-economic factors.  The regressors are explained below: 
Owner Attributes 
We considered two borrower characteristics that are directly related to a borrower’s financial 
strength - homeownership and credit grade. Home ownership (Home_owner) is an indicator 
variable taking value of 1 if prospective borrowers are home owners and 0 otherwise; depicted 
by an active mortgage loan on the borrower’s credit report. In our analysis, home ownership is a 
measure of borrower creditworthiness; it is indicative of stability and a prior ability to access 
credit to obtain a mortgage. A large body of empirical studies examining small business lending 
has shown that borrowers’ financial strength plays a significant role in their ability to obtain 
credit from financial institutions (Berger and Udell, 1998; Berger et al, 2007); hence use this 
variable to test for hypotheses: H1a, H1b, and H1c.  
Credit Grade (Credit_grade) is also a direct indicator of a borrower’s creditworthiness.  It 
summarizes factors related to prospective borrowers’ previous experience with credit, payment 
of bills and any failures to repay previous loan commitments. Prior research has shown that 
individuals’ credit scores are strong predictors of their repayment likelihood for extended credit 
(e.g., Avery et al, 2004; Berger and Frame, 2007).  Prosper has seven credit grade categories 
ranging from 1 to 7; with 1 being the lowest credit risk category and 7 being the highest credit 
risk category.  We expect lenders to be inclined to favour borrowers with better credit grades - 
since poor credit grades may indicate a history of being unable to meet previous repayment 
obligations. In the analysis we use this variable to test for hypotheses: H2a, H2b, and H2c.  
Delinquencies: borrowers who have delinquent obligations (Delinquencies) and those who have 
declared bankruptcy (Judgements) (in the past 10 years) may be viewed as less creditworthy 
because they have a demonstrated history of being unable to meet their previous financial 
obligations. Therefore, on the one hand we may expect a negative relationship between these 
variables and the credit allocation, cost of credit and default. However, entrepreneurial finance 
literature suggests that lenders may be forgiving to entrepreneurs - such that borrowers who have 
previously filed for bankruptcy are still able to access credit from lenders. We use this variable to 
test for hypotheses: H7a, H7b, and H7c.  
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Firm Attributes 
Firm age (Firm_exist): In literature, Firm age is typically used as a proxy for the severity of 
information asymmetries inherent in small business ventures.  Potential lenders are expected to 
look favourably upon loan applications from existing firms as compared to applications from 
borrowers starting new businesses. Existing firms are thought to be more creditworthy because 
they have survived the high-risk start-up period. Our data does not include the age of the firm; 
however borrowers do indicate whether they are looking for funds for an existing firm or a new 
business start-up. In our analysis Firm age is an indicator variable assigned 1 if the borrower is 
looking for funds for an existing firm and 0 otherwise. We use this variable to test for 
hypotheses: H4a, H4b, and H4c.  
Information attributes 
Repeat Loan (Repeat_loan): To be successful, borrowers must create a positive reputation, 
engendering trust within prospective lenders. Creating trust is relatively difficult in P2P lending 
because of the nature of the market (borrowers and lenders never meet). It is possible for 
borrowers to engender trust based on re-payment history. Prior loans are visible to lenders. They 
can be seen as a proxy for some sort of reputation that the borrower can form on Prosper, based 
on re-payment activity. Hence we include a variable indicating the presence and performance of 
a prior loan (Repeat_loan) and use this variable to test for hypotheses: H3a, H3b and H3c.  
As discussed earlier, borrowers can provide (optional) text information (Elaboration) about 
themselves, their business or about their creditworthiness, and they can post pictures 
(Include_picture). Both of these variables represent strategies which borrowers may use to 
reduce information asymmetries. In our analysis, these variables are measured as binary indicator 
variables; Include_picture is assigned a 1 if a borrower includes an image in the loan request; we 
use the elaboration variable to test for H8a, H8b, and H8c. Similarly, Elaboration is assigned a 1 
if prospective borrowers choose to offer a text elaboration. We use the elaboration variable to 
test for H6a, H6b, and H6c  
As discussed earlier, given that hundreds of lenders assess and screen loan requests at any given 
time, this may serve as an indication of the level of due diligence done per loan request; which 
other lenders can use as a mechanism to decrease information asymmetries. We measure the 
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number of extended pledges per loan request (Bid_count); to operationalise this variable; with an 
expectation that the more the number of extended pledges, the likely it is for the loan request to 
fund. We use this variable to test H5  
Ex post default (ex_default): we include a variable which identifies individual loans which were, 
ex post, not repaid for reasons of legal default. This particular variable is our key innovation over 
most P2P lending studies and provides us with a pure test of amateur lenders ability to assess 
borrower risk for small business loans over the P2P lending context.  
Control Variables 
In all our empirical models we use a number of control variables to take account of additional 
owner specific, loan specific, macroeconomic and industry specific factors which if omitted 
might otherwise lead us to draw some unsafe conclusions. Specifically we include owner 
employment status, income range, loan size, offer interest rate, final interest rate, industry 
dummies, and time dummies (as a proxy for macroeconomic activity). These are all variables 
which have commonly been used in previous empirical studies and tend to reflect factors which 
might play a key role in helping the potential lenders to assess borrower risk type. 
Owner Attributes 
We include controls for borrower income (Income_range) and employment status 
(Employment_status); both measured as dummy variables. Traditional markets like banks value 
borrowers who have a constant income or who can easily get back to the employment market and 
earn a constant income in the event the business fails.   
Loan Attributes 
Loan Amount ($1000): We control for loan size (Requested_amount). This is the amount the 
borrowers seek to raise using Prosper. Prosper follows an ‘all or nothing’ approach. While many 
factors may influence credit access, cost of finance and default activity; there is a strong 
incentive for individuals to select realistic loan amounts. Requesting too little capital may result 
in project non – delivery (Hanley and Crook, 2005), and high loan size may be deemed too risky 
due to moral hazard effects hence less likely to succeed. We also include a polynomial variable 
to control for non-linear effects of the requested loan size (Requested_amount
2
) in all our 
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empirical models. 
Offer Interest Rate (%) and Final Interest Rate (%): Offer interest rate is the maximum interest 
rate offered by the borrower when asking for a loan (Offer_interest_rate) and Final interest rate 
is the maximum interest rate paid by the borrowers who were extended credit 
(Final_interest_rate). In our analysis we subtract the prime rate from both variables. It is not 
clear what affect the offer interest rate variable will have on the credit allocation decision; 
likewise it is also not clear what effect the final interest rate will have on credit allocation and 
default. Theoretical literature suggests that borrowers that offer high interest rates may be 
signalling that they are high risk (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). However, individual lenders - by 
definition smaller and less professional than traditional financial institutions - may be attracted to 
borrowers offering high interest rates; with the view of attracting high returns. Burke and Hanley 
(2003; 2006) put forward the argument that interest rates may take a non-linear form. Hence, we 
include a polynomial variable to control for non-linear effects of both the offered interest rates 
(Offer_interest_rate
2
) in all our credit extension empirical models and the final interest rate 
(Final_interest_rate
2
) in all our interest rate and default empirical models. 
 
Industry and Macroeconomic Factors 
The industry variable indicates a firm's one-digit standard industrial classification to control for 
industry-wide differences (Industry) dummies in all our empirical models. We also include time 
dummies to account for loans asked over (Time) and State dummies to account for interest rates 
paid - given that the interest rates may vary according to States that the loan was originated 
(Region). The list of all regressors is presented in Table 3-1. 
3.3.3 Estimation strategy 
Overall, we adopted the ‘general-to-specific’ strategy for all empirical estimations - starting by 
using data on as many available variables as possible that we might expect to be relevant in 
determining our independent variables (guided by literature), but discarding some variables on 
the basis of the statistical evidence. That is, we dropped variables from the general equations 
which were insignificant at the 10 percent level (p>0.10). The aim was to derive a parsimonious 
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model. The key benefit of parsimony in this context is that dropping irrelevant variables 
increases the precision or statistical significance of the estimated effects of the remaining 
variables on the dependant variable.   
We have three empirical Chapters. We first analysed, in a multivariate setting, the factors that 
drive the likelihood of loan approval (Chapter 4). As reported previously, since the dependent 
variable is a binary outcome, we used a multivariate Probit regression model. To test the 
hypotheses developed we specified the following main equation:   
 
         Pr (Approval|1) = α +β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 Information Attributes + β4 Loan Attributes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
+                                       +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + µ                                                       (3-4) 
Approval takes the value of 1 if the nth loan application is granted and 0 if it is rejected. Next, we 
analysed factors that drive the cost of credit in this market (Chapter 5). Given that it is unlikely 
that lenders will accept negative interest rates; we censored the dependent variable at 0; this lead 
to the adoption of a Tobit regression for our estimation.  We considered the following equation:  
 
            Interest rate = α + β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 InformationAttributesi β4 LoanAttributesi 
                                       + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni   + µ                                                                     (3-5) 
 
Finally, in line with most literature modeling default activity (Berger et al, 2005; DeYoung and 
Nigro 2005; 2008; Cowling and Mitchell, 2003), we used a binary Probit regression to test the 
developed predictions (Chapter 6). The dependant variable was assigned 1 if a loan defaulted and 
0 otherwise. We considered the following equation: 
 
          Pr (Default) = α + β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 InformationAttributesi β4 LoanAttributesi               +                                       
+                                   + β5Industryi + β6Macroi   + µ                                                                                            (3-6) 
 
In some of the empirical studies linear and square terms of the loan size, offer interest rates and 
final interest rates were included to account for a non-linear relationship with dependent 
variables.
  
77 
 
Figure 3-1: Example Listing of Loan request on Prosper.com 
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Table 3-1: Summary of all regressors 
This table list all regressors developed from our sample data from Prosper. The table gives a definition of each 
variable and it distinguishes between variables which were collected directly from the listing and variables which were 
coded. 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Home_owner    =indicator variable, taking value of 1 if borrower is 
homeowner, 0 otherwise; 
Listing 
Repeat_loan        =indicator variable, taking value of 1 if the borrower 
has a prior loan that has been paid off  or is current at 
the time of the listing, 0 otherwise; 
Coded 
Credit_grade =dummy indicating borrower’s risk of default that 
takes integer values       1 = AA; 2 = A; 3 = B; 4 = C; 
5 = D; 6 = E;  7= HR; 
Listing 
Judgements =indicates whether the borrower declared bankruptcy 
within the last 10 years 
Listing 
Delinquencies       =number of times the borrower has been 60 or more 
days late with payments in the last 10 years 
Listing 
Employment_status =dummy indicating the employment status of the 
borrower assigned to the following categories 
1=fulltime;2=part-time;3=self-employed, 4=retired 
Listing 
Income_range =dummy indicating income range of the borrower 
assigned to the following categories 1 = $0 or 
undefined ; 2=$25k  - $49,999;3=$50k  - $74,999; 
4=$75k  - $99,999; 5=$100k + 
Listing 
Existing_firm =indicator variable, taking value 1 if firm exist, 0 
otherwise; 
Coded 
Requested_amount =borrower requested loan amount; Listing 
Offer_interest_rate =interest rate offered by the borrower; Listing 
Final_interest_rate =interest rate paid by those who were extended credit Listing 
Elaboration         =dummy indicating whether potential borrower 
includes a text elaboration 
Coded 
Include_picture =dummy indicating whether potential borrower 
include a picture  
Coded 
Loan_term =dummy indicating the term of the loan, taking value 
1 for 36month loans and 2 for 60mnth loans 
Coded 
Industry  = 1 DIG SIC defined as 1=construction;2=transport 
and utilities;3=services;4=retail 
trade;5=manufacturing;6=wholesale 
trade;7=agriculture;8=finance and real estate 
Coded 
Time =month dummies, indicating the time at which the 
loan request was posted on Prosper 
Listing 
Region = dummies indicating all the States represented in the 
US 
Listing 
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Table 3-2: The Coders’ agreement measures for the three key coded variables 
This table shows the coder’s agreement for our three key variables. 
a  
Agreement rate between the set of coders for the listings that everyone coded 
b 
The interpretation of the Kappa size is based on the one suggested by Landi and Koch (1977) 
Coded Variable Coder’s agreement 
rate
a
 (%) 
Fleiss Kappa
 
Interpretation of 
Kappa
b  
Firm Status    
          New firm 92 .78 Substantial 
          Existing firm 89 .80 Substantial 
Industry     
         Wholesale 77 .69 Substantial 
         Retail 81 .73 Substantial 
         Services 88 .64 Substantial 
         Manufacturing 80 .68 Substantial 
         Construction 91 .71 Substantial 
         Mining 84 .73 Substantial 
         Transport 88 .64 Substantial 
         Agriculture 79 .66 Substantial 
        Finance &real estate 74 .68 Substantial 
Loan  purpose    
         Business expansion 79 .68 Substantial 
          Operating expenses 96 .62 Substantial 
        Inventory 92 .73 Substantial 
         Buy existing business 96 .79 Substantial 
        other 79 .58 Moderate 
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Table 3-3:  Correlation Matrix 
Variable Requested 
Amount 
Interest 
rate 
Income 
range 
Credit grade Judgements Picture Existing 
firm 
Industry Loan 
purpose 
Homeowner Repeat 
loans 
Number of 
bids 
 Requested amount 1 -.17** .18** -.41** -.23** .003 
 
-.04** 
 
.05** 
 
.06** 
 
.21
** 
 
-0.16** 0.16** 
 Interest rate  1 -.06** 
 
.42** 
 
.18** 
 
.04** .003 -.02 -.02 -.16
** 
 
0.06** -0.23** 
 Income range   1 -.19
** 
 
-.09
** 
 
.11
** -.07** .02 .03** .24** 0.09** 0.11** 
Credit grade    1 .37
** 
 
.04
** .05** -.05** -.03* -.30** 
 
0.16** -0.33** 
Judgements     1 -.03
* .03* -.04** -.02 -.12** 0.10 -0.12** 
Picture      1 .006 .010 -.009 .03
** -0.08 0.01** 
Existing firm       1 -.020 -.12
** -.04** 0.04 0.04** 
Industry        1 -.016 .04
** -0.07 0.03** 
Loan purpose         1 .02
* -0.03 0.02** 
Homeowner            1 0.01 0.12** 
Repeat loans           1 -0.14** 
Number of bids            1 
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Chapter 4 Factors driving small business loan approval in 
P2P lending 
Who gets credit, who doesn’t? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
82 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The main objective of our first empirical study is to answer the following research question: 
what factors drive credit allocation for small business loan on P2P lending websites? The basic 
intuition behind the research question is to determine whether P2P lending responds to known 
signals established in traditional lending used to predict borrower quality.   If the mechanisms 
used by traditional lending institutions are not predictive of borrower within the P2P lending 
context, this may suggests that: either the signals sought by traditional lenders are ceremonial in 
nature and are therefore not generally predictive of entrepreneurial credit allocation outside the 
traditional ‘offline’ lending market; or that P2P lending relies on other (unique) mechanisms. 
Additionally, in traditional lending, many of the mechanisms available to already established 
firms may not necessarily be available to new business start-ups; based on the premise that new 
firms are the riskier offering. Hence we distinguish whether mechanisms used to cope with 
information issues differ between new business start-ups and existing firms in the P2P lending 
context. 
We know from theory that some of the mechanisms which typically matter in traditional lending 
in terms of reducing information asymmetries include: collateral; a good credit rating; previous 
existing relationships with the lenders; education and greater working experience. Moreover, 
there is also evidence that suggests that firm age and firm size are also mechanisms that are 
typically used by lenders to reduce information issues.  
The nature of P2P lending market is such that information asymmetries are still present. As a 
starting point, we assert that information asymmetries in this market may not necessarily be 
resolved by collateral as put forward by Bester (1985; 1987). First, in P2P lending loans are 
unsecured; in an event where the loans result in a default, lenders cannot seize any of the 
borrower’s assets. Second, unlike traditional lending, if a borrower is extended credit, it is 
typically underwritten by a large number of individuals. If the loan results in a default, trying to 
gather lenders to collectively chase the borrower for the loss is unlikely; given that P2P lending 
can be thought of as a collection of fairly independent lenders. Third, lenders may offer as little 
as $50 dollars per loan request. If the loan defaults, the loss per individual lender is not too big; 
hence it may not be worthy to chase borrowers to try and recover the extended funds. 
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In contrast, if banks give a business loan, they are only dealing with one case; accordingly it is 
feasible to chase borrowers. Moreover, they typically are dealing with larger amounts (relative to 
$50 per lender) which are worth the chasing effort in an event where the loans result in default. 
Hence, collateral as a mechanism of reducing information asymmetries and as a signal of 
borrower quality is very limited in the P2P lending context; mainly because it may still be 
difficult to operationalise. We argue however, that the fact that borrowers indicate whether they 
are home owners or not in the loan requests can still provide useful information to potential 
lenders.  
For example, if borrowers have previously managed to attain a mortgage loan (from elsewhere) 
and have not defaulted; this could be useful information, notifying lenders about the borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. Following this argument, we postulate that: 
H1a small business borrowers, who own their homes, demonstrate better credit risk (relative 
to those that rent) and therefore are more likely to be extended credit by prospective 
lenders 
A related issue is that of borrower credit ratings as a means to appraisal borrower quality (Berger 
et al, 2005). Given the inability of potential borrowers to commit to pay back the loans in P2P 
lending (since the loans are unsecured); we argue that prospective lenders could condition the 
decision of whether to extend credit and the terms of credit on an individual’s credit history 
captured by a credit score such that: 
H2a small business borrowers, with high credit ratings, demonstrate better credit risk and 
therefore are more likely to be extended credit by prospective lenders 
Theory asserts that information asymmetries may also be resolved by established relationships 
between borrowers and lenders (see Sharpe, 1990; Greenbaum et al, 1989; Boot and Thakor, 
1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998). In traditional lending, by 
close and continued (physical) interaction, potential borrowers may provide the lenders with 
sufficient information about the firm’s affairs; accumulated over time. The resulting information 
allows for inter-temporal arrangements, reducing credit rationing (Cole, 1998) and lowering 
aggregate cost of capital (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). In the P2P lending 
context, however, relationships in the traditional sense may not be feasible.  First, borrowers and 
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lenders never meet; hence interactions – which form an important element in reducing 
information asymmetries in traditional lending – are unavailable. Second, due to the sheer 
volume of potential lenders who could potentially extend credit per loan request; it may be 
impractical to form relationships as per Petersen and Rajan (1995).  We contend however that 
borrowers can still forge reputational effects based on repayment behavior (Diamond, 1989).  
Information on whether potential borrowers have had a loan granted is visible to all prospective 
lenders; as well as the borrower’s repayment behavior (conditional of the loan being granted).  
Borrowers that successfully pay back the loans and build some repayment history may build a 
good reputation. Therefore, we hypothesise that:    
H3a small business borrowers who have successfully paid back a previous loan are more 
likely to be extended credit by lenders  
It is also agreed from theory that older firms (borrowers) who are thought to have longer track 
records are likely to reduce information issues (Bates and Nucci, 1999; Dunne et al, 1989; Good 
and Graves, 1993; Honjo, 2000). In the context of P2P lending, borrowers are not required to 
indicate their age or the age of the firm. They do however indicate whether they are seeking 
funds for an existing business or a new business start-up. Whether firm status ultimately plays a 
similar role in P2P lending is unclear; especially given the fact that lenders are amateurs. 
However, we would expect that P2P lenders, like traditional lenders, ultimately act to rationally 
assess the quality of the firms such that a firm with demonstrable history or track record reduces 
would provide credibility even to amateurs. This logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4a  existing firms are more likely to be funded (relative to new business start-ups) in the 
P2Plending context 
Information asymmetries in the context of P2P lending may also be solved by new mechanisms 
unique to this market. For example, unlike traditional lending, in P2P lending hundreds of 
potential lenders assess and screen the credit requests from small business venture at any given 
time.  It could be argued that individuals understand each other’s business better than traditional 
lenders.  For example, some individuals may have knowledge about the area where the borrower 
wishes to start the business, others might have expertise in the product or the technology or the 
feasibility of the business. Thus, although prospective lenders do not physically meet the 
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potential borrowers looking for business funds, they do see the number of other prospective 
lenders extending credit to a single loan request. We contend therefore that when lenders see 
many others extending credit to a firm, they may gauge this as an indication that extensive due 
diligence has been conducted by those who have already extended credit. Hence it is plausible 
that:  
H5 the likelihood of a partially funded loan receiving additional credit will increase with the 
total number of already extended offers  
Potential borrowers in P2P lending may include additional (optional and unverified) personal 
and/or financial information in their loan request in the form of text descriptions to try and 
attenuate information asymmetries. These descriptions often provide potential borrowers with an 
opportunity to explain to prospective lenders any previous failures, credit score deterioration, 
delinquencies, judgements or bankruptcies. The common perception in the entrepreneurial 
finance literature is that traditional lenders such as venture capitalists often adopt a tolerant, 
flexible and forgiving attitude to business failure. Studies by Zacharakis et al (1999) and Cope et 
al (2004) put forward that business failure is not automatically considered a ‘black mark’ by the 
venture capital community. Thus, a venture capitalist’s decision to invest in a small business 
venture is not automatically negatively affected by a previous experience of failure. Instead, 
borrowers may use the interaction with venture capitalists to explain any previous failures such 
that failure may be considered to be part of the learning process.   
In the context of P2P lending we argue that although there are no human interactions, borrowers 
are given an opportunity to explain to lenders any delinquencies, judgements or bankruptcies 
through the (optional) text elaboration such that borrowers who have previous failures may still 
be able to access funds on P2P lending websites. If lenders believe that the delinquencies, 
judgements or bankruptcies signal something relatively permanent about the potential borrower’s 
unobservable characteristics, then it may be optimal for lenders to limit future credit. But if the 
circumstances surrounding previous failures are temporary (such as adverse income shock), 
those individuals who have just shed their previous obligations may be a good future credit risk 
(Chatterjee et al 2007; Behr et al, 2004). We argue therefore that borrowers may use the 
(optional) text elaboration to give account of the previous failures as well as give clarity on 
current repayment and bankruptcy status so as to ensure that potential lenders use this current 
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repayment and bankruptcy status to decide whether to extend credit. Hence, it is possible that 
lenders in the P2P context, similar to venture capitalists, may be forgiving such that: 
H6a  small business borrowers who use text elaborations are more likely to be funded in the 
P2P lending context 
One might counter the argument above however based on banking literature (Berger and Udell, 
1990; Cressy, 1996). In the (unsecured) loan market, the fact that borrowers have defaulted 
before could actually be a big strike; a default may signal something about the borrower’s future 
ability to repay and leads to a drop in the individual’s credit score. Consequently, we hypothesise 
that: 
H7a  small business borrowers who have previous failures are less likely to access funds in the 
P2P lending context 
Another unique feature of P2P lending is that potential borrowers may include (optional and 
unverified) pictures in their loan requests. These pictures often provide potential lenders with the 
context of the business (for example a picture of the business premises or the picture of the 
product). The pictures may also attempt to humanize the lending process; as it could also be an 
image of the potential borrower. We argue therefore that it is plausible that in the absence of 
human interactions, potential borrowers that include pictures could be giving prospective lenders 
information about the business context, or the product or even about prospective borrowers 
which may be used by lenders to reduce information asymmetries. This additional information 
may help attenuate information issues more favourably such that it increases the chances of 
funding success. However, it is also plausible that inclusion of these pictures may result in a 
negative (discriminatory) outcome. Hence we posit that: 
H8a  small business borrowers who post pictures are more (less) likely to get funded by 
lenders in the P2P lending context 
The Chapter is organised as follows: we first present the descriptive statistics and simple 
bivariate association between key variables reflecting borrower quality and credit allocation. We 
then proceed with the regression analyses; reporting results for both statistical as well as the 
marginal effects. Finally we report results for all robustness checks conducted. We conclude the 
Chapter with an overall summary of our findings. 
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4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 4-1 we present the summary statistics (means and standard errors) for our explanatory 
and control variables. Statistics are presented separately for all loan requests (column 1); 
declined loans (column 2) and approved loans (column 3). In column 4, we show t-tests to 
determine whether the mean values for the funded and declined loans are statistically different.  
 
...........Table 4-1 goes around here........... 
 
Column 1 of Table 4-1 shows summary statistics for the sample of 12526 loan requests (from 
7834 small firms); from which it is possible to profile the type of small business ventures that 
approach this market for funds. Using various characteristics from the loan requests, we found 
that typical firms approaching this market are started or owned by borrowers who are relatively 
in a poor credit situation: majority (76 percent) fall into Prosper’s lower credit grade categories 
(B, C, D E HR); on average they have 6 delinquencies and at least 1 judgement record, indicating 
that they have previously failed to pay back loan commitments. It would appear that these 
owners seem to be pursuing the business venture either as a side-line to their existing works or as 
a hobby, given the fact that 60 percent of the sample indicate full time employment as their 
labour force activity. New firms make up around 30 percent of businesses approaching this 
market; the remaining 70 percent is made up of already established businesses. Relative to a 
representative sample of US small firms of which new ventures form around 10 percent, it 
appears new firms are over represented in the P2P context. In terms of personal wealth, just 
under half of the prospective borrowers own their homes.  
On average, these small business borrowers are looking for small amounts of money ($10,430); 
they are willing to pay a high price for credit (24 percent) and the majority (55 percent) of them 
are looking for working capital. In terms of industry distribution, 82 percent of the sample is 
found in the retail, services, or finance industries.  Finally, Figure 4-1 shows the regional spread 
of where the loan requests are typically originated – majority of the small business borrowers 
seeking funding are from California, Florida, Texas, New York, Atlanta, North Carolina, Illinois, 
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and Virginia. These are regions also typical in attracting Venture Capital. 
 
...........Figure 4-1 goes around here........... 
 
Moving on to column 3 of Table 4-1, we observe that of the 12526 loan requests 1417 became 
funded loans; which translate to a success rate of 11 percent. So, this means that almost 9 out of 
10 of those requesting a loan will not get it. In Figure 4-2, we illustrate the effort that goes into a 
typical loan request. We observe from this illustration that just over half of the funded loans (N = 
745) were funded on the first attempt; 325 loans (23 percent) were funded after the second 
attempt and 347 loans (25 percent) resulted after 3 or more loan requests. These figures seem to 
suggest that it may be difficult to get a loan in this market. 
 
...........Figure 4-2 goes around here........... 
 
So far we have profiled the type of firm that looks for funds in this market and we have painted a 
picture on the effort, i.e. how easy or difficult, it may be to access funds from this market. Next 
we attempted to gain insight on factors associated with funding success. Hence, from Table 4-1 
column 2 and column 3 we show the summary statistics of declined and funded loans 
respectively. In general, when comparing mean difference between funded and rejected loan 
requests for our explanatory variables, based on a standard t –test, we found statistically 
significant differences associated with credit approval are related to: borrower credit grades; 
delinquencies; judgements; labour force status; home ownership; income range; firm age, repeat 
loans, and inclusion of pictures. All these associations are significant at the 0.05 level or less. No 
statistically significant differences were found for inclusion of text elaboration. In terms of our 
control variables, we found that statistically significant differences associated with credit 
approval are loan size, interest rates and employment status; these associations were all 
significant at the 0.05 level. No statistically significant differences were found for income range, 
region of the United States and or the macroeconomic factors. 
More specifically, typical business owners likely to be associated with funding success tend to be 
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of higher credit quality (usually found in low risk credit grade categories AA). Most are 
homeowners (58 percent of funded loans vs. 48 percent of rejected requests indicate home 
ownership) and they have also previously failed to honour a loan (funded loans show an average 
of 3 delinquencies and 1 judgement). We further observe from Table 4-1 column 3 that new 
firms make up around 30 percent of firms getting funds in this market and existing firms make 
up 70 percent of firms getting funding, maintaining the same proportion as the firms asking for 
funds. This seems to suggest that lenders in this context may be indifferent about the firm status 
in the credit approval decision. The fact that lenders on P2P websites are lending to 30 percent of 
new businesses however suggests that this is a market that is favourable to new businesses; given 
that in a typical population of small business ventures in the US, nascent firms make up about 10 
percent of the population.  
Looking at our information variables, almost 40 percent of funded loans come from repeat loans, 
which seem to suggest an association between building some reputation in this market and access 
to funds. Moreover, 56 percent of loans include a picture (48 percent for declined loans) and on 
average it takes 191 lenders to finance a loan. Finally, in terms of loan attributes, we observe that 
funded business owners ask for an average of $7,920; they receive an average of $7,864 which 
seems to suggest that they get what they ask for; on average they set a maximum interest rate of 
21 percent on their loan request and had an average final interest rate of 18.5 percent on funded 
loans.  
4.2 Regression analysis 
Having commented on the simple bivariate relationships between our variables in the previous 
section, we now move on to investigate the observed relationships in a multivariate analysis. The 
probit models are estimated based on equation (4 -1) using STATA V12.0. In all the estimations, 
we conduct a general to specific procedure (Darlington, 1990) for a set of regressors (defined in 
the previous chapter; found in Table 3-1) which provide various measures of owner attributes, 
firm attributes, information attributes as well as measures to capture loan attributes and industry 
conditions. We also include dummies controlling for time and macroeconomic effects. 
         Pr (Approval|1) = α +β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 Information Attributes + β4 Loan Attributes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
+                                       +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + µ                                                                  (4 -1) 
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Our estimation results are shown in Table 4-2; which is made up of four columns. The first 
column shows the probit results for the general specification; which includes all the regressors 
that could possibly drive credit allocation (identified from literature). We tested down all 
regressors to derive a parsimonious model shown in column 2.  The testing down approach 
involved dropping variables from the general estimation which were insignificant at the 10 
percent level (p >0.10). As stated previously, the key benefit of parsimony in this context is that 
dropping irrelevant variables increases the precision or statistical significance of the estimated 
effects of the remaining variables on the credit allocation decision.  
 
...........Table 4-2 goes around here........... 
 
The results of the Likelihood Ration (LR) test confirm that the parsimonious model is a better 
estimation; the null hypothesis that the excluded regressors collectively have no role in 
predicting our dependent variable is decisively accepted by the LR test (LRX
2
= - 1924, df = 102, 
p <0.10). The third and fourth columns subsequently report the determinants of credit approval 
separate for existing firms and new business start-ups. 
Collateral (typically proxied by homeownership) as a mechanism of reducing information 
asymmetries and as a signal of borrower quality is not available in the P2P lending context 
mainly because loans are unsecured.  Therefore, information asymmetries in this market may not 
necessarily be resolved by collateral as put forward by theory (Bester 1985, 1987; Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; and Besanko and Thakor, 1994).  Consequently, collateral in the context of P2P 
lending becomes less important. Our results show however that given the fact that borrowers 
indicate whether they are home owners or not in the loan requests provide useful information to 
potential lenders. We show, in column 2 of Table 4-2, that similar to traditional lending, the 
supply of loans flows to the least risky entrepreneurs who are homeowners (H1a); confirming the 
importance of homeownership (as useful mechanisms of eradicating information asymmetries in 
the P2P lending context (Berger and Frame, 2007). Not as a form of collateral, but in the form of 
borrower reputation as stipulated by Diamond (1989). Borrowers who are consistent in mortgage 
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repayments seem to build a positive reputation, thus gaining access to loans in this context.  
Similarly, the supply of loans flows to less risky entrepreneurs with high credit ratings (H2a) and 
to those indicating that they are repeat borrowers (H3a) with previous established repayment 
history within the P2P lending context. In fact our proxy of previously existing relationship 
Repeat_loans does not appear in the probit results as shown in Table 4-2 because it predicts 
funding success perfectly. In traditional lending, by close and continued (physical) interaction, 
potential borrowers may provide the lenders with sufficient information about the firm’s affairs; 
accumulated over time. The resulting information allows for inter-temporal arrangements, 
reducing credit rationing (Cole, 1998). In the P2P lending context, however, relationships in the 
traditional sense may not be feasible.  First, borrowers and lenders never meet; hence interactions 
– which form an important element in reducing information asymmetries in traditional lending – 
are unavailable. Second, due to the sheer volume of potential lenders who could potentially 
extend credit per loan request; it may be impractical to form relationships as per Petersen and 
Rajan (1995). Although there are no physical interactions between borrowers and lenders in this 
context, our results corroborates Diamond’s (1989) findings regarding the importance of building 
a reputation with a prospective lender; implying that a presence of a track record and the building 
of a reputation matters in reducing information asymmetries and adverse selection issues in the 
P2P lending market see Sharpe, 1990; Greenbaum et al, 1989; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998). 
Our results also demonstrate that firm level characteristics have little impact on loan supply. We 
observe from column 2 of Table 4-2 that our variable Existing_Firm is not significant. Hence we 
do not find support for H4a.  This result is counter to what is typically seen in banking literature 
(see Cole, 1998; Coleman, 2000); where the age of the firm (entrepreneur) is an important 
determinant of access to finance. This is largely due to the fact that older firms (entrepreneurs) 
are thought to have longer track records; hence they are likely to reduce information issues 
(Bates and Nucci, 1999; Dunne et al, 1989; Good and Graves, 1993; Honjo, 2000).  One 
plausible explanation for this observation is that although lenders in this context act like debt 
financiers, they appraise risk more like the decision-making of equity funders who focus more on 
people rather than the business itself. Another plausible explanation for this observation is that 
lenders may be extending credit based on personal idiosyncrasies – for example they may be 
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extending credit based on philanthropy (Agarwal et al, 2011; Mollick, 2013); simply because 
they identify with the course of the entrepreneur, regardless of firm age. 
Interestingly, our results show support for Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assertion that reducing 
information gaps in the form of conducting due diligence improves access to loans. We observe 
from column 2 of Table 4-2 that information asymmetries in the context of P2P lending may also 
be solved by the ‘crowds’. For example, unlike traditional lending, in P2P lending hundreds of 
potential lenders assess and screen the credit requests from small business venture at any given 
time.  It could be argued that individuals understand each other’s business better than traditional 
lenders.  For example, some individuals may have knowledge about the area where the borrower 
wishes to start the business, others might have expertise in the product or the technology or the 
feasibility of the business. Thus, although prospective lenders do not physically meet the 
potential borrowers looking for business funds, these lenders do see the number of other 
prospective lenders extending credit to a single loan request. Our results show that ‘crowds’ 
somehow help to reducing information asymmetries (H5); the variable Bid_count is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level; which suggests that prospective lenders perceive loan requests 
attracting a large number of potential lenders to have conducted a great deal of due diligence. It 
is important to highlight however that although our results support the model of Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981); P2P lending differs in that unlike traditional banks where due diligence is 
conducted by an individual, due diligence is conducted by the crowd – a new unique mechanism 
of reducing information asymmetries and adverse selection risk in P2P lending. 
The common perception in the entrepreneurial finance literature is that traditional lenders such as 
venture capitalists often adopt a tolerant, flexible and forgiving attitude to business failure. 
Studies by Zacharakis et al (1999) and Cope et al (2004) put forward that business failure is not 
automatically considered a ‘black mark’ by the venture capital community. Thus, a venture 
capitalists decision to invest in a small business venture is not automatically negatively affected 
by a previous experience of failure. Instead, borrowers may use the interaction with venture 
capitalists to explain any previous failures such that failure may be considered to be part of the 
learning process.  In the context of P2P lending our results show that although there are no 
human interactions, borrowers are given an opportunity to explain to lenders any delinquencies, 
judgements or bankruptcies through the (optional) text elaboration such that borrowers who have 
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previous failures may still be able to access funds on P2P lending websites. If lenders believe 
that the delinquencies, judgements or bankruptcies signal something relatively permanent about 
the potential borrower’s unobservable characteristics, then it may be optimal for lenders to limit 
future credit. But if the circumstances surrounding previous failures are temporary (such as 
adverse income shock), those individuals who have just shed their previous obligations may be a 
good future credit risk (Chatterjee et al 2007; Behr et al, 2004). Interestingly, however it seems 
the stories which these borrowers tell do not influence funding success (H6a); our information 
variable Elaboration is not significant. 
However, our results show that  lenders respond positively to pictures such that  small business 
borrowers  who include them in their loan requests are more likely to be extended credit (H8a); 
our variable Include_picture  is positive and significant at the 0.01 level; suggesting perhaps that 
inclusion of a picture somehow humanizes the process. Hence our results seem to suggest that in 
the absence of human interactions, potential borrowers that include pictures could be giving 
prospective lenders information about the business context, or the product or even about 
prospective borrowers which may be used by lenders to reduce information asymmetries. This 
additional information may help attenuate information issues more favourably such that it 
increases the chances of funding success. Pope and Sydnor (2013), give an alternative 
explanation for this observation – asserting that lenders may be reacting to pictures based on 
beauty of those in the pictures – such that more beautiful individuals are more likely to get 
extended credit.  
Looking at the control variables, we observe that the larger the amount requested by the 
(prospective) small business owners , the higher the probability that their loan request will be 
declined, as evidenced in the negative sign and high significant coefficient of the variable 
Requested_amount.  This seems counter intuitive to previous studies (see Hanley and Girma, 
2006); where it is possible that lenders may be likely to reject lower credit requests if these 
projects are synonymous with underinvestment and hence pose a higher failure risk if the 
business is under. Interestingly, looking at the linear and square requested amount variables 
together, our results propose a U shape – suggesting that borrowers seeking smaller loans on the 
one extreme and those seeking large loans on the other extreme are less likely to be funded. In an 
attempt to confirm this observed relationship, Figure 4-3 plots the variable Requested_amount2. 
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As identified in the figure, the relationship appears to support non-linear (at a decreasing rate); 
rendering the effects of square term somewhat important (this was formally tested later when 
conducting marginal effects).  Our results also report that once borrower risk is accounted for - 
borrowers that offer higher interest rate are more likely to be extended credit; supporting results 
put forward by Hanley and Girma, (2006).  Finally, we find that similar to banks, prospective 
borrowers who indicate that they have some form of income, and those who are in full time 
employment are more likely to be extended credit (all these factors are significant at the 0.05 
level or below).   
...........Figure 4-3 goes around here........... 
Next, in order to confirm the result as shown by the indicator variable, Existing_firm,  in column 
3 and column 4 of Table 4-2 we extend the analysis to determine  factors associated with the 
likelihood of default separately for  existing firms and new business start-ups as defined by 
equations (4-2) and (4-3). 
Pr (Approval: Existing_firms|1) = α +β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 Information Attributes            +                                                                          
+                                                               +β4 Loan Attributes +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + µ      (4 -2) 
    Pr (Approval: New_firms|1) = α +β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 Information Attributes            +                                                                          
+                                                           +β4 Loan Attributes +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + µ         (4 -3) 
Our estimation results are shown in Table 4-2 column 2 and column3 for existing firms and new 
firms respectively. The estimated probabilities of credit approval for existing firms and new 
business start-ups are virtually identical. In both estimations the likelihood of credit approval is 
determined by home ownership, credit grade,  previous judgements; firm age, repeat loans, the 
posting of pictures, bid count, borrower income; and employment status (all these factors are 
significant at the 0.05 level or below).  
With the exception of homeownership variables, all the other attributes determining funding 
success for new firms and existing firms are similar. One explanation for the modest role for 
home ownership in predicting credit approval for existing firms could be that much of the 
information may already be contained in other variables - notably the Credit_grade variable and 
the credit history variables (Judgements and Delinquencies) because credit scores generally 
incorporate borrower’s payment history on any credit extended to individuals.  
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4.3 Marginal Effects  
In the preceding section, we found that typical tools used in traditional lending such as credit 
history, credit scores, homeownership significantly influenced the probability of loan approval; 
whilst firm level attributes seem less important. We also observed that mechanisms unique to the 
P2P lending context such as crowd intelligence and pictures also help attenuate information 
asymmetries. In this section of the paper, we provide a quantitative assessment of the influence 
of the observed results.  We measure the marginal effects of all significant observations. 
4.3.1 Average marginal effects 
In Table 4-3 we report the estimated marginal effects of the individual regressors on the credit 
approval decision. By setting most regressors at their sample means, we attempt to discover the 
impact of changes in one regressor for an otherwise 'typical' case. The target was to demonstrate 
how entrepreneurs possessing different attributes exhibit credit approval probabilities. Table 4-3 
has three columns. The first column traces marginal effects of a particular regressor on the 
likelihood of credit approval for all loans. The second and third columns subsequently trace the 
marginal effects separate for existing firms and new business start-ups. 
 
...........Table 4-3 goes around here........... 
 
We see in column 1 of Table 4-3 that the borrower quality dummy, ‘Credit_grade’, is the single 
most important variable in the credit approval decision. We estimate that in comparison to a 
small business owner with credit grade in category AA, borrowers in category A are 4 
percentage points less likely to get funded. Compared to the average probability of funding, 11 
percent, this translates to approximately 40 percent reduction in the likelihood of the loan 
application being approved. As the credit grades deteriorate, the impact becomes even more 
drastic.  
For instance, borrowers in category C and those in category HR are 10 and 20 percentage points 
less likely to get funded which translate to 90 percent and 180 percent reduction in funding 
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success respectively. Similarly, in terms of borrower quality, home ownership is also important, 
albeit at a lesser impact relative to credit rating. Loan applications from borrowers who are 
homeowners are 1.4 percentage points more likely to be funded; this translates to approximately 
13 percent increase in the likelihood of the loan application being approved relative to the 
average probability of funding.  
Moreover, our results show evidence that prospective lenders are cognisant of previous handling 
of credit issues when sanctioning a loan to a would-be borrower.  Prospective borrowers who 
have had previous borrowings rescheduled due to an inability to meet repayments or who have 
been insolvent in the past, Delinquencies, are 16 percent less likely to have their applications 
approved. It is plausible however that the credit grade variable may be capturing much of the 
information already reported in the homeownership and credit history variables (Delinquencies 
and Judgements) because , as previously stated, credit scores generally incorporate borrower’s 
payment history on any credit extended to individuals. This directly includes mortgage 
payments, such that paying the mortgage on time strengthens the credit score while late 
payments affect the credit score adversely. 
In terms of the information variables - Include_picture and Bid_count- the impact of pictures is 
evident in the fact that compared to borrowers who opt not to include pictures in their loan 
application; we estimate that borrowers who do are 2.4 percentage points more likely to receive 
funding. Compared to the average probability of funding, 11 percent, this represents a 23 percent 
increase in the likelihood of receiving funding. It is somewhat surprising that we find evidence 
that pictures seem to attenuate information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, because 
pictures are optional and not verified by Prosper. A natural expectation therefore would be that 
lenders in this market would respond little to this type of ‘cheap talk’. Yet the fact that borrowers 
include a wide variety of (non-standardized) pictures and the market responds to them, suggest 
that the information on the contrary is not treated as cheap talk by lenders in this market. Perhaps 
the pictures do indeed serve as some element of humanizing the lending process. Interestingly, 
we also find strong support for the number of lenders and collective due diligence argument. For 
every one additional lender extending credit to a loan request, this increases the funding success 
of the loan by 0.6 percent; for every 10 persons, the funding increases by 6 percent, and for every 
100 people, the likelihood of funding success increases by 60 percent.  
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When we examined the marginal effects of control variables, we found that dropping the 
requested loan by $1,000 in the amount requested significantly increases the likelihood of getting 
funds by 23 percent. Interestingly, dropping the requested loan amount by $1,000 seems to have 
the same effect on the chance of being funded as including a picture in the loan request. As 
identified earlier both the requested amount and squared requested amount obtained significant 
coefficients, suggesting a nonlinear relationship between loan size and the likelihood of funding. 
We see from column 1 of Table 4-3 that the marginal effect of the square variables is small but 
significant (0.9 percent).  Interestingly, once we control for credit risk - borrowers that offer a 1 
unit increase in interest rate, increase their likelihood of funding success by 0.6 percent. 
Increasing the interest rates by a factor of 10 results in the likelihood of funding success 
increasing my 6 percent - suggesting that borrowers really need to dig need and offer higher 
interest rates.  Finally, in terms of labour force participation, being evasive about the labour force 
activity does not bode well with potential lenders – it decreases the likelihood of funding by 4 
percentage points. This translates to a 36 percent decrease in the likelihood of funding; a much 
tougher punishment than that received than those who state that they are self-employed.  
4.3.2. Beyond average marginal effects 
The results presented thus far measure marginal effects. The biggest problem with this approach 
however is the fact that it only produces a single estimate of the marginal effect. No matter how 
‘average’ is defined, averages can obscure difference in effects across cases. It is of course 
possible that the effect of certain variables will differ across the distribution of small business 
ventures; especially given that small business ventures by nature are heterogeneous. Moreover, 
the interpretation of the concept of ‘average’ may be rendered difficult by the discrete nature of 
many of our regressors. Therefore in this section we conduct marginal effects at representative 
values; which could be both intuitively meaningful, while also showing how the effects of 
variables vary by other characteristics of the small business borrowers.  
Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 confirms that moving beyond the average effect of each variable on 
credit approval uncovers a large amount of heterogeneity in credit approval.  As a starting point, 
in Table 4-4 we show the estimates of how the marginal effects differ over a range of different 
requested loan sizes across different borrower credit grades (all other variables were kept at their 
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mean). What we observe from the Table 4-4 suggest that credit approval does decrease as the 
loan size increases (across all credit grades); larger loans are more risky.  As identified 
previously, we see from the table the relationship between loan size and credit approval does 
appear to be linear. Also, the effect of credit grades across different loan sizes is immediately 
eminent.  
 
...........Table 4-4 goes around here........... 
 
 In Table 4-5 we take the analysis a step further by compiling predicted probabilities for credit 
allocation at representative values of owner attributes, firm attributes, loan attributes and 
information attributes.  We selected cases from our data file - a mix of extremes (highest and 
lowest credit risk) and a few cases in-between to illustrate our point (of moving beyond marginal 
effects). The baseline case is an individual with credit grade C, full time employment, income 
range $25k - $49,999k, include a picture, with delinquencies, who owns their home – this 
borrower has a 7 percent likelihood of funding success. Compared to the baseline case, a 
borrower with  premium credit grade AA, full time employed income range $50k - $74,999k, no 
past due loans, who is a homeowner, has a 20 percent chance of getting a loan request funded; 
this translates to a probability of funding that is almost 3 times more likely than the base case. 
Whilst, compared to the baseline case, a high risk borrower with HR credit grade, self-employed, 
income range $1k - $24,999k with delinquencies and who rents their home, has 1 percent chance 
of being funded. 
 
...........Table 4-5 goes around here........... 
 
Interestingly, we observe from the table that for our extreme cases (AA and HR) - the pictures 
certainly have a bigger impact for those in premium credit grades; whilst they seem to be doing 
very little for those who already have bad credit ratings.  For premium borrowers not including a 
picture (for otherwise similar borrowers) reduce their funding success by 3 percentage points. In 
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comparison, the higher risk borrowers including a picture still keeps the probability of funding 
success in lower single digits, which seems to suggest that for this cohort including a picture 
does very little to attenuate information asymmetries. 
What’s more, although on average borrowers who have failed to honour their credit obligations 
in the past - with delinquencies and judgements - are less likely to be funded. Our results seem to 
suggest that for borrowers who do bounce back and manage to rectify their previous credit 
discretions and work up their credit rating, the fact that they have previously failed to honour 
their commitment is overlooked. They are able to attract capital. For instance Table 4-5 shows 
that a borrower with the profile: Full-time employed, credit grade A, income range $25k - 
$49,999k,  past due loans and judgements,  homeowner, existing firm,    image,  elaboration has 
a 15 percent chance of funding success. They actually outperform premium borrower Self-
employed, premium credit grade AA, income range $25k - $49,999k,  no past due loans and  no 
judgements, rent, new firm, no image, elaboration by 3 percentage points. This observation 
seems to support the notion that, perhaps similar to venture capitalists, lenders on Prosper are 
somewhat forgiving. 
4.4 Robustness Check 
In the preceding sections, we found that credit grades significantly impacts the probability of 
loan approval. Owner, information and loan variables were a little less important, while firm 
variables were not important.  In this subsection, we conduct a number of additional analyses to 
examine the robustness of our results.  
4.4.1 Removing the credit grade variable  
As a starting point, we looked at the robustness of our results based on the credit grade variable, 
since this is the single most important determinant of loan approval. As stated earlier, it is 
plausible that the credit grades may be capturing much of the information already reported in 
other variables – notably the Home_ownership variable and the credit history variables 
(Judgements and Delinquencies) because credit scores generally incorporate borrower’s payment 
history on any credit extended to individuals. To see if this is indeed the case, we re-estimated 
the parsimonious models (defined in Table 4-2 columns 2, 3 and 4) without the credit grade 
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variable; results of which are shown in Table 4-6.  
 
...........Table 4-6 goes around here........... 
 
In this analysis, noticeably the Home_ownership and Judgement variables which were jumping 
in and out of significance in the previous model specifications - are now statistically significant 
for all estimations.  What’s more, we observe from the marginal effects on these variables that 
the impact of these variables on the likelihood of funding has also strengthened.  In the end credit 
grades, home ownership, delinquencies and judgements all measure the level of trust. Since 
lenders do not have personal relationships with borrowers, they need an objective measurement 
which all these variables provide. The fact that being a homeowner can build trust (the same 
argument applies to borrowers with no delinquencies and no judgements) which may be easily 
translatable for an otherwise (less sophisticated) individual lender in the P2P context; which 
justifies keeping all these variables in the models.  
Most importantly, we observe that the estimated probabilities of loan approval for our key 
information variables are generally consistent with our previous findings; regardless of exclusion 
of the information on credit grades  including of a picture increases funding success; and the. 
What’s more, firm level characteristics are still insignificant, consistent with our previous results. 
Finally, our results also confirm that coefficient signs on the control variables were also 
generally consistent. 
4.4.2 Changes in the specification of the dependent variable  
 We recall that Prosper is an ‘all or nothing’ market; small business borrowers need to raise 
hundred percent of the requested amount in order for the loan to be funded.  Although this is the 
case, Prosper provides information on the fraction funded for each loan request.  We use this 
measure as an alternative dependent variable to provide a robustness check on factors driving 
credit approval. The empirical specification is the following Tobit regression:  
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Fraction_funded = α + β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesi + β5Industryi           +                                    
+ β6Macroi + µ                                                                                      (4 -3) 
       
Where the independent variables are the same as those defined in Table 3-1 (Chapter 3). All in 
all, our results, shown in Table 4-7, confirm our earlier findings; the estimated coefficients on all 
our explanatory variables retain very similar coefficients in terms of statistical significance. 
 
...........Table 4-7 goes around here........... 
4.5. Chapter summary 
Recalling our research question, this study considers the nature of the signals adopted by P2P 
lenders in attenuating information asymmetry problems. These include mechanisms typically 
used in traditional lending such as home ownership, credit grades as indicators of borrower 
creditworthiness and those relating to measures of the small business. The study also considers 
new mechanisms adopted such as the intelligence of the crowd and inclusion of pictures – which 
may attenuate information asymmetries. 
Overall, these results suggests the following: P2P lending depicts a new venture loan market 
where previously underserved early stage ventures and those looking for small amounts are able 
to access credit, with the relaxation of typical collateral requirements since these loans are 
unsecured. However, although P2P lending is a new innovation, mechanisms of eradicating 
information asymmetry challenges adopted in traditional finance are still valued on P2P 
websites. From this study, we put forward three key conclusions in terms of supply of loans: (i) 
our results show that the supply of loans flows to the less risky entrepreneurs (homeowners, 
those with high credit ratings, and repeat borrowers); highlighting the importance of reputation in 
this context (ii) our result show that firm level characteristics (including firm age) have little 
impact on the supply of loans; suggesting that idiosyncratic features like philanthropy might 
potentially also  be at play (iii) reducing information gaps through crowds and pictures improves 
access to loans; where new crowds improve the conducting of due diligence, whilst inclusion of 
pictures help humanize the lending process. These findings are both interesting and important in 
  
102 
 
that they suggest P2P lending is a low risk form of debt finance for investors; in this sense they 
act like commercial debt financiers. But the way they appraise risk funding opportunities is more 
like the decision-making of equity funders who focus on people rather than the business itself.  
Our results have key implications to theory. To recap, Stiglitz and Weiss put forward four key 
parameters underpinning their theory of information asymmetry and adverse selection: collateral, 
conducting due diligence, refraining from high interest rates to avoid moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues, and the inferred face to face borrower-lender interactions. From our results, we 
find that some weights of these parameter values are likely to change in Stiglitz-Weiss model.  
First, the general insight we get from is that borrower reputation, stipulated by credit grades, is 
the single most important determinant of credit allocation .The significance of using the credit 
grade helps to reduce the problem of adverse selection. The cost of defaulting will result in 
poorer scores – which are quantifiable to 24 percent in reduction of probability of funding.  
Moreover, with the advancement of internet, reputations which were previously limited within 
the 1-to-1 lending typology from banks, where if a borrower defaults on credit in one region or 
country for example, would not have an effect if the borrower were to move to another country 
has since  have completely changed.  But with internet age loan default may quickly go viral. 
The consequence of 1-to- many borrower-lender interactions relative to reputation over the 
internet and the ease with which default may go viral makes reputation to be a very important 
aspect within the P2P lending context. 
Second, we see from our results that collateral, which was such an important determinant in 
reducing adverse selection issues in Stiglitz-Weiss theory, in the P2P lending it is unimportant.  
Third, the general insight we get is that due diligence, although still an important factor, in the 
P2P lending context is conducted by the ‘crowd’. This new feature, unique to P2P lending was 
not taken into consideration in the Stiglitz and Weiss framework – where credit risk appraisal 
was done by relatively one person. Consequently we introduce collecting intelligence as a means 
of eradicating information asymmetry and adverse selection issues. Furthermore, our results shift 
focus from 1-to-1 physical interactions between borrowers and lenders inferred in Stiglitz-Weiss 
theory and highlights the 1-to many borrower lender typology over the internet. Effectively 
rendering physical contact, which was previously seen an important aspect of reducing 
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information asymmetry and adverse selection issues in theory, relatively less important. 
Furthermore, In terms of due diligence, the crowd also introduces another distinctive change 
based in the notion that lenders in this context may have philanthropy ambitions which they may 
consider when appraising credit risk. For example, a lender taking into consideration 
philanthropic ambitions may look for different credit risk when compared to a lender whose sole 
ambition is to maximise returns. This may effectively alter access to credit and subsequently the 
P2P borrower pool. 
We contend that the lessons we leant from our results about asymmetric information and adverse 
selection issues are quiet different to those developed in Stiglitz-Weiss model.  Reputation is 
very important in this market (this was not highlighted by Stiglitz). We learn that physical 
contact and collateral becomes less important in reducing information asymmetries. We also 
learn about the importance of three key new features: collective intelligence of the crowd, an 
aspect of philanthropy present when appraising credit risk and the general element of fun which 
may drive lenders when choosing to allocate credit. We contend that Stiglitz-Weiss model will 
have to be updated to take into consideration the facts raised above in their theory of information 
asymmetry in order to reflect our finding.  
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Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics 
In this table column (1) shows descriptive statistics all funded loans. In column (2) we show statistics for all loans which were 
paid back whilst column (3) shows all the loans that resulted in default. Finally, column (4) presents t-test/x
2
 statistics  for 
differences in the means of the repaid and defaulted loans. *, **, *** stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable  All loans Declined loans Funded Loans t- test 
Number of loans 12,526 11,109 1,417  
Owner attributes     
Home_ownership 0.49 0.48 0.58 6.8*** 
Credit_grade     
AA 0.11 0.09 0.22 15.1*** 
A 0.12 0.11 0.18 7.9*** 
B 0.15 0.15 0.18 3.3*** 
C 0.18 0.18 0.14 -3.7*** 
D 0.15 0.15 0.15 -.07 
E 0.09 0.10 0.07 -2.7** 
HR 0.20 0.22 0.05 -15.5*** 
Delinquencies  6.1 6.5 2.9 -9.6*** 
Judgements 1.7 1.8 0.4 12.1*** 
Income_range     
$0 or undefined   0.13 0.13 0.06 -8.4*** 
$1 - $24,999 0.10 0.11 0.08 -3.2*** 
$25k  - $49,999 0.27 0.27 0.28 1.4 
$50k  - $74,999 0.23 0.22 0.27 4.2 
$75k  - $99,999 0.11 0.11 0.14 3.2*** 
$100k + 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.83 
Employment_Status     
Full time 0.60 0.57 0.75 -12.7*** 
Part time 0.02 0.02 0.01 2.3*** 
Self-employed 0.35 0.36 0.21 11.3*** 
other 0.03 0.05 0.03 1.4* 
Firm Attributes     
 Existing_firm 0.70 0.70 0.71 -2.9* 
Industry     
construction 0.02 0.02 0.01 -2.4** 
transport and utilities 0.02 0.02 0.02 -1.3 
services 0.42 0.42 0.40 -1.2** 
retail trade 0.31 0.31 0.30 1.1 
finance &real estate 0.16 0.17 0.20 3.8*** 
agriculture 0.01 0.01 0.02 3.1 
wholesale trade 0.01 0.004 0.01 2.5 
manufacturing 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.7 
Information attributes     
Include_picture 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.68** 
Elaboration 0.97 0.97 0.97 -2.5 
Repeat_loan  0.04 N/A 0.39 N/A 
Bid_count 39 20 191 1.6** 
Loan Contract Attributes     
Requested amount  $10,430 $10,751 $7,920 13.4*** 
Funded amount $1,821 - $7,864 N/A 
Offer_ interest_ rate 24.1 24.5 21.3 -12.1*** 
Final_ interest_rate 23.8 24.4 18.5 -20.1*** 
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Table 4-2: Probit estimates of factors driving credit approval 
This table reports the Probit regression results for factors driving credit approval on Prosper.com. The first two regressions present 
estimates for the general and parsimonious specifications for all loan requests. The last two regressions present estimates for 
parsimonious specifications for loans from existing firms only and for loans from new firms only.  In all regressions, the 
dependent variable is binary taking the form 1 if credit the loan request was funded and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables 
include owner, firm, and information attributes: credit grade, home ownership, repeat loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, 
judgements in the past 10 years, firm age, inclusion of pictures, indication of text elaboration, and number of lenders extending 
credit per loan. 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time and industry dummies are also 
included in the regressions but results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the general estimation model: 
Pr (Approval|1) = β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesi + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + µ 
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable General model 
(all) 
Parsimonious 
Model (all) 
Existing firms 
(only) 
New firms 
(only) 
Constant -0.332 -0.122 0.956*** 0.423 
 (-0.350) (-0.138) (2.609) (0.566) 
Owner Attributes     
Homeowner 0.134*** 0.136*** 0.087 0.299*** 
 (2.685) (2.732) (1.483) (2.850) 
Credit_grade (AA)     
A -0.263*** -0.245*** -0.210** -0.421** 
 (-2.858) (-2.704) (-2.033) (-1.982) 
B -0.397*** -0.369*** -0.339*** -0.498** 
 (-4.019) (-3.899) (-3.126) (-2.334) 
C -0.662*** -0.625*** -0.717*** -0.415* 
 (-6.079) (-6.059) (-5.930) (-1.863) 
D -0.921*** -0.881*** -0.906*** -0.881*** 
 (-7.468) (-7.505) (-6.636) (-3.424) 
E -1.373*** -1.347*** -1.421*** -1.255*** 
 (-9.741) (-9.748) (-8.702) (-4.336) 
HR -1.849*** -1.835*** -1.871*** -1.880*** 
 (-12.552) (-12.639) (-11.033) (-6.028) 
Delinquencies -0.170*** -0.175*** -0.124** -0.263** 
 (-3.239) (-3.342) (-1.998) (-2.417) 
Judgements -0.223    
 (-1.514)    
Income_range ($ 0 – unable to 
verify) 
    
$1 - $24,999 0.184* 0.214* 0.098* 0.704** 
 (1.666) (1.829) (0.719) (2.445) 
$25,000 - $49,999 0.277*** 0.301*** 0.210* 0.764*** 
 (2.874) (2.975) (1.879) (2.787) 
$50,000 - $74,999 0.322*** 0.344*** 0.265** 0.794*** 
 (3.280) (3.350) (2.351) (2.856) 
$75,000 - $99,999 0.232** 0.253** 0.093* 0.950*** 
 (2.093) (2.201) (0.730) (3.135) 
$100 000 plus 0.106* 0.120 0.013 0.671* 
 (0.957) (1.052) (0.106) (2.129) 
Employment_status (full time)     
Part-time -0.450** -0.443** -0.492** -0.465* 
 (-2.435) (-2.393) (-1.989) (-1.472) 
Self-employed -0.107* -0.100* -0.137** -0.140* 
 (-1.947) (-1.820) (-2.248) (1.031) 
Table 4-2 continue 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable General model 
(all) 
Parsimonious 
Model (all) 
Existing firms 
(only) 
New firms 
(only) 
Firm Attributes     
Existing_firm 0.054    
 (1.041)    
Information Attributes     
Include_picture 0.231*** 0.238*** 0.179*** 0.435*** 
 (4.138) (4.261) (2.695) (3.788) 
Elaboration 0.140  0.511 -0.348 
 (0.561)  (1.365) (-0.795) 
Bid_count 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (30.644) (31.048) (26.262) (16.183) 
Loan Attributes     
Requested_amount($1000) -0.249*** -0.247*** -0.225*** -0.335*** 
 (-16.221) (-16.251) (-12.844) (-9.675) 
SQ Requested_amount 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (5.101) (5.061) (3.477) (3.344) 
Offer_interest_rate (%) 0.030* 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.010** 
 (1.702) (3.694) (3.494) (1.304) 
SQ Offer_interest_rate -0.000    
 (-0.982)    
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 10,278 10,281 7,249 2,983 
Pseudo R
2
 0.481 0.481 0.473 0.549 
Log Likelihood -1910 -1924 -1400 -459.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-2 continue 
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Table 4-3: Marginal effects after Probit regression 
This table presents the marginal effects after Probit models based on all variables set at their means. The marginal effects for 
categorical variables show how Pr (Approval = 1) is predicted to change as a particular factor variable changes from 0 to 1, 
holding all other independent variables at zero. The marginal effect of a continuous variable measures the instantaneous rate of 
change, which may or may not be close to the effect on Pr (Approval=1) of a one unit increase in the independent variable. *, **, 
*** stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively. 
 All firms Existing firms only New firms only 
Owner  attributes    
Homeownership 0.014 0.009 0.025 
 (0.005)*** (0.006) (0.009)*** 
Credit_grade (ref AA)    
A -0.043 -0.022 -0.036 
 (0.016)*** (0.011)** (0.018)** 
B -0.063 -0.036 -0.042 
 (0.017)*** (0.011)*** (0.018)** 
C -0.099 -0.076 -0.035 
 (0.018)*** (0.013)*** (0.019)* 
D -0.131 -0.096 -0.075 
 (0.019)*** (0.014)*** (0.022)*** 
E -0.173 -0.151 -0.107 
 (0.020)*** (0.017)*** (0.024)*** 
HR -0.201 -0.199 -0.160 
 (0.019)*** (0.018)*** (0.026)*** 
Delinquencies -0.018 -0.013 -0.022 
 (0.005)*** (0.007)** (0.009)** 
Income_range($0 or undefined)    
     $1 - $24,999 0.020 0.010 0.060 
 (0.011)* (0.014)* (0.024)** 
     $25k  - $49,999 0.029 0.022 0.065 
 (0.009)*** (0.012)* (0.023)*** 
     $50k  - $74,999 0.034 0.028 0.068 
 (0.010)*** (0.012)** (0.024)*** 
     $75k  - $99,999 0.024 0.010 0.081 
 (0.011)** (0.013)* (0.026)*** 
     $100k + 0.011 0.001 0.057 
 (0.010)* (0.013)* (0.027)** 
Employment _status (full time)    
     Part-time -0.040 -0.052 -0.040 
 (0.014)*** (0.026)** (0.027)** 
     Self employed -0.010 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.023) (0.019)* (0.012)* 
Information attributes    
Include_picture 0.024 0.019 0.037 
 (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** 
Elaboration  0.014 -0.030 
  (0.023) (0.037) 
Bid_count 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Loan  attributes    
Requested amount ($1000) -0.025 -0.024 -0.029 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
SQ Requested amount 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Offer_ interest_ rate 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001) 
N 10,281 7,249 2,983 
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Table 4-4: Predicted probabilities for different credit risk over a range of loan size 
In this table we present predicted probabilities for different credit risk over a range of loan sizes 
conducted after the Probit regression. 
Requested amount 
($1,000) AA A B C D E HR 
1 69.7% 62.5% 58.6% 51.1% 43.9% 32.5% 22.7% 
2 62.9% 55.4% 51.6% 44.2% 37.4% 27.1% 18.5% 
3 55.8% 48.3% 44.6% 37.7% 31.5% 22.3% 15.0% 
4 48.7% 41.6% 38.1% 31.7% 26.1% 18.2% 12.0% 
5 41.9% 35.2% 32.1% 26.3% 21.5% 14.7% 9.7% 
6 35.6% 29.5% 26.7% 21.7% 17.5% 11.8% 7.7% 
7 29.8% 24.4% 21.9% 17.6% 14.1% 9.5% 6.2% 
8 24.7% 20.0% 17.9% 14.3% 11.4% 7.6% 5.0% 
9 20.2% 16.2% 14.5% 11.5% 9.1% 6.1% 4.1% 
10 16.4% 13.1% 11.6% 9.2% 7.3% 4.9% 3.4% 
11 13.2% 10.5% 9.3% 7.4% 5.9% 4.0% 2.8% 
12 10.6% 8.4% 7.5% 5.9% 4.8% 3.3% 2.3% 
13 8.5% 6.7% 6.0% 4.8% 3.9% 2.8% 2.0% 
14 6.8% 5.4% 4.9% 3.9% 3.2% 2.3% 1.7% 
15 5.5% 4.4% 4.0% 3.2% 2.7% 2.0% 1.4% 
16 4.5% 3.6% 3.3% 2.7% 2.2% 1.7% 1.2% 
17 3.7% 3.0% 2.7% 2.3% 1.9% 1.4% 1.1% 
18 3.0% 2.5% 2.3% 1.9% 1.6% 1.2% 0.9% 
19 2.5% 2.1% 1.9% 1.6% 1.4% 1.1% 0.8% 
20 2.1% 1.8% 1.6% 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 
21 1.8% 1.5% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0% 0.8% 0.6% 
22 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.7% 0.5% 
23 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 
24 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 
25 1.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 
*All other variables are set at the mean 
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Table 4-5: Predicted probabilities for credit allocation at representative values 
In this table we present predicted probabilities for credit allocation at represented values conducted after the Probit regression; with actual cases extracted from the population of loan 
requests. 
Actual Cases  Probability of  credit approval 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $50k - $74,999k, no past due loans and no judgments, homeowner, existing firm, 
image,  elaborate  
20% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $50k - $74,999k, no past due loans and  no judgments, rent  home, existing firm,    
no image ,    elaboration  
15% 
Self-employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $25k - $49,999k,  no past due loans and  no judgments, rent, new firm, no image, 
elaboration 
12% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $25k - $49,999k, no past due loans and no judgments,  homeowner, existing firm,    
image ,    elaboration  
16% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $25k - $49,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  home, existing firm,   no  
image ,    elaboration  
11% 
Self-employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $50k - $74,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  home, existing firm,    no image ,    
elaboration 
10% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade B, income range $50k - $74,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  home, existing firm,    no 
image ,    elaboration 
9% 
Self-employed ,  credit grade C, income range $25k - $49,999k, past due loans and  judgments, home owner,   existing firm, image, 
elaboration  
7% 
Full-time employed average credit grade D, income range $25k - $49,999k, no delinquencies, no judgment, rent,   existing firm, image, 
elaboration 
6% 
Self-employed  credit grade D, income range $25k - $49,999k, no delinquencies, no judgment, rent,   existing firm, image, elaboration  6% 
Full-time employed credit grade E, income range $25k - $49,999k, delinquencies, no judgment, homeowner,   existing firm, image, 
elaboration 
5% 
 Self-employed, credit grade E, income range $25k - $49,999k,  delinquencies,  judgment, rent,   existing firm, image, elaboration 5% 
Full-time employed, high risk credit grade HR, income range $75k - $99,999k,  past due loans and judgments, homeowner, new firm,   image,    
elaboration  
3% 
Self-employed, high  risk credit grade HR, income range $75k - $99,999k,  past due loans and  judgments, rent home, new firm, no image,    
elaboration 
2% 
Self-employed, high risk credit grade HR, income range $1 - $24,999,  past due loans and judgments, rent home, new firm, no image, no 
elaboration    
1% 
Requested amount and interest rates set at their mean values, $10,430 and 18.5 percent respectively       
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Table 4-6: Robustness Test Probability of funding – without credit grades 
This table reports the Probit regression results for factors driving credit approval. The first two regressions 
present estimates for the general and parsimonious specifications for all loan requests. The last two regressions 
present estimates for parsimonious specifications for loans from existing firms only and for loans from new 
firms only.  In all regressions, the dependent variable is binary taking the form 1 if credit the loan request was 
funded and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables include owner, firm, and information attributes: home 
ownership, repeat loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, judgements in the past 10 years, firm age, inclusion 
of pictures, indication of text elaboration, and number of lenders extending credit per loan. 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time and industry 
dummies are also included in the regressions but results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the 
general estimation model: 
Pr (Approval|1) = β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesti + β5Industryi + β6Macroi 
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given 
in parentheses. Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
significance levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable General model 
(all) 
Parsimonious 
Model (all) 
Existing firms 
(only) 
New firms 
(only) 
Constant -0.429 -0.469 -0.370 0.355 
 (-0.478) (-0.531) (-0.747) (0.433) 
Owner Attributes     
Home_owner 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.181*** 0.373*** 
 (4.735) (4.653) (3.259) (3.756) 
Delinquencies -0.300*** -0.288*** -0.257*** -0.323*** 
 (-5.967) (-5.782) (-4.402) (-3.149) 
Judgements -0.347** -0.342** -0.337** -0.430** 
     
Income_range ($ 0 – unable to 
verify) 
    
$1 - $24,999 0.133 0.145 0.047 0.470** 
 (1.267) (1.387) (0.376) (2.048) 
$25,000 - $49,999 0.194** 0.198** 0.126 0.472** 
 (2.105) (2.158) (1.222) (2.128) 
$50,000 - $74,999 0.243*** 0.241** 0.162 0.560** 
 (2.584) (2.575) (1.549) (2.434) 
$75,000 - $99,999 0.137 0.138 -0.017 0.704*** 
 (1.282) (1.291) (-0.142) (2.760) 
$100 000 plus 0.033 0.039 -0.058 0.451 
 (0.305) (0.364) (-0.499) (1.638) 
Employment_status (full time)     
Part-time -0.446** -0.439** -0.462* -0.461* 
 (-2.512) (-2.478) (-1.943) (-1.560) 
Self-employed -0.097* -0.093* -0.130** 0.113* 
 (-1.843) (-1.772) (-2.229) (0.886) 
     
Firm Attributes     
Existing_firm 0.068    
 (1.343)    
Information Attributes     
Include_picture 0.220*** 0.218*** 0.162** 0.410*** 
 (4.108) (4.085) (2.541) (3.767) 
Table 4-6 continue 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable General model 
(all) 
Parsimonious 
Model (all) 
Existing firms 
(only) 
New firms 
(only) 
Elaboration 0.199 0.212 0.627* -0.406 
 (0.805) (0.859) (1.704) (-0.910) 
Bid_count 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 
 (35.147) (36.166) (30.743) (18.356) 
Loan Attributes     
Requested_amount($1000) -0.183*** -0.156*** -0.147*** -0.210*** 
 (-13.039) (-24.677) (-20.381) (-13.881) 
Offer_interest_rate (%) 0.004** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (-0.286) (-4.861) (-3.850) (-2.695) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,278 10,278 7,246 2,983 
Pseudo R
2 0.449 0.449 0.439 0.518 
Loglikelihood -2028 -2030 -1488 -491.3 
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Table 4-7: Robustness test - marginal effects for factors driving probability of funding 
This table presents the marginal effects after Probit models based on all variables set at their means. The 
marginal effects for categorical variables show how Pr (Approval = 1) is predicted to change as a particular 
factor variable changes from 0 to 1, holding all other independent variables at zero. The marginal effect of a 
continuous variable measures the instantaneous rate of change, which may or may not be close to the effect on 
Pr (Approval=1) of a one unit increase in the independent variable. *, **, *** stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
significance levels respectively. 
 All loans Existing firms (only) New firms(only) 
Owner  attributes    
Home_owner 0.024 0.021 0.034 
 (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)*** 
Delinquencies -0.031 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** 
Judgements -0.037 -0.038 -0.039 
 (0.015)** (0.017)** (0.030)** 
Income_range($0 or undefined)    
     $1 - $24,999 0.015 0.005 0.043 
 (0.011)* (0.014)* (0.021)** 
     $25k  - $49,999 0.021 0.014 0.043 
 (0.009)** (0.012)** (0.020)** 
     $50k  - $74,999 0.026 0.018 0.051 
 (0.010)*** (0.012)* (0.021)** 
     $75k  - $99,999 0.014 -0.002 0.064 
 (0.011)** (0.014)* (0.023)*** 
     $100k + 0.004 -0.007 0.041 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.025) 
Employment Status (full time)    
Part-time -0.041 -0.052 -0.042 
 (0.014)*** (0.027)* (0.027)* 
Self-employed -0.010 -0.015 0.010 
 (0.006)* (0.007)** (0.012)* 
Information attributes    
Include_picture 0.023 0.018 0.037 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)** (0.010)*** 
Bid_count 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Loan  attributes    
Requested amount ($1000) -0.017 -0.017 -0.019 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
SQ Requested amount 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Offer_ interest_rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
N 10,278 7,246 2,983 
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Table 4-8: Robustness test Tobit estimation of credit approval decision 
This table report regression results for factors driving credit approval. In all regressions, the dependent variable is a percentage of 
the loan funded denoted by (   ). The explanatory variables include credit grade
+
, home owner, firm, and 
information attributes: home ownership, repeat loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, judgements in the past 10 years, firm age, 
inclusion of pictures, indication of text elaboration, and number of lenders extending credit per loan. The controls are requested 
loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time and industry dummies are also included in the regressions but 
results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the general estimation model: 
Fraction_funded = β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesti + β5Industryi + β6Macroi 
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively 
 
 Fraction Funded 
With credit grade 
Fraction Funded 
Without credit grade 
Constant 0.499*** 0.379** 
 (2.871) (2.073) 
Owner Attributes   
Home_owner 0.009 0.032*** 
 (1.265) (4.444) 
Credit_grade (ref AA)   
A -0.060***  
 (-4.700)  
B -0.134***  
 (-10.224)  
C -0.231***  
 (-16.781)  
D -0.307***  
 (-19.614)  
E -0.390***  
 (-21.514)  
HR -0.511***  
 (-30.005)  
Delinquencies -0.047*** -0.104*** 
 (-6.436) (-14.020) 
Judgements -0.011 -0.054*** 
 (-0.650) (-3.102) 
Income_range ($ 0 – unable to verify)   
$1 - $24,999 0.061*** 0.044*** 
 (4.172) (2.870) 
$25,000 - $49,999 0.088*** 0.068*** 
 (7.163) (5.342) 
$50,000 - $74,999 0.108*** 0.092*** 
 (8.599) (7.094) 
$75,000 - $99,999 0.109*** 0.090*** 
 (7.640) (6.018) 
$100 000 plus 0.089*** 0.079*** 
 (6.596) (5.654) 
Employment_status (full time)   
Part-time -0.071*** -0.056** 
 (-2.982) (-2.273) 
Self-employed -0.050*** -0.047*** 
 (-6.936) (-6.204) 
Firm Attributes   
Existing_firm 0.016 0.025 
 (2.198) (3.272) 
Table 4-8 continue 
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 Fraction Funded 
With credit grade 
Fraction Funded 
Without credit grade 
 
Information Attributes 
  
Include_picture 0.033*** 0.039*** 
 (4.662) (5.159) 
Elaboration -0.026 -0.007 
 (-0.811) (-0.223) 
Bid_count 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (74.880) (85.116) 
Loan Attributes   
Requested_amount($1000) -0.020*** -0.014*** 
 (-38.560) (-29.219) 
Offer_interest_rate (%) 0.005*** 0.001** 
 (12.664) (1.285) 
Time fixed effects YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES 
Number of observations 10,303 10,303 
Pseudo R
2
 0.569 0.492 
Loglikelihood -3315 -3911 
 
Table 4-8 continue 
  
115 
 
Figure 4-1: Geographic distribution of loan requests 
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Figure 4-2: Flow chart showing the attempts of getting funding 
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Figure 4-2: Square measurement 
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Figure 4-3: Predictive values across different loan size for borrowers in different credit risk categories 
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Figure 4-4: Predictive values across different loan size for borrowers in different credit risk categories 
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Chapter 5 Factors driving the cost of credit in P2P lending 
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1.0 Introduction 
The first empirical study, in the previous Chapter, examined the determinant effects of 
observable borrower and firm characteristics and information variables on the likelihood of 
credit allocation. As stated earlier, credit allocation is not only about access to credit but also 
about cost of credit. Hence, it  is  the  purpose  of  this  second study  to  examine empirically  
the  fundamental determinants  of  interest rates  for small  business  loans in the P2P lending 
context. The chapter focuses on whether the variations in interest rates paid by small business 
borrowers can be explained by differences in the observable borrower and firm characteristics   
and information variables (Diamond, 1989; Keasey and Watson, 2000; Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Cowling, 1999; Hanley and Crook, 
2005; Burke and Hanley, 2006).  
Our empirical tests are based on the premise that:  if the methods we identified from theory, 
typically adopted in traditional lending, such as home ownership, credit grades, credit history, 
reputation built over time, and firm age help attenuate information problems in the P2P lending 
context, then we should observe higher risk small business borrowers (those less likely to repay 
the credit) associated with higher interest rates and lower risk small business borrowers ( those 
likely to repay credit) associated with lower interest rates. This evidence would suggest that: 
either little risk is generated by small business borrowers with better observable borrower and 
firm characteristics; or that the risk that is generated is generally offset by lenders’ ability to 
select risk. 
In  addition,  to  the  extent  that  the mechanisms specific to P2P lending such as the optional 
pictures and text elaboration  may possibly  generate information  about  small business 
borrowers (or the business ventures)  and  perhaps attenuate  information  problems, we  also  
explore  whether  inclusion of this kind of information result in cheaper (expensive) credit for 
small business borrowers. 
Our empirical analysis also distinguishes new business start-ups from established firms. New 
business start-ups are arguably more risky. Hence, we test the following hypotheses:   
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H1b  small business borrowers, who own their homes, demonstrate better credit risk (relative to those 
that rent) and therefore are more likely to pay lower interest rates 
H2b  small business borrowers, with high credit ratings, demonstrate better credit risk and therefore are 
more likely to pay lower interest rates 
H3b  small business borrowers who have successfully paid back a previous loan are more likely to pay 
lower interest rates  
H4b  existing firms are more likely to pay lower interest rates (relative to new business start-ups) in the 
P2Plending context 
H6b  small business borrowers who use text elaborations are more (less) likely to be pay cheaper 
interest rates in the P2P lending context 
H7b  small business borrowers who have previous failures are more likely to pay higher interest rates 
H8b  small business owners who post pictures are more (less) likely to pay lower interest rates in the 
P2P lending context 
 
The rest of the Chapter is organized in the following manner. We begin by providing summary 
statistics and simple bivariate correlations of variables. Then in section 5.2, estimates based on 
multivariate analysis of the determinants driving the price of small business credit on Prosper are 
presented. Finally, in section 5-3, we present our robustness checks.   
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 5-1 presents descriptive statistics relating to the 1417 observations that resulted in funded 
loans for the period 2007 - 2013. The table indicates that across all funded loans, the mean 
interest rate offered and the final interest rate paid by small business borrowers were 21.3 and 
18.5 percent respectively with a considerable standard deviation. Figure 5-1 displays how the 
offer interest rate and final interest rates vary across time. We observe three things from the 
figure: first the interest rates offered seem to have a selection effect - lenders appear cautious of 
borrowers offering higher interest rates; opting to ration credit instead.  Second, we observe that 
over time, the final interest rate paid approaches the (higher) levels of the offer interest rates. 
Third, compared to typical small business loans from traditional lending institutions like banks, 
loans on Prosper, on average, are more expensive. According to SBA data (2010), typical small 
business loans (under $100,000) from US banks show a national average of 13.2 percent; 
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unsecured loans from Credit unions averaged 12.8 percent per annum for the period 2006 - 2009, 
whilst business credit cards had a national average of 15 percent.  
 
...........Table 5-1 goes around here........... 
 
Interestingly, when we break down the interest rates paid by credit grade as shown in Table 5-1, 
we observe that for small business borrowers in the low risk categories (AA) Prosper offers even 
better interest rates in comparison to business credit cards (11.7 percent vs. 15 percent); fixed 
term unsecured bank loans (11.7 percent vs. 13.2 percent) and fixed term unsecured Credit union 
loans (11.7 percent 12.8 percent). This observation may seem to suggest that for a subset of low 
risk small business borrowers, this market may be competing with traditional banks. All other 
borrowers in the remaining credit grade categories seem to pay interest rates higher than those 
available in traditional debt lending; more comparable to returns earned by equity finance 
investors as shown in Table 5-2 (Damodaran, 2010).  In fact we observe from Table 5-2 that that 
interest that high risk borrowers in credit grades HR and E seem somewhat comparable to returns 
from Venture Capitalists in 2007, which may seem to suggest that  for a subset of small business 
borrowers P2P lending may actually be an expensive form of finance. 
 
...........Table 5-2 goes around here........... 
 
5.2 Regression analysis  
Next in order to confirm the suggested associations as suggested by the univariate results, we 
conducted multivariate analysis. The dependent variable used in the analysis is the interest rate 
paid by the small business borrowers (Interest rate). Following previous studies (Keasey and 
Watson, 1; Cowling, 1999; Cressy and Toivanen, 2001; Hanley and Crook, 2005; Burke and 
Hanley, 2006) the interest rate was adjusted according to the prime rate to provide the interest 
rate premium so as to allow for a reliable comparison between data collected at different points 
  
124 
 
in time. When lenders on Prosper grant a loan to small business borrowers they gather 
information to assess the credit risk of their projects. We argue that rational lenders in the P2P 
context will accept an interest rate equal to the underlying cost of funds plus a premium that will 
depend on the quality of the credit risk presented by the borrower. As indicated in the 
methodology section (Chapter 3), in the regression analysis, we control for observable borrower 
and firm characteristics that proxy for firm quality as well as the prevailing conditions in the 
market when the loan was made. We include variables reflecting the main characteristics of the 
small business borrower: home ownership, credit grade, credit history variables - delinquencies 
and judgements, employment status and income. We include variables reflecting firm attributes 
namely: age of the firm (denoted as established or new firm) and dummies for firm industry.  
We also include information variables: given that lenders on Prosper can see whether a small 
business borrower has any previous loans, we include dummy (repeat loan), signifying whether 
the finance requested is follow-up finance or whether the loan represents the first ever granted 
request. We also add information variables from the (optional) pictures and text elaboration. 
Finally, we add some controls for the main features of the loan: loan size, offer interest rate; 
dummies for the region where the small business borrower is located; and time dummies to 
control for variation in the market conditions. The regressions estimated by Tobit follow the 
form: 
Interest rate = α + β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 InformationAttributesi +β4 LoanAttributesi 
                          + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni   + µ                                 (5-1)    
                                                                                   
The empirical results are presented in Table 5-3; which is made up of 3 columns. In the first 
column, we report results for the general regression specification; including all the regressor 
variables that could possibly drive the cost of credit on Prosper (identified from literature). We 
tested down all regressor variables to derive a parsimonious model shown in column 2; dropping 
variables from the general estimation which were insignificant at the 10 percent level (p >0.10). 
The coefficients of the included variables may be interpreted as reflecting the association 
between the included variables and the risk of the loan as reflected in its price. The results of the 
Likelihood Ration (LR) test confirm that the parsimonious model is a better estimation; the null 
  
125 
 
hypothesis that the excluded regressors collectively have no role in predicting our dependent 
variable is decisively accepted (LRX
2
= - 3562, df = 102, p <0.10). The third columns 
subsequently report the determinants driving the cost of credit separate for when we exclude the 
credit variable; on the basis that it may be capturing some of the effects we observe from 
delinquencies and home ownership.  
 
...........Table 5-3 goes around here........... 
 
On the whole, the general findings from this study suggest that at an average lending of between 
18 percent and 20 percent; P2P lending is a very expensive form of debt finance. Banks typically 
refuse to extend credit given such high interest rates as this tends to alter the borrower pool as 
put forward by theory (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bosanko and Thakor,1987)  such that only 
the riskiest of borrowers have projects that generate returns that are high enough to be able to re-
pay these interest rates.  Consequently, if we were to characterise P2P lending we would 
effectively conclude that it is typically a high cost finance with required returns expected to be 
likely in the levels of Business Angels and VC equity investments (Bygrave and Quill,2007). 
Further insight we get from our second study is that borrower reputation, stipulated by credit 
grades is the single most important determinant of the cost of credit .The significance of using 
the credit grade helps to reduce the problem of moral hazard. The cost of defaulting will result in 
poorer scores – quantifiable to an increase of 80 basis points.  Second, we see from our results 
that collateral, which was such an important determinant in reducing moral hazard in Stiglitz-
Weiss theory, in the P2P lending it is unimportant. The fact that P2P lending relaxes collateral 
requirements and the fact that reputation is the single most important variant in assessing the cost 
of credit on P2P websites, highlights some of the facts that were not previously considered by 
previous theory. That is, moral hazard may be solved by other means in the form of credit scores. 
More specifically, we find that small business borrowers in high risk credit categories (HR) will 
pay as high as 500 percent more in interest rate when compared to those in premium credit grade 
categories (AA). This suggests that ‘good types’ defined in terms of credit rating, get their loans 
at a lower interest rate (H2b). These results may be driven by the fact that either little risk is 
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generated by small business borrowers with better creditworthiness, or that the risk that is 
generated by higher risk borrowers is generally offset by the lenders charging higher interest 
rates for it.  Given that in the previous empirical analysis (Chapter 4) we identified that the credit 
grade variable may also include information already captured by the Home_ownership variable 
and other credit history variables, in columns 3 of Table 5-3 we estimate the Tobit regressions 
based on the estimation defined in equation 5-1, excluding the credit grade variable. Indeed we 
observe that the Home_ownership variables become significant such that small business 
borrowers who own homes will pay 3 percent less in interest rate per $1,000 extended by lenders 
relative to those who rent homes (H1b). Similarly, borrowers who have failed to honour previous 
loan commitments end up with higher interest rates (H7b).   
In terms of firm attributes, we observe from column 2 of Table 5-3 that the coefficient on our 
variable of interest Existing_ firm, is not significant (H4b). Thus, we do not find evidence that 
lenders on Prosper incorporate firm level characteristics when pricing loans. This result seem to 
suggests that the pricing of loans in this context may possibly be relatively idiosyncratic - the 
interest rate on the funded loans may depend more on personal reputation of the small business 
owner than on the observed characteristics of the firm. This finding seems counter to results 
found in small finance literature (see Keasey and Watson; 2000; Cressy and Toivanen, 2001; 
Cowling, 1999) where firm age is one of the key determinants of pricing credit. Additionally, we 
also find that our industry variables are not significant (not reported). 
Interestingly, in terms of the information variables: the insignificant coefficient of the variable 
Repeat_loans suggests that building a relationships in this context may not necessarily translate 
to cheaper credit as suggested by model of Petersen and Rajan, 1994; hence we do not find 
support for H3b.  This is hardly surprising given that relationships are weak at best.  
However, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the Include_picture variable 
suggests that by including a picture in the loan requests, small business borrowers will pay 
almost 50 percent less in their final interest rates per $1,000 of their funded loan relative to those 
who do not include a picture (H8b). This result appears to suggest that lenders seem to value 
pictures as a mechanism of reducing information asymmetries - even though these pictures are 
not verified by Prosper.   
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In terms of control variables, we find that small business lenders, who offer high interest rates, 
will end up paying more for credit on Prosper. Interestingly, the loan size variable             
Requested_ amount   has a positive and significant sign, suggesting that P2P lenders expect to be 
compensated for the risk of extending larger loan amounts; hence in this context larger loans are 
expensive. This observation seem counter intuitive to theory and what typically happens in 
traditional lending, where larger loans are typically associated with lower interest rates (Besanko 
and Thakor, 1987; Cressy, and Toivanen,2001; Hanley and Crook, 2006); given the fact that they 
have more collateral. But given the fact that P2P loans are not secured by collateral, high interest 
rates may induce moral hazard behaviour (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
In Table 5-4 we move on to present estimates for Tobit regressions separately for established 
firms and for new business start-ups in order to facilitate comparison as to whether factors 
driving interest rates differ between these two groups.  
Interest rate_Existing_Firm = α + β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 InformationAttributesi                               +                                                  
+ β4 LoanAttributesi   + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni   + µ                                          (5-2)    
 
Interest rate_New_Business = α + β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 InformationAttributesi                               +                                                  
+ β4 LoanAttributesi   + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni   + µ                                         (5-3)    
The findings for factors driving cost of credit for established firms substantially mirror those of 
new business start-ups and those found for all firms; further validating the earlier observed 
result, evident from the Existing_firms variable, suggesting that lender on Prosper may not 
necessarily pay attention to firm characteristics when deciding on the cost of credit.  
 
...........Table 5-4 goes around here........... 
 
We now move on and try and illustrate the impact of the statistically significant factors that were 
shown above to influence interest rates paid.  In Table 5-5 we compile predicted probabilities for 
factors driving interest rate at representative values. The baseline case is an individual with 
Prime credit grade A, income range $25k - $49,999k, with previous delinquencies and 
judgements, who rents their home, running an existing business, who opts not to include a 
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picture but gives a text elaboration - this borrower has an 11 percent likelihood of funding 
success and is likely to pay approximately 13.7 percent interest rate. Compared to the baseline 
case, a borrower with a premium credit grade AA, full time employed income range $50k - 
$74,999k, no past due loans, who is a homeowner, who includes a picture has a 20 percent 
chance of getting a loan request funded at a cost of almost 12.5 percent interest rate; this 
translates to a probability of funding that is twice as likely than the base case, with an interest 
rate that is only 1.2 percentage point less. This renders the credit grade as an influential 
determinant of the price. Whilst, compared to the baseline case, a high risk borrower with a HR 
credit grade, full time employed, income range $75k - $99,999k with delinquencies and who 
rents their home, has a 1 percent chance of being funded and can expect to pay as high as 30 
percent interest rate. Being delinquent in the past on loan obligations only reduce the probability 
of funding by 0.56 percentage points which seems to support our argument that lenders in this 
market are forgiving. 
...........Table 5-5 goes around here........... 
 
Our predictions do confirm that all in all including a picture will increase funding success and 
lower interest rates. When we compare otherwise identical cases in terms of credit grades, 
differing only in inclusion of pictures (as shown in the first two rows of Table 5.5), we observe 
that the borrower who includes a picture can save 0.5 percentage points in interest rates.  
Unfortunately, for the highest risk category (HR) even inclusion of a picture simply would not be 
enough.  
All in all, our results suggest that prospective borrowers with low credit scores, it will be cheaper 
to partner with a small business owner who has a good credit grade in order to gain access to the 
market.  
5.3 Robustness Check 
In the preceding sections, we found that credit grades, previous credit history and the inclusion 
of pictures significantly impacts the cost of credit on Prosper; whilst the remainder of our  
explanatory variables namely:  repeat loan, firm variables  and stories that small business 
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borrowers tell were not important.  In this subsection we perform several additional regressions 
as robustness checks.  
5.3.1 Changes in the method of estimation – accounting for selection bias 
Our previous estimates on factors driving interest rates were based on a sample of 1417 funded 
loans only; a sample that is not randomly selected. Because we do not estimate factors driving 
cost of credit for the population (i.e. randomly selected sample) our results may be biased. This 
challenge emphasises the need to model sample selection explicitly. Hence as a robustness 
check, we have adopted a 2-stage Heckman model to estimate the interest rate equation 
accounting for selection bias as follows: 
Stage 2 Outcome regression: observed only if loan funded (i.e. Pr (Approval) = 1) 
Interest rate = α + β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 InformationAttributesi + β4 LoanAttributesi                                            
+                             +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni   + µ                                                              (5.3a) 
Stage 1 selection regression:  probability of credit approval is 1 if loan funded, and 0 
otherwise 
Pr (Approval) = α+β1Owneri+β2Firmi+β3InformationAttributesi+β4LoanAttributesi                        +                             
+                         +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni + Ɛ                                                                    (5.3b) 
  
Table 5-6 report our result. The estimated coefficients in this case are an indicator of 
determinants driving interest rates net the observed selection bias. All in all, we observe the same 
pattern of results, with the exception of home ownership, meaning that after controlling for 
selection bias, it seems credit grades are still important determinants of interest rates.  Similar to 
the Tobit, we find that borrowers with delinquencies also pay higher interest rates (p<0.01); 
whilst small business borrowers that include a picture (p<0.01). We find however that the Home 
ownership variable now is positive and statistically significant; suggesting that borrowers who 
own homes may appear as better risk to lenders.   These results seem to suggest that even after 
selection; lenders in this context may still be unable to resolve information asymmetries such 
they seem to compensate by charging higher interest rates for those in high risk credit grades (C, 
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D E and HR) and look to home ownership, previous credit history and inclusion of pictures as 
signals which may help attenuate information issues. 
 
...........Table 5-6 goes around here........... 
 
In terms of firm attributes, we observe that our variable Existing_firm is still insignificant. 
Moreover, consistent with our previous observation, repeat loans do not necessarily translate to 
cheaper credit in the P2P lending context. We also find that the stories that prospective 
borrowers tell do not seem to affect price of credit. 
In terms of our loan attributes, we observe from Table 5-6 that it seems the result observed from 
the Tobit estimation on the Requested_amount variable and Offer_interest_rate still hold after 
accounting for selection bias. All else equal, small business borrowers who ask for larger loans, 
who offer higher interest rates do end up paying high prices for credit in the P2P lending context. 
Moreover, our control variables Employment_status, and Income_range variables included are 
significant in the selection equation, but not in the outcome regression; suggesting that once the 
lenders have looked at the prospective borrower’s income and employment status when making a 
decision of whether or not to extend credit - these variables don’t seem to influence the interest 
rate borrowers pay.   
Finally, in term of justifying whether adoption of the Heckman estimation is reasonable, we see 
from Table 5-6 that the LR test of independence is supported. Further, the Null hypothesis of 
zero correlation between the error terms of the selection (equation 5-4b) and outcome (equation 
5-4b) regressions was rejected at the 0.05 level; suggesting that our results can indeed be 
generalised to the population (of funded and declined loans). 
 5.3.2 Including ex post default 
Next we, we looked at the robustness of our results based on ex post default; so as to establish 
whether indeed the high risk borrowers were paying  higher prices for loans. From our results in 
Table 5-7, the ability of P2P lenders to ascertain the small business borrower’s real ‘revealed’ 
quality is evident in the positive and significant coefficient of our variable ex_default (p<0.01). 
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Here we observe that small business borrowers who were higher risk (unidentifiable upfront) 
were in fact charged higher interest rates, perhaps in anticipation  of this deterioration of their 
credit quality. All in all, the estimated coefficients for our key explanatory variables are 
generally consistent with our previous findings. 
 
...........Table 5-7 goes around here........... 
 
 
 5.4 Chapter Summary 
Recalling the research question, this study has empirically examined the determinants of interest 
rate paid by small business borrowers on Prosper .Given that the primary goal for this study was 
not so much to get the best estimation of loan rate; rather, it was to find the estimation implicitly 
used by the ‘less sophisticated’  Prosper lenders in pricing credit. This type of an enquiry helps 
us determine if mechanisms typically used in traditional lending can help attenuate information 
issues in pricing credit within a new context. 
All in all, there is evidence that the interest rate paid by small business borrowers in this context 
incorporate a number of easily observable specific risk/cost characteristics of the borrower. In 
addition, there is also evidence that interest rate reflect the reduction in information asymmetries 
due to inclusion of pictures and those who are home owners. We find however that firm specific 
information does not affect the pricing of loans. This result seem to suggests that the cost of 
loans in this context may possibly be relatively idiosyncratic - the interest rate on the funded 
loans may depend more on personal reputation of the small business owner than on the observed 
characteristics of the firm. 
In sum, main insight we get from this study is that borrower reputation, stipulated by credit 
grades is the single most important determinant of the cost of credit .The significance of using 
the credit grade helps to reduce the problem of moral hazard. Second, we see from our results 
that collateral, which was such an important determinant in reducing moral hazard in Stiglitz-
Weiss theory, in the P2P lending it is unimportant. The fact that P2P lending relaxes collateral 
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requirements and the fact that reputation is the single most important variant in assessing the cost 
of credit on P2P websites, highlights some of the facts that were not previously considered by 
previous theory. That is, moral hazard may be solved by other means in the form of credit scores 
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Table 5-1: Summary statistics of cost of capital 
This table contains the descriptive statistics of the cost of capital based on all funded loans. We report the mean and the 
standard deviation of each variable. 
Funded Loans Obs Mean interest rate 
(%) 
Standard Deviation Min Max 
Requested loan ($1,000) 1417 7.9 6.3 1 25 
Offer Interest rate 1417 21.3 9.0 4.5 36 
Final Interest rate 1417 18.5 8.6 4.3 36 
      
Credit Grade      
      AA 314 11.3 4.6 4.9 36 
      A 261 14.7 6.8 4.3 36 
      B 253 18.2 6.4 5.0 36 
      C 204 21.5 7.1 10 36 
      D 213 24.6 5.6 9.0 36 
      E 105 31.0 3.1 17 36 
      HR 67 31.5 4.8 15 36 
      
Home owner 818 17.9 8.1 4.9 36 
Rent 599 20.5 9.0 4.3 36 
      
Firm Age      
     Firm Exist 1027 18.8 8.7 5.6 36 
     Firm New 390 19.6 8.5 4.3 36 
      
Industry      
    agriculture 22 13.4 6.1 7.5 36 
    construction 14 18.7 5.5 9.0 36 
    finance, insurance, real estate 279 16.3 8.5 4.3 36 
    manufacturing 64 18.8 8.0 6.0 36 
    retail trade 420 20.9 8.4 6.0 36 
    services 572 18.6 8.4 5.0 36 
    wholesale trade 18 18.2 9.2 8.0 36 
    transportation 28 19.1 8.0 9.0 36 
      
Include Picture 790 18.1 8.1 4.3 36 
No Picture 627 20.1 9.1 5.0 36 
      
Elaboration 1369 19.0 8.6 4.3 36 
No elaboration 48 18.0 9.5 6.0 36 
      
Repeat loans      
Once only 661 18.2 8.5 5.0 36 
Twice only 84 19.0 8.9 4.3 36 
Three times and more  672 20.4 8.0 5.6 36 
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Table 5-2: Returns from Venture Capitalists in 2007: 
Reported rates of return for venture capital investment 
 Three Years Five Years Ten Years Twenty Years 
Early/Seed  VC 4.9% 5.0% 32.9% 21.5% 
Balanced VC 10.8% 11.9% 14.4% 14.7% 
Later  VC 12.4% 11.1% 8.5% 14.5% 
All VC 8.5% 8.5% 16.6% 16.9% 
Data Source: Damodaran (2010): The Dark Side of Valuation: Valuing Young, Distressed, and Complex Business 
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Table 5-3: Figure 5 3: Factors driving cost of credit on Prosper 
This table reports the Tobit estimates for factors driving credit on Prosper.com. The first regressions (column 1) present estimates for 
the general specifications for all loan requests. Next, column (2) present estimates for parsimonious specifications for all loan requests 
while column (3) represents estimates excluding the credit grade variable.  In all regressions, the dependent variable is the interest rate 
(less prime rate). The explanatory variables include owner, firm, and information attributes: credit grade ( excluded in column 3), 
home ownership, repeat loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, judgements in the past 10 years, firm age, inclusion of pictures, 
indication of text elaboration, and number of lenders extending credit per loan. 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time, Region and industry dummies are also 
included in the regressions but results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the general estimation model: 
Interest rate =α+ β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesti + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + ų 
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively.   t-statistics in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 General 
All  
Parsimonious  
All 
Parsimonious All 
Excluding credit grade 
Constant 4.756 4.664 6.628 
 (1.197) (1.181) (1.621) 
Owner attributes    
Homeowner 0.077   
 (0.392)   
Credit grade (AA)    
    A 0.750** 0.455  
 (2.533) (1.595)  
    B 1.730*** 1.139***  
 (5.012) (3.617)  
    C 3.131*** 2.350***  
 (7.861) (6.824)  
    D 3.915*** 2.980***  
 (8.485) (7.692)  
    E 6.118*** 5.143***  
 (10.756) (10.142)  
    HR 6.309*** 5.304***  
 (10.142) (9.652)  
Delinquencies 0.131  0.081* 
 (0.604)  (0.404) 
Judgements 0.375  0.575* 
 (1.586)  (2.442) 
Employment_Status(full time)    
   Part-time -0.611   
 (-0.792)   
   Retired -0.112   
 (-0.185)   
   Self-employed 0.364   
 (1.605)   
Income_Range ($ 0 – unable to verify)    
$1 - $24,999 -0.654 -0.683 -0.260 
 (-1.293) (-1.383) (-0.516) 
$25,000 - $49,999 -1.197*** -1.110*** -0.764* 
 (-2.748) (-2.723) (-1.829) 
$50,000 - $74,999 -1.184*** -1.016** -0.755* 
 (-2.673) (-2.461) (-1.782) 
    
Table 5-3 continues 
Table 5-3 continues 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 General 
All  
Parsimonious  
All 
Parsimonious All 
Excluding credit grade 
$75,000 - $99,999 -1.378*** -1.140*** -0.898** 
 (-2.905) (-2.583) (-1.963) 
$100 000 plus -1.483*** -1.113** -1.109** 
 (-3.129) (-2.537) (-2.430) 
Firm Attributes    
  Existing firms -0.064   
 (-0.326)   
Information Attributes    
Repeat loans -0.404  -0.221 
 (-2.117)  (-1.128) 
Include_picture -0.456** -0.457** -0.567** 
 (-2.105) (-2.095) (-2.559) 
elaboration 0.194   
 (0.316)   
Loan Attributes    
Requested amount ($1000) 0.021** 0.062* 0.016* 
 (0.404) (0.221) (0.302) 
SQRequested amount 0.003   
 (1.267)   
Offer interest rate (%) 0.539*** 0.648*** 0.747*** 
 (9.524) (12.703) (15.227) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,390 1,391 1,390 
Pseudo R
2
 0.291 0.289 0.279 
Log Likelihood -3546 -3562 -3682 
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Table 5-4: Predicted margins at represented values 
In this table we present predicted probabilities of interest rate at represented values conducted after 2- stage Heckman regressions; with actual cases extracted from the population 
of loan requests 
Actual Cases   Interest rate 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $50k - $74,999k, no past due loans and no judgments, homeowner, 
existing firm, image,  elaborate  
.20 12.5% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $50k - $74,999k, no past due loans and  no judgments, rent  home, 
existing firm,    no image ,    elaboration  
.15 13.0% 
Self-employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $25k - $49,999k,  no past due loans and  no judgments, rent, new firm, 
no image, elaboration 
.12 13.3% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $25k - $49,999k, no past due loans and no judgments,  homeowner, 
existing firm,    image ,    elaboration  
.16 13.5% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $25k - $49,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  home, existing 
firm,   no  image ,    elaboration  
.11 13.7% 
Self-employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $50k - $74,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  home, existing firm,    
no image ,    elaboration 
.10 13.7% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade B, income range $50k - $74,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  home, existing 
firm,    no image ,    elaboration 
.09 14.5% 
Self-employed ,  credit grade C, income range $25k - $49,999k, past due loans and  judgments, home owner,   existing firm, 
image, elaboration  
.07 15.6% 
Full-time employed average credit grade D, income range $25k - $49,999k, no delinquencies, no judgment, rent,   existing 
firm, image, elaboration 
.06 16.5% 
Self-employed  credit grade D, income range $25k - $49,999k, no delinquencies, no judgment, rent,   existing firm, image, 
elaboration  
.06 16.9% 
Full-time employed credit grade E, income range $25k - $49,999k, delinquencies, no judgment, homeowner,   existing firm, 
image, elaboration 
.06 19.7% 
 Self-employed, credit grade E, income range $25k - $49,999k,  delinquencies,  judgment, rent,   existing firm, image, 
elaboration 
.05 20.1% 
Full-time employed, high risk credit grade HR, income range $75k - $99,999k,  past due loans and judgments, homeowner, 
new firm,   image,    elaboration  
.03 22.9% 
Self-employed, high  risk credit grade HR, income range $75k - $99,999k,  past due loans and  judgments, rent home, new 
firm, no image,    elaboration 
.02 27.3% 
Self-employed, high risk credit grade HR, income range $1 - $24,999,  past due loans and judgments, rent home, new firm, no 
image, no elaboration    
.01 30.1% 
        Note: Requested loan amount set at the mean $ 10,430
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Table 5-5:  Factors driving cost of credit on Prosper – split by Firm Status 
This table reports the Tobit estimates for factors driving credit on Prosper.com. The first regressions (column 1) present estimates for 
the general specifications for all loan requests. Next, column (2) and column (3) regressions present estimates for parsimonious 
specifications for loans from existing firms only and for loans from new firms only respectively.  In all regressions, the dependent 
variable is the interest rate (less prime rate). The explanatory variables include owner, firm, and information attributes: credit grade, 
home ownership, repeat loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, judgements in the past 10 years, firm age, inclusion of pictures, 
indication of text elaboration, and number of lenders extending credit per loan. 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time, Region and industry dummies are also 
included in the regressions but results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the general estimation model: 
Interest rate =α+ β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesti + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + ų 
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively.   t-statistics in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 General 
All  
Existing firms 
Only 
New firms 
only 
Existing firms 
only (no credit 
grade) 
New firms  
Only (no credit 
grade) 
Constant 4.756 1.084 4.147 2.849 6.287 
 (1.197) (0.271) (1.025) (0.687) (1.466) 
Owner attributes      
Homeowner 0.077     
 (0.392)     
Credit grade (AA)      
    A 0.750** 0.567* 0.249   
 (2.533) (1.698) (0.476)   
    B 1.730*** 1.211*** 1.025*   
 (5.012) (3.322) (1.684)   
    C 3.131*** 2.240*** 2.454***   
 (7.861) (5.473) (3.983)   
    D 3.915*** 3.025*** 2.893***   
 (8.485) (6.643) (4.065)   
    E 6.118*** 4.998*** 5.318***   
 (10.756) (8.127) (6.153)   
    HR 6.309*** 5.070*** 5.931***   
 (10.142) (7.644) (6.205)   
Delinquencies 0.131     
 (0.604)     
Judgements 0.375   0.707 0.068 
 (1.586)   (2.450) (0.169) 
Employment_Status(full time)      
   Part-time -0.611     
 (-0.792)     
   Retired -0.112     
 (-0.185)     
   Self-employed 0.364     
 (1.605)     
Income_Range ($ 0 – unable to 
verify) 
     
$1 - $24,999 -0.654 -0.691 -0.213 -0.284 -0.455 
 (-1.293) (-1.160) (-0.243) (-0.458) (-0.493) 
Table 5-5 continues 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 General 
All  
Existing firms 
Only 
New firms 
only 
Existing firms 
only (no credit 
grade) 
New firms  
Only (no credit 
grade) 
$25,000 - $49,999 -1.197*** -1.404*** -0.306* -1.148** -0.774* 
 (-2.748) (-2.949) (-0.395) (-2.328) (-0.939) 
$50,000 - $74,999 -1.184*** -1.282*** -0.176 -0.976* -0.299 
 (-2.673) (-2.639) (-0.230) (-1.939) (-0.369) 
$75,000 - $99,999 -1.378*** -1.215** -0.161* -1.026* -0.009* 
 (-2.905) (-2.340) (-0.195) (-1.895) (-0.010) 
$100 000 plus -1.483*** -1.515*** -0.776* -1.599*** -1.068* 
 (-3.129) (-2.970) (-0.909) (-2.990) (-1.154) 
Firm Attributes      
  Existing firms -0.064     
 (-0.326)     
Information Attributes      
Repeat loans -0.404 -0.430 -0.748 -0.233 -0.475 
 (-2.117) (-1.892) (-2.304) (-0.986) (-1.386) 
Include_picture -0.456** -0.255 -0.928** -0.395 -0.964** 
 (-2.105) (-0.975) (-2.432) (-1.452) (-2.374) 
Elaboration 0.194     
 (0.316)     
Loan Attributes      
Requested amount ($1000) 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.011 0.019 
 (0.404) (0.213) (0.641) (0.022) (0.032) 
SQRequested amount 0.003     
 (1.267)     
Offer interest rate (%) 0.539*** 0.619*** 0.641*** 0.714*** 0.721*** 
 (9.524) (10.343) (7.096) (11.802) (8.582) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,390 1,001 390 1,001 390 
Pseudo R
2
 0.291 0.287 0.337 0.275 0.320 
Log Likelihood -3546 -2564 -934.9 -2605 -958.6 
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Table 5-6: Factors driving cost of credit on Prosper – with selection effects 
This table reports the 2 stage estimates for factors driving cost of credit. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the interest rate 
(less prime rate). The explanatory variables include owner, firm, and information attributes: credit grade, home ownership, repeat 
loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, judgements in the past 10 years, firm age, inclusion of pictures, indication of text 
elaboration, and number of lenders extending credit per loan. Model 1 includes all explanatory variables, whilst Model 2 excludes the 
credit grade variable. 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time, Region and industry dummies are also 
included in the regressions but results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the general estimation model: 
Outcome: Interest rate =α+ β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesti + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + ų 
Selection: Pr (Approval) =α+β1Owneri+β2Firmi+β3InformationAttributesi+β4LoanAttributesi +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 
Regioni + Ɛ    
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively.   t-statistics in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 (1) (2) 
 2 stage estimation  model 
Include credit grade 
2 stage estimation 
excluding credit grade 
 Outcome Selection Outcome Selection 
 Interest rate Pr (Approval) borrower_rate Granted 
     
Constant 1.687 -0.711 2.533 -0.510 
 (0.687) (-0.725) (1.000) (-0.514) 
     
Owner Attributes     
Home_owner 0.224 0.131*** -0.068* 0.121** 
 (0.995) (2.701) (-0.286) (2.487) 
Credit_grade (AA)     
    A 0.252 -0.173*  -0.176** 
 (0.755) (-1.950)  (-2.175) 
    B 0.492 -0.306***  -0.290*** 
 (1.359) (-3.314)  (-3.312) 
    C 0.971** -0.484***  -0.524*** 
 (2.315) (-4.859)  (-5.426) 
    D 2.072*** -0.650***  -0.760*** 
 (4.555) (-5.833)  (-6.987) 
    E 4.688*** -1.082***  -1.389*** 
 (8.071) (-8.312)  (-10.868) 
    HR 3.371*** -1.527***  -1.748*** 
 (5.083) (-11.339)  (-13.255) 
Delinquencies 0.321 -0.147*** 0.262* -0.168*** 
 (1.324) (-3.082) (1.030) (-3.270) 
Judgements 0.325 -0.203  -0.219 
 (0.430) (-1.543)  (-1.510) 
Employment_Status(full time)     
   Part-time -1.978 -0.399** -2.349 -0.419** 
 (-2.122) (-2.223) (-2.385) (-2.310) 
   Retired 0.573 -0.020 0.771 -0.050 
 (0.837) (-0.146) (1.066) (-0.360) 
   Self-employed -0.060 -0.088* -0.235 -0.104* 
 (-0.237) (-1.649) (-0.877) (-1.931) 
Table 5-6 continues 
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 (1) (2) 
 2 stage estimation  model 
Include credit grade 
2 stage estimation 
excluding credit grade 
Income_Range ($ 0 – unable to 
verify) 
    
$1 - $24,999 0.346 0.207* 0.604 0.189* 
 (0.628) (1.921) (1.036) (1.736) 
$25,000 - $49,999 0.158 0.270*** 0.494 0.273*** 
 (0.335) (2.868) (0.990) (2.871) 
$50,000 - $74,999 0.508 0.321*** 0.963 0.331*** 
 (1.063) (3.348) (1.913) (3.420) 
$75,000 - $99,999 0.184 0.251** 0.679 0.270** 
 (0.355) (2.316) (1.240) (2.474) 
$100 000 plus -0.208 0.151 0.122 0.158 
 (-0.406) (1.409) (0.226) (1.467) 
Firm Attributes     
Existing firms -0.112 0.049 -0.112 0.050 
 (-0.461) (1.040) (-0.461) (0.972) 
Information Attributes     
Repeat loans 0.121  0.295 0.121 
 (0.599)  (1.413) (0.599) 
Include_picture -1.276*** 0.100* -1.744*** 0.052* 
 (-5.967) (1.893) (-7.831) (0.991) 
Elaboration -0.455 0.072 -0.551 0.019 
 (-0.422) (0.297) (-0.481) (0.078) 
Bid_count  0.008***  0.008*** 
  (35.311)  (34.509) 
Loan Attributes     
Requested amount ($1000) 0.005 -0.183*** 0.059 -0.237*** 
 (0.261) (-28.378) (0.990) (-16.039) 
SQRequested amount   -0.000 0.002*** 
   (-0.139) (3.971) 
Offer interest rate (%) 0.719*** 0.009*** 0.796*** 0.021* 
 (45.451) (2.796) (62.506) (1.346) 
SQ Offer interest rate    -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.464) (-0.464) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional effects Yes - Yes - 
Number of Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Log Likelihood -4976 -4976 -5006 -5006 
     
LR  test of independence                                  chi2(1) = 3.13; p<0.001 chi2(1) = 3.06 ; p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-6 continues 
  
142 
 
Table 5-7: Factors driving cost of credit on Prosper – with selection effects and accounting for ex post default 
This table reports the 2 stage estimates for factors driving cost of credit. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the interest rate 
(less prime rate). The explanatory variables include owner, firm, and information attributes: credit grade, home ownership, repeat 
loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, judgements in the past 10 years, firm age, inclusion of pictures, indication of text 
elaboration, and number of lenders extending credit per loan. Model 1 includes all explanatory variables, whilst Model 2 excludes the 
credit grade variable. 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time, Region and industry dummies are also 
included in the regressions but results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the general estimation model: 
Outcome: Interest rate =α+ β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesti + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + 
β7ex_defaulti + ų 
Selection: Pr (Approval) =α+β1Owneri+β2Firmi+β3InformationAttributesi+β4LoanAttributesi +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 
Regioni + Ɛ    
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively.   t-statistics in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                          
 (1) (2) 
 2 stage estimation  model 
Include credit grade 
2 stage estimation  
excluding credit grade 
 Outcome Selection Outcome Selection 
 Interest rate Pr (Approval) borrower_rate Granted 
     
Constant 1.687 -0.711 2.533 -0.510 
 (0.687) (-0.725) (1.000) (-0.514) 
ex_default 1.171***  1.687**  
 (4.219)  (0.687)  
Owner Attributes     
Home_owner 0.224 0.131*** -0.068* 0.121** 
 (0.995) (2.701) (-0.286) (2.487) 
Credit_grade (AA)     
    A 0.252 -0.173*  -0.176** 
 (0.755) (-1.950)  (-2.175) 
    B 0.492 -0.306***  -0.290*** 
 (1.359) (-3.314)  (-3.312) 
    C 0.971** -0.484***  -0.524*** 
 (2.315) (-4.859)  (-5.426) 
    D 2.072*** -0.650***  -0.760*** 
 (4.555) (-5.833)  (-6.987) 
    E 4.688*** -1.082***  -1.389*** 
 (8.071) (-8.312)  (-10.868) 
    HR 3.371*** -1.527***  -1.748*** 
 (5.083) (-11.339)  (-13.255) 
Delinquencies 0.321 -0.147*** 0.262* -0.168*** 
 (1.324) (-3.082) (1.030) (-3.270) 
Judgements 0.325 -0.203  -0.219 
 (0.430) (-1.543)  (-1.510) 
 
Employment_Status(full time) 
    
   Part-time -1.978 -0.399** -2.349 -0.419** 
 (-2.122) (-2.223) (-2.385) (-2.310) 
   Retired 0.573 -0.020 0.771 -0.050 
 (0.837) (-0.146) (1.066) (-0.360) 
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 (1) (2) 
 2 stage estimation  model 
Include credit grade 
2 stage estimation  
excluding credit grade 
   Self-employed -0.060 -0.088* -0.235 -0.104* 
 (-0.237) (-1.649) (-0.877) (-1.931) 
Income_Range ($ 0 – unable to 
verify) 
    
$1 - $24,999 0.346 0.207* 0.604 0.189* 
 (0.628) (1.921) (1.036) (1.736) 
$25,000 - $49,999 0.158 0.270*** 0.494 0.273*** 
 (0.335) (2.868) (0.990) (2.871) 
$50,000 - $74,999 0.508 0.321*** 0.963 0.331*** 
 (1.063) (3.348) (1.913) (3.420) 
$75,000 - $99,999 0.184 0.251** 0.679 0.270** 
 (0.355) (2.316) (1.240) (2.474) 
$100 000 plus -0.208 0.151 0.122 0.158 
 (-0.406) (1.409) (0.226) (1.467) 
Firm Attributes     
Existing firms -0.112 0.049 -0.112 0.050 
 (-0.461) (1.040) (-0.461) (0.972) 
Information Attributes     
Repeat loans 0.121  0.295 0.121 
 (0.599)  (1.413) (0.599) 
Include_picture -1.276*** 0.100* -1.744*** 0.052* 
 (-5.967) (1.893) (-7.831) (0.991) 
Elaboration -0.455 0.072 -0.551 0.019 
 (-0.422) (0.297) (-0.481) (0.078) 
Bid_count  0.008***  0.008*** 
  (35.311)  (34.509) 
Loan Attributes     
Requested amount ($1000) 0.005 -0.183*** 0.059 -0.237*** 
 (0.261) (-28.378) (0.990) (-16.039) 
SQRequested amount   -0.000 0.002*** 
   (-0.139) (3.971) 
Offer interest rate (%) 0.719*** 0.009*** 0.796*** 0.021* 
 (45.451) (2.796) (62.506) (1.346) 
SQ Offer interest rate    -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.464) (-0.464) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional effects Yes - Yes - 
Number of Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Log Likelihood -4976 -4976 -5006 -5006 
     
     
LR  test of independence                                 
 
chi2(1) = 2.17 ; p< 0.001 chi2(1) = 2.22   ;    p<0.001 
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Figure 5-1: Final interest rates paid over time 
 
   Source: US Banks 36 months unsecured fixed loan data 
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Chapter 6 Factors driving small business loan default in P2P 
lending 
Is it worth it for lenders to invest? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
146 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Finally, in this study we are interested in understanding the general performance of the funded 
loans. Looking at the default activity in comparison to lender returns, will help us ascertain 
whether it is worth it for strangers to invest in small business ventures in this market.  The two 
previous empirical studies put forward some of the mechanisms which lenders seem to adopt in 
when making credit extension decisions. In this empirical study we investigate who is likely to 
default. We are especially interested in testing whether by not incorporating firm level 
characteristics in the credit extension and in the pricing of credit P2P lenders are making better 
or worse off retunes.   Hence we test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1c  small business borrowers, who own their homes, demonstrate better credit risk (relative to those 
that rent) and therefore are less likely to default 
H2c  small business borrowers, with high credit ratings, demonstrate better credit risk and therefore are 
less likely to default 
H3c  small business borrowers who have successfully paid back a previous loan are less likely to 
default on future loans 
H4c  existing firms are less likely to default (relative to new business start-ups) in the P2P the lending 
context 
H6c  small business borrowers who use text elaborations are more (less) likely to be default 
H7c  small business borrowers who have previous failures are more likely to default 
H8c  small business owners who post pictures are less (more) likely to default 
 
6.1. Data  
The analysis is based on loans funded between 2007 and 2011. Prosper provides information on 
payment status for each loan. The loans are annuities, with repayments in equal monthly 
instalments. Repayments are automatically deduct from the borrower's account and distributed to 
lenders' Prosper accounts. If the monthly payment is made on time, the loan status is considered 
current. If a monthly bill is not paid, the loan status will be changed to 1 month late, 2 months 
late and so on. If a loan is late for more than 90 days, it is considered to be in default. All 
  
147 
 
defaulted loans are reported to credit reporting agencies and can affect borrowers' credit scores. 
Borrowers who default on their loans are not permitted to borrow using Prosper again.  
For the purpose of this analysis, we consider a default to have occurred when the principal loan 
amount (plus the calculated interest) remains unpaid in full when the loan reaches the maturity 
date.  Our initial sample consisted of 1417 funded loans of which 1208 (87 percent) have reached 
full maturity - 885 loans (64 percent) were paid off; 323 loans (23 percent) resulted in default; 
while 209 loans (15 percent) are current.   We then apply the following filtering criteria: Loans 
initiated in 2011 require complete payment information in 2014 for us to judge whether or not a 
default has occurred. In total 209 loans found in our sample were granted in 2011; 177 are 
registered as current, 59 loans have reached full maturity and were paid off and 39 loans were in 
default. Including only the sub sample of defaulted loans from the 2011 cohort may bias our 
estimates, i.e., we may either under or overestimate default. Consequently, for consistency with 
our default definition, we remove 209 such loans. The final sample therefore consists of 1208 
funded loans, 302 (25 percent) of which resulted in a default.  
6.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 6-1 present descriptive statistics of the default study sample. In Table 6-1 there are 4 
columns: column 1 shows statistics for all funded loans while columns 2 and 3 show statistics for 
paid loans and those which resulted in default respectively.  Of the 1208 funded loans, 25 percent 
have resulted in default.  A simple comparison of means between paid loans and defaulted loans, 
found in column 4, give a basic intuition on factors that might be associated with default.  
Variables showing statistically significant mean differences between paid and defaulted loans 
include Credit_grade, Home_ownership, Repeat_loans and Include_picture.  
 
...........Table 6-1 goes around here........... 
 
Of the significant variables, if a small business borrower is a home owner, this reduces the 
proportionality that they will default on the loan. The proportion of homeowners for borrowers 
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that repaid their loans is 57 percent compared with a 59 percent of home owners who failed to 
repay their loans (p<0.01). Similarly, if a small business borrower is in a premium credit grade 
(eg AA), this reduces the proportionality that they will result in default (29 percent repay loans 
vs. 14 percent that default); whilst if the borrower is in a high risk category this heightens the 
proportionality that they will result in default (6 percent vs. 3 percent).  
Turning to information variables, being a repeat borrower reduces the proportion that the loan 
will result in default. The proportion of repeat loans for small business borrowers that repaid 
their loans is 43 percent (compared to 22 percent that defaulted). Similarly, including a picture 
seems to reduce the proportion that the loan will result in default (61 percent vs. 69 percent). 
The remaining explanatory variables namely:  Delinquencies, Judgements, Existing_firms, and 
Elaboration did not show statistically significant mean differences between the two cohorts.  
Moreover, we see from Table 6-1 that small business borrowers that defaulted on their loans on 
average asked for larger loan amounts ($9,681 vs. $7507); and on average they typically paid 
higher interest rates than those who repaid the loans (23 percent vs. 17 percent). 
We observe from Table 6-2 that 27 percent of all defaulted loans resulted within the first year of 
origination. This latter measure, to some extent, may indicate the soundness of the lenders’ 
decision making when appraising credit risk on Prosper. By the end of the second year,   well 
over 70 percent of all defaults have occurred. This may be an early indication that high numbers 
of loan default are the rule rather than the exception in this market, perhaps indicating lender’s 
inexperience. 
...........Table 6-2 goes around here........... 
 
Figure 6-1 shows how the observed default rates have changed over time. There was a dip in 
default rates between 2008 and 2010; but after the first quarter of 2010, default rates showed a 
linear increase for the remaining duration of our data sample.  At least three possible 
explanations may help us account for this observation: macroeconomic factors, evolution of 
Prosper’s credit risk over time and an increase in interest rate caps enabled by Prosper across 56 
US states in April 2008. As shown in Figure 6-1, the unemployment rate increased in 2009 
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(almost doubled when compared to previous year); subsequently we observe an increase in 
default towards the end of 2009, a trend that continued throughout peaking in the second quarter 
of 2011. Furthermore, Figure 6-1 suggests that overall the pool of loans has worsened over time 
on Prosper. Although loans initially migrated away from the worst credit grades; around the 
second quarter of 2010 the fractional change has since surpassed early 2008 levels, moving 
towards worst credit grades - a possible explanation of the observed upward movement of default 
rates over time.  
 
...........Figure 6-1 goes around here........... 
 
Overall, given the observed difference in mean value for some of the variables of interest 
between observed for defaulted and non-defaulted borrowers; an examination of the mean values 
provides motivation for the regression analysis which follows, as the two groups have some 
observed differences. 
6.3 Regressions 
We now move on to the first regression that estimates the relationship between the three main 
categories of explanatory variables and the probability that the loan will result in default, whilst 
controlling for loan attributes as well as industry and macroeconomic factors. The Probit models 
are estimated based on equation 6-1 below. In other words, we model the likelihood that 
‘Default=1’. All explanatory variables (are defined in Table 3-1 in Chapter 3). Furthermore, as 
shown in the bivariate correlation matrix (in Table 3-2 in Chapter 3), in terms of explanatory 
variables, where significant, none of the correlations are above 0.5 demonstrating that in relation 
to the econometrics models, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem.  
 
         Pr (Defaultl|1) = α +β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 Information Attributes + β4 Loan Attributes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
+                                       +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + µ                                                             (6-1)       
The results are shown in Table 6-3. As stated previously, in all the estimations, a general- to - 
specific procedure to establish the model of interest was adopted (Darlington, 1990). Column 1 
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of Table 6-3 shows the probit estimates for the general specification; which includes all the 
regressors, identified from literature, which could possibly be important determinants of default 
in the P2P lending context. The procedure begins with a full model and removes variables with a 
p-value above 0.10 resulting in a parsimonious model as shown in column 2. The results of the 
Likelihood Ration (LR) test confirm that the parsimonious model is a better estimation; the null 
hypothesis that the excluded regressors collectively have no role in predicting our dependent 
variable is decisively accepted (LRX
2
= - 511, df = 102, p <0.10). The third and fourth columns 
subsequently report the determinants of credit approval separate for existing firms and new 
business start-ups -  with the main aim of testing the proposition firmly established in literature 
that new business start-up are more likely to default relative to already established firms. 
 
...........Table 6-3 goes around here........... 
 
In general, our results show that default is found to be related to risk as predicted by 
conventional theory in both formal credit rating and also information and track record (see for 
example Berger et al, 2005; Agarwal et al, 2007; DeYoung et al, 2007; Berger et al, 2009).   
More specifically, consistent with what we have already seen in the univariate analysis, the 
coefficients of the Credit_grade variable are positive and statistically significant. This indicates 
that lenders on Prosper, similar to traditional lenders like banks, do indeed lend with a 
conservative mind set - small business borrowers in high risk credit grade categories are more 
likely to default (DeYoung et al, 2007; Berger et al, 2009).  We notice in fact from column (2) 
that the coefficients of the credit grade variable gets progressively stronger as we move from low 
risk borrowers (A) to high risk borrowers (HR) in predicting default risk (H1c).  This result 
underpins the importance of credit scoring as a method of predicting default, supporting results 
put forward by conventional theory (Berger et al, 2009; Berger and Frame, 2007). In terms of the 
remainder of owner variables - we find that Home_ownership, Delinquencies, and Judgements 
are not predictors of default in this context. This result is persisting even in the absence of the 
Credit_grade variable (given that we have shown Credit_grade can incorporate some of the 
information already captured by these other variables). Hence H1c and H7c are not supported.  
One interpretation which can be offered for this observation is that perhaps this finding 
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highlights characteristics of the P2P lending market – when lenders default, the borrower’s home 
cannot be taken to compensate the lenders. Loans are unsecured. 
Importantly, in terms of our firm variables, we find that new small business start-ups are no more 
likely to result in default when compared to established firms our variable of interest, 
Existing_Firm is not statistically significant.  This result is counter to what is typically found in 
banking literature where new firms are perceived to be the riskier class on the bases of severe 
information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Cassar, 2004). Hence we do not find support 
for H4c.  We also observe that default activity does not favour any industry or sector – all 
industry dummies were not statistically significant. Therefore, from these results we assert that 
firm level information is not an important determinant of default in the P2P lending context.  
In terms of the information variables - reputation built over time through re-payment of loans 
attained from prosper decreases the likelihood of default (p<0.001). This result seems to offer 
support to Diamond (1989); affirming that information accumulated specific from Prosper is 
useful for lenders in determining default risk; especially given the fact that there are no 
opportunities to collect information through physical interactions (H3c). Hence, our findings 
implies that a presence of a track record (developed on Prosper) matters and is useful in 
predicting default in the P2P lending context.  Interestingly, we also find that reducing 
information gaps improves default activity (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985). All else 
equal, we find that small business borrowers that include a picture in their loan request are less 
likely to default. The variable Include_picture is negative and significant at the 0.01 level; 
suggesting perhaps that inclusion of a picture somehow either humanizes the process or gives 
some information about the business or product which lenders seem to use to separate credit risk 
(H8c). Seemingly, the stories that small borrowers tell may not necessarily influence default; the 
variable Elaborate is statistically insignificant (H6c).  
Looking at the control variables, a key finding of our result is that the cost of credit is associated 
with default. All else equal, we find that those high interest rates translate to a higher likelihood 
of default; the variable Final_interest_rate is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. This result 
seems to support the moral hazard argument developed by the model of Stiglitz and Weiss, 
(1981) where small business borrows (in the absence of collateral) may be encouraged to take 
additional risk. After all, if their projects succeed, they will keep all the gains - and yet when 
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they fail, it is the P2P lenders that will lose their capital (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This finding 
presents an interesting dilemma for lenders. For example, if holding all else constant, and lenders 
opt to lower interest rates that they will accept from prospective borrowers on a loan, and this 
reduces the default probability, at what point do lenders make a higher expected return even with 
lower income stream?  This argument seems to suggest that there may be a potential or real 
trade-off between interest rates and default which lenders might have to take into considerations; 
which presents an interesting dilemma for lenders. However, it is also plausible that some 
lenders extend credit to firms in this context for fun - as some form of ‘gambling’. Hence it 
would not be necessary to consider a potential trade-off between interest rates and default. In this 
case, lenders would simply accept loan requests from borrowers offering high interest rates with 
the view that knowing that if the borrowers pay back the loan, they win big. However, if some of 
the loans in the portfolio result in default, the loss is not too big.  Furthermore, it is also 
reasonable to consider that some of the lenders choose to extend credit in this context driven by 
philanthropic reasons. This is supported by evidence we found earlier that lenders in this market 
extend credit focusing on people – hence their idiosyncrasies may be at play. Therefore, lenders 
driven by philanthropy might not necessarily have wealth maximisation as his main goal for 
funding these firms (see for example Argawa et al, 2011). 
Finally, our results show that larger loans are more likely to result in default, as evidenced in the 
positive sign and high significant coefficient of the variable Requested_amount. This highlights 
the acute moral hazard issues entrenched in P2P lending. Typical in traditional lending; large 
credits usually induce higher borrower motivation because the borrower stands to lose a lot in the 
event of default given that borrowers offer collateral (Hanley and Crook, 2005). But in this case, 
since these loans have no security – it seems moral hazard risk is heightened. We can also 
interpret this result in the context of borrower motivation:  smaller credits are taken very 
seriously in P2P lending. All things equal, the cost of default - which in this case default may 
result in a judgement and the threat of losing access to an external source of credit - may be 
damaging to a small business borrower (especially those in the early stages) who might 
otherwise have limited avenues of external (unsecured) small business finance.    
 Next, in order to confirm the result as shown by the indicator variable, Existing_firm,  in column 
3 and column 4 of Table 6-3 we extend the analysis to determine  factors associated with the 
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likelihood of default separately for  existing firms and new business start-ups as defined by 
equations (6-2) and (6-3). 
 
Pr (default: Existing_firms|1) = α+ β1Owneri + β2Information + β3LoanAttributesti + β4Industryi                          
+                                                    +β5Macroi   + µ                                                                      (6 -2) 
Pr (default: New_business_start-ups|1) = α +β1Owneri + β2Information + β3LoanAttributesti               +                                                                     
+β4Industryi + β5Macroi + µ                                   (6 -3) 
 
We see from Table 6-3 that the two key variables that help disentangle information borrower risk 
namely, the Credit_grade variable and the Include_picture variables differ between new business 
start-ups and established firms. All other factors driving the likelihood of default for new firms 
and established firms are generally similar. More specifically, in both cases the determinants of 
default include the following variables:  Repeat_loan, Requested_amount, Offer interest_ rate. 
Interestingly, we find that although Credit_grade remains significant for established firms; the 
variable is insignificant in the new business start-ups estimation. This result seem to suggests 
that, in the absence of a track record, lenders may be unable to disentangle credit risk associated 
with small business borrowers starting new firms.  Interestingly, we also see that, inclusion of a 
picture becomes insignificant for the established firm, and remains negative and significant for 
new business start-ups.  One explanation for the modest role for Include_picture in determining 
default for existing firms could be that perhaps better borrowers have learnt that lenders in the 
market simply values pictures in general and they tend to include pictures.  Finally, looking at 
loan characteristics, for both new business start-ups and established firms, we find that loans 
with higher interest rates are indeed more difficult to repay - lending support to the fact that 
higher interest rates are an indicator of higher risk. Similarly, borrowers with larger loans are 
more likely to drive default.  
6.4 Average marginal effects 
To assess the impact of the observed factors, that drive default risk, we compute marginal effects 
at the mean as shown in Table 6-4.  For an otherwise average small business owner with a C 
credit rating, all else equal, the predicted probability of default is 8 percentage points greater 
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when compared to the prime credit grade AA.  
 
...........Table 6-4 goes around here........... 
 
When this business owner increases the loan amount by $1,000 (from $8,108 to $9,108) we 
observe an increase in default risk of 1.3 percentage points; meaning a 5 percent increase in 
default probability. Increasing the requested loan amount by a factor of 10 however, to $18,108, 
the default probability increases by 13 percentage points; meaning a 52 percent increase in 
default probability- which may render the loan unplayable.  
Likewise, we see from Table 6-4 that increasing the interest rate by 1 percentage point (for 
example from 18 percent to 19 percent), meaning a 5 percent increase in default probability.  
Similarly increasing the interest rate by a factor of 10 from 18.1percent to 28.1percent, results in 
a 52 percent increase in default probability.  
We also observe find that all else equal, the predicted probability of default is decreased by 7.7 
percentage points if the small business owner includes a picture. In relation to the average 
probability of default, 25 percent, a difference of 7.7 percentage points means a 31 percent 
decrease in the likelihood that the loan will result in non-payment.  Interestingly, the impact of 
pictures is especially substantial for new firms, such that including a picture results in a decrease 
in default probability of 15.7 percentage points. Compared to an average probability of default, 
25 percent, this represents an approximately 62 percent in reduction in the likelihood of default.  
6.5 Margins at representative values 
Table 6-5 puts into perspective our argument above – showing how the default rate varies at 
representative values. We observe from the table that simply improving on the credit grade, 
reduces the default probability substantially – all else equal a borrower with an AA credit grade 
has a 10 percent chance of defaulting on the loan; whilst a high risk borrower with similar 
characteristics will almost have a 60 percent chance of defaulting when compared to a borrower 
with an average credit grade.  
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...........Table 6-5 goes around here........... 
6.6 Robustness Check 
Our probit model estimate the default equation based on a sample of funded loans, selected non-
randomly from the sample of all loans (funded and not funded). If selectivity exists; the 
coefficients we observe from the probit estimate may not be applicable to all borrowers 
requesting loans. To determine whether selection is a problem, we run a robustness check - by 
estimating a 2 stage Heckman selection model. The first stage of the Heckman’s model estimates 
a probit in order to determines whether the loan was funded or not; and the second stage 
estimates a probit model to determines factors which drives default (given that the loan was 
funded).  
We estimate the first stage as a function of the original control variables credit used in the default 
model above (i.e. credit score, collateral, firm age, loan size, interest rate, information, and 
controlling for industry, region and time effects) and an additional identifying variable - in this 
case the borrower income range. Bank literature suggests that borrower income is expected to 
affect the probability of a borrower being funded positively; it determines the affordability of the 
borrower to be able to pay back the loan.  While being relevant for funding decision, borrower 
income range should not influence the default equation. Once lenders have appraised the 
borrower’s affordability of loan repayment and compensated with an appropriate risk premium, 
lenders should be indifferent with respect to borrower income range. The estimation results of 
the Heckman equation are reported in Table 6-6.  Indeed when we look at estimation result in 
column 2, income rage has a positive and significant effect on the probability of funding; we 
observe that small business owners that have an income are more likely to be granted a loan than 
those in the zero or undefined income range category.  Income range is insignificant in the 
default equation (column 1 of Table 6.6).  
 
Stage 2 Outcome regression: observed only if loan funded (i.e. Pr (Approval) = 1) 
Pr (Default) = α + β1 Owneri   + β2 Firmi   + β3 InformationAttributesi + β4 LoanAttributesi                                            
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+                         +                        +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni   + µ                                (6-4a) 
 
Stage 1 selection regression:  probability of credit approval is 1 if loan funded, and 0 
otherwise 
Pr (Approval) =α+β1Owneri+β2Firmi+β3InformationAttributesi+β4LoanAttributesi                                            +                    
+                     +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni + Ɛ                                                               (6.4b) 
 
The LR test of independence (X
2
 = 1.16; p=0.001); which confirms the adoption of the Heckman 
estimation to control for selection bias. In general, the coefficient estimates, signs and statistical 
significance for our entire variable set are maintained in the two-stage regression. Hence, our 
robustness checks confirm the earlier obtained result.  
 
...........Table 6-6 goes around here........... 
 
Our results for new and established businesses in Probit regressions seem to suggest that Firm 
status does not necessarily drive default. The Heckman result, however, seem to suggest we 
exercise a little caution in this interpretation – especially given that  after accounting for 
selection, credit grade variable is insignificant for new business borrowers. This could suggest 
that it may be difficult to appraise risk for this cohort. 
6.7. Estimation of Net Returns 
In this section we examine the net returns that lenders get from investing in P2P small business 
loans, with the view of gaining insight as to whether it is worth it for lenders to invest through 
this medium. 
In Figure 6-3 we show average lender returns on Prosper, over time. We find that mean return 
for P2P  small business loans is 3.26 percent per year (having charged on average 18.5 percent 
interest for the loan that has a 25 percent probability of default). Returns in this market are 
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somewhat volatile, with an annual standard deviation of 3.67 (i.e. over 100 percent). In Table 6-7 
we illustrate the proportion of total lending attributed to the top 5 percent of lenders; based on 
the total dollar amount lent. The single biggest lender has disseminated $125, 000 worth of small 
business loans across 23 loans; which amounts to 0.8% of the total lending for the whole sample 
(i.e. derived as follows $125thousand/ $15.4mil). We observe  from Table 6-7 a risk adjusted 
average return of 6.1 percent per annum for the top 5 percent of lenders (having charged an 
average interest rate of 18.5 percent)  with  a less erratic annual standard deviation of 1.24 (i.e. 
20 percent).   
 
...........Table 6-7 goes around here........... 
From these results we can make three key assertions: First, we can make an assertion regarding 
the risk tolerance of the individual lenders in this market. On average, the standard deviation 
associated with the returns of loans from the top 5 percent lenders was relatively low. By 
contrast, for the average lender pool, the standard deviation of returns associated with those loans 
was high. As a result, based on standard deviation alone, we might come to the conclusion that 
the average lender on P2P platforms actually has a higher risk tolerance (a different class of 
investors to those inferred in the model by Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)  . Hence, it can be inferred 
then that the utility function of the average lender on Prosper is that of an upward slope. For 
these lenders, the risk of losing a small proportion (as little as $25) per investment in the overall 
portfolio of loans is offset by the potential gain from high interest rates charged for loans. 
Consequently, given the fact that lenders in this market are risk lovers, perhaps the 1.49 percent 
return from a less risky or more conservative bank investment and a 1.61 percent return from a 
less risky Treasury bond may seem less appealing to this cohort. These interest rates are low; 
investors are possibly looking for better returns. 
Second, we can further make an assertion on how informed (or uninformed) the lenders are. By 
comparison, the return achieved  by an average lender on Prosper is 3 percentage points lower 
when compared to the returns achieved by the top 5 percent lenders (i.e. 3.26 percent returns vs. 
6.1 percent returns). Our result seems to confirm our initial observation of the fact that the 
average lenders on Prosper are indeed amateurs in making investment decisions – different class 
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of investors to that inferred in the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Only a handful of lenders 
are able to attract returns almost comparable to other classes of risky assets such as returns from 
the stock market or returns from 3 year venture capital investments (6.1 percent vs. 7 percent 
stock market vs. 8.5 percent
5
 from VC).  Put differently, our results suggest that P2P lending 
introduces a new breed of informal investors  into the small business finance landscape, who are 
risk loving enough to look for high yield investment opportunities but who are not conversant 
enough to be able to participate in more technical asset classes like the stock market. 
Third, we can make some assertions concerning the viability of P2P lending in the long run. 
Given the fact that P2P lending is generally a young market, and the fact that majority of lenders 
attracted to P2P lending are relatively uninformed amateurs in making investment decisions, we 
observe from our results that if the amateur lenders do indeed learn, it then becomes plausible 
that in time the returns in this market may generally converge to be better (and gravitate towards 
the 6.1 percent achieved by top 5 percent). However, if the P2P lending platforms continue to 
attract a pool of amateur lenders, the average returns of 3.25 percent may render the market 
somewhat unsustainable in the long run. Given the current data limitation however, viability of 
P2P lending remains an avenue that needs to be further explored by future research as the market 
matures and more performance data become available.  
 
...........Figure 6-3 goes around here........... 
So who makes money in this market? We observe from Figure 6-4 that 74 percent of funded 
loans results in a positive return - on average lenders that make money, make around 9 percent 
per annum.  Just over 20 percent of the loans however result in a complete loss while the 
remaining 5 percent of the loans either breaks even, or incur some loss. 
 
...........Figure 6-4 goes around here........... 
                                                          
5 See Table 5-2; Data Source: Damodaran (2010): The Dark Side of Valuation: Valuing Young, Distressed, and Complex Business 
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When we breakdown the characteristics of best performing returns by loan size, Figure 6-5 
clearly shows a strong negative skew – with almost 40 percent of the loans less than $5,000; 
perhaps representing the (lower) risk involved.  All else equal, it seems smaller loans are more 
profitable. 
...........Figure 6-5 goes around here........... 
 
When we breakdown the characteristics of best performing returns by credit rating as shown in 
Figure 6-6, as to be expected, the higher risk categories give higher returns to compensate for the 
relative risk. 
...........Figure 6-6 goes around here........... 
 
We observe from Figure 6-7 that as the market ages, the distribution of loans changes such that 
default rates decrease - resulting with better returns. So, we see that lenders that extend credit to 
borrowers that have no history in the platform, on average they can expect to get 1 percent 
return. But as firms continue to build history, returns increase. 
...........Figure 6-7 goes around here........... 
 
Theory stipulates that new firms are riskier (Cassar, 2004).  When a lender invests in a new firm, 
they will receive an average return of 2.5 percent (given a default risk of 26.6 percent with 
borrowers paying 18.2 percent interest rate). If a lender chooses to invest in an existing business 
instead, they stand to make on average 3.5 percent (given a 23.7 percent default rate and 
borrower paying on average 17.8 percent).  We see from Figure 6-8 that lenders investing in new 
businesses that have no pre-established payment history in this market will result with complete 
losses - start-ups result in losses when they first enter the market; those that choose to invest in 
existing firms that come to P2P for the first time, will make  on average a return of 1.6 percent.  
We observe however from Figure 6-8 that over time the returns from both new and existing firms 
converge; and by the 5
th
 loan, lenders’ returns average at 10 percent from both new firms and 
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existing (which may be a knock on confirmation that over time start-ups were no more likely to 
default than existing firms).  
 
...........Figure 6-8 goes around here........... 
 
Finally, perhaps our most interesting result is that of including an image. Lenders who invest in 
new firms that include a picture stand to make on average 3.7 percent returns; whilst those that 
invest in new firms that do not include a picture receive on average 0.2 percent return. 
6.8 Chapter summary 
The overall research objective of this study was to determine whether P2P lending is sustainable 
in the long run. We intended to gain this knowledge by first understanding key determinants 
driving default in the P2P lending context, then second, by estimating lender returns. This is one 
of a smaller number of papers that exploits micro level data from P2P lending websites on 
defaults among small business borrowers. 
We find that small business owner’s credit grade, the requested loan size, and interest rate paid, 
are significant predictors of default in this market. Our results also lend support to the prediction 
that new firms are no more likely to default when compared to existing firms. This is a 
particularly important finding as start-ups are widely perceived to be the riskiest class of small 
firms. We observe that small business borrowers anticipating to start new businesses that include 
pictures tend to be more successful in reducing information asymmetries, allowing lenders to 
conduct better due diligence – loans that include picture are less likely to default. We see from 
the analysis that smaller loans offer better returns. Moreover, loans from riskier borrowers in 
terms of credit grades offer higher returns to compensate for the relative high risk.  
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Furthermore, we also report in the study that default does not vary across different types of 
industries such that P2P lending becomes sustainable only in some parts of the small business 
sector and not in others – all else equal; industry variables are insignificant determinants of 
default.  
Is it worth it for lenders to extend credit to these firms? The distribution of returns for this 
type of investment is quite varied. On average lenders will receive 3.26 percent per annum 
for their investment in small business loans (having charged on average 18.5 percent interest 
for the loan that has a 25 percent probability of default). Returns in this market are somewhat 
volatile, with an annual standard deviation of over 100 percent.  Our results suggest that 
average lender on P2P platforms actually has a higher risk tolerance relative to those lenders 
described by the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), hence, it can be inferred then that the 
utility function of the average lender on Prosper is that of an upward slope. For these lenders, 
the risk of losing a small proportion (as little as $25) per investment in the overall portfolio of 
loans is offset by the potential gain from high interest rates charged for loans.  
Overall our results suggest that P2P lending is some kind of ‘gambling’ for lenders - if a 
portfolio with relatively riskier business ventures are chosen, the result will exceed the 
market average (of 3.26 percent) but if not - the loss is not too big. In fact, our results 
introduce a novel finding, that is P2P lending introduces a new breed of informal investors  
into the small business finance landscape, who are risk loving enough to look for high yield 
investment opportunities but who are not conversant enough to be able to participate in more 
technical asset classes like the stock market.  
We make key contributions. First, we shed light on the determinants of default in the P2P 
lending context; highlighting that borrower reputation continues to be the single most 
dominant determinant of default. Second, we find that the breed of investors extending credit 
to entrepreneurs in this context are amateurs, who have high risk tolerance, with a completely 
different utility function to that of lenders inferred in the model by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
This study sheds some light that P2P lending may be availing a different type of investor to 
that previously seen in the small business lending literature. Finally, Caution will to be 
exercised when ascertaining whether our findings can be generalised to developing countries 
for example. As it stands, P2P lending does not have other mechanisms at its disposal such as 
peer pressure and a sense of community, which help keep default rates down when extending 
microfinance. Given that relationships in this context are very weak at best, since lending 
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takes place online, default rates may therefore sky rocket in the context of Microfinance 
institutions, thus rendering P2P lending an unsustainable form of extending credit to small 
businesses.  
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Table 6-1: Univariate table: Descriptive statistics for loan default 
In this table column (1) shows descriptive statistics all funded loans. In column (2) we show statistics 
for all loans which were paid back whilst column (3) shows all the loans that resulted in default. 
Finally, column (4) presents t-test/x
2
 statistics  for differences in the means of the repaid and defaulted 
loans. *, **, *** stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Funded loans Default=0 Default=1 t- test / x
2
 
statistics 
Number of observations 1417 0.75 0.25 - 
Owner attributes     
Home_ owner 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.68 
Credit_ grade     
    AA 0.25 0.29 0.14 4.71*** 
    A 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.11* 
    B 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.06* 
    C 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.24 
    D 0.13 0.11 0.17 -2.8 
    E 0.05 0.04 0.09 -3.46 
    HR 0.04 0.03 0.06 -2.65 
     
Delinquencies 2.3 2.3 3.9 -1.4 
Judgements 0.27 0.24 0.37 -2.3 
Firm attributes     
    Existing _firms 0.73 0.74 0.70 1.06 
    Industry     
construction 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.61 
transport and utilities 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 
services 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.25 
retail trade 0.29 0.27 0.33 -1.87 
finance &real estate 0.21 0.23 0.16 2.16** 
agriculture 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.74** 
wholesale trade 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.61 
manufacturing 0.05 0.04 0.09 -2.17 
Information Attributes     
    Repeat_loan 0.39 0.43 0.22 6.1*** 
    Include image 0.67 0.69 0.61 2.31*** 
    Elaboration  0.99 0.99 0.98 1.24 
Loan Attributes     
Requested amount ($ 1,000) $8,108 $7,507 $9,681 -4.5 
Interest rate (%) 18.51 16.97 22.8 -10.3 
Macro and Industry attributes     
Unemployment rate (%) 6.7 6.8 6.6 1.58 
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Table 6-2: Loan default across time 
In this table column (1) shows all funded loans while column (2) shows the percentage of loans that 
resulted in default. In column (3) we present the percentage of loans which resulted in default within 
the first year of issue while in column (4) we present the percentage of loans which resulted in default 
within the second year of issue. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year All D=1(%) 
D=1 
1
st
 yr. (%) 
D =1 
2
nd
 yr. (%) 
2007 8 25% 0% 0% 
2008 692 27% 28% 75% 
2009 83 12% 20% 50% 
2010 146 21.% 29% 48% 
Total 929 25% 27% 75% 
              D1 – Denotes loans which resulted in default,    D0 – Denotes loans which were repaid 
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Table 6-3: Determinants of loan default for P2P small business loans 
This table reports the Probit regression results for factors driving default on Prosper.com. The first two 
regressions present estimates for the general and parsimonious specifications for all loan requests. The last two 
regressions present estimates for parsimonious specifications for loans from existing firms only and for loans 
from new firms only.  In all regressions, the dependent variable is binary taking the form 1 if credit the loan 
request was funded and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables include owner, firm, and information attributes: 
credit grade, home ownership, repeat loans, delinquencies in the past 10 years, judgements in the past 10 years, 
firm age, inclusion of pictures, indication of text elaboration, and number of lenders extending credit per loan. 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time and industry 
dummies are also included in the regressions but results are not reported. Regressions are estimated using the 
general estimation model: 
Pr (Default|1) = α + β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesi + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + µ 
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given 
in parentheses. Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
significance levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables General 
All firms 
Reduced 
All firms 
Existing Firms  
only 
New Firms  
only 
Constant -1.904*** -2.145*** -2.034*** -1.937** 
 (-2.740) (-11.871) (-3.655) (-2.436) 
Owner attributes     
Credit grade (ref AA)     
A 0.365** 0.339** 0.394** 0.255 
 (2.296) (2.190) (2.082) (0.781) 
B 0.391** 0.373** 0.438** 0.307 
 (2.322) (2.296) (2.185) (0.897) 
C 0.382* 0.330* 0.580** 0.169 
 (1.952) (1.742) (2.424) (0.453) 
D 0.637*** 0.567*** 0.723*** 0.476 
 (3.042) (2.841) (2.851) (1.187) 
E 0.556** 0.509* 0.384* 0.901 
 (2.024) (1.911) (1.130) (1.720) 
HR 0.701** 0.600** 0.715* 0.748 
 (2.289) (2.027) (1.901) (1.297) 
Home_owner 0.068    
 (0.654)    
Delinquencies 0.004    
 (0.037)    
Judgements 0.107    
 (0.854)    
Firm attributes     
Existing_firms 0.038    
 (0.348)    
Information attributes     
Repeat_loan -0.627*** -0.662*** -0.627*** -0.720*** 
 (-5.438) (-5.346) (-4.523) (-2.967) 
Include_picture -0.212** -0.170** -0.155 -0.288** 
 (-2.105) (-1.753) (-1.250) (-1.502) 
Elaboration -0.277  -0.174 -0.724 
 (-0.578)  (-0.022) (-1.097) 
Table 6-3 continues 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables General 
All firms 
Reduced 
All firms 
Existing Firms  
only 
New Firms  
only 
 
 
 
    
Loan attributes  
Requested amount ($1,000) 
 
0.052*** 
 
0.052*** 
 
0.046*** 
 
0.071*** 
 (6.048) (6.385) (4.392) (4.241) 
SQRequested amount  -0.002*    
 (-1.073)    
Final_interest_rate (%) 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.029** 
 (5.368) (5.855) (5.156) (1.811) 
SQFinal_interest_rate -0.001    
 (-1.389)    
Unemployment rate YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1208 1208 845 363 
Pseudo R
2 0.144 0.131 0.156 0.165 
X
2 -503.7 -511.5 -355.3 -136.0 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-3 continues 
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Table 6-4: Marginal effects 
This table presents the marginal effects after Probit models based on all variables set at their means. The 
marginal effects for categorical variables show how Pr (default = 1) is predicted to change as a particular factor 
variable changes from 0 to 1, holding all other independent variables at zero. The marginal effect of a 
continuous variable measures the instantaneous rate of change, which may or may not be close to the effect on 
Pr (Default=1) of a one unit increase in the independent variable. *, **, *** stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
significance levels respectively. 
 
 All firms Existing firms New firms 
Owner attributes    
Credit grade (ref AA)    
     A 0.096 0.118 0.052 
 (0.041)** (0.053)** (0.097) 
     B 0.082 0.120 0.104 
 (0.043)* (0.055)** (0.100) 
     C 0.088 0.168 0.025 
 (0.051)* (0.066)** (0.110) 
     D 0.162 0.206 0.143 
 (0.058)*** (0.069)*** (0.119) 
     E 0.171 0.138 0.280 
 (0.080)** (0.092)* (0.154) 
     HR 0.151 0.192 0.067 
 (0.090)* (0.102)* (0.176) 
Homeowner 0.023 0.009 0.010 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.062) 
Firm risk    
Existing_firm 0.010   
 (0.029)   
    
Information attributes    
     Repeat_loan -0.164 -0.155 -0.294 
 (0.028)** (0.036)*** (0.073)*** 
     Include picture -0.077 -0.045 -0.157 
 (0.030)** (0.035) (0.060)*** 
     Elaboration -0.156 -0.004 -0.189 
 (0.148) (0.203) (0.171) 
Loan characteristics    
Requested amount ($1,000) 0.013 0.013 0.017 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
Interest rate (%) 0.013 0.013 0.012 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)** 
    
N 1208 845 363 
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Table 6-5: Predicted margins at represented values 
In this table we present predicted probabilities of loan default at represented values conducted after the Probit regression; with actual cases extracted from the population of loan 
requests. 
Actual Cases  Probability of 
funding 
Interest rate Default rate 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $50k - $74,999k, no past due loans and no 
judgments, homeowner, existing firm, image,  elaborate  
20% 12.5% 10.8% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $50k - $74,999k, no past due loans and  no 
judgments, rent  home, existing firm,    no image ,    elaboration  
15% 13.0% 10.2% 
Self-employed, Prime credit grade AA, income range $25k - $49,999k,  no past due loans and  no judgments, 
rent, new firm, no image, elaboration 
12% 13.3% 10.2% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $25k - $49,999k, no past due loans and no judgments,  
homeowner, existing firm,    image ,    elaboration  
16% 13.5% 19.8% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $25k - $49,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  
home, existing firm,   no  image ,    elaboration  
11% 13.7% 22.9% 
Self-employed, Prime credit grade A, income range $50k - $74,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  home, 
existing firm,    no image ,    elaboration 
10% 13.7% 23.0% 
Full-time employed, Prime credit grade B, income range $50k - $74,999k, past due loans and  judgments, rent  
home, existing firm,    no image ,    elaboration 
9% 14.5% 42.5% 
Self-employed ,  credit grade C, income range $25k - $49,999k, past due loans and  judgments, home owner,   
existing firm, image, elaboration  
7% 15.6% 25.1% 
Full-time employed average credit grade D, income range $25k - $49,999k, no delinquencies, no judgment, rent,   
existing firm, image, elaboration 
6% 16.5% 29.9% 
Self-employed  credit grade D, income range $25k - $49,999k, no delinquencies, no judgment, rent,   existing 
firm, image, elaboration  
6% 16.9% 33.2% 
Full-time employed credit grade E, income range $25k - $49,999k, delinquencies, no judgment, homeowner,   
existing firm, image, elaboration 
6% 19.7% 31.8% 
 Self-employed, credit grade E, income range $25k - $49,999k,  delinquencies,  judgment, rent,   existing firm, 
image, elaboration 
5% 20.1% 32.9% 
Full-time employed, high risk credit grade HR, income range $75k - $99,999k,  past due loans and judgments, 
homeowner, new firm,   image,    elaboration  
3% 22.9% 55.5% 
Self-employed, high  risk credit grade HR, income range $75k - $99,999k,  past due loans and  judgments, rent 
home, new firm, no image,    elaboration 
2% 27.3% 58.9% 
Self-employed, high risk credit grade HR, income range $1 - $24,999,  past due loans and judgments, rent 
home, new firm, no image, no elaboration    
1% 30.1% 59.6% 
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Table 6-6: Probability of default with selection 
The controls are requested loan size, offer interest rate, employment status, and income. Time, Region and industry dummies are also included in the regressions but results are not reported. 
Regressions are estimated using the general estimation model: 
Outcome: Pr (default =α+ β1 Owneri + β2 Firmi + β3 Information + β4 LoanAttributesti + β5Industryi + β6Macroi + ų 
Selection: Pr (Approval) =α+β1Owneri+β2Firmi+β3InformationAttributesi+β4LoanAttributesi +β5Industryi + β6Macroi + β7 Regioni + Ɛ 
Model diagnostics include the log likelihood and chi-squared statistics of the regression. Test statistics are given in parentheses. Significant coefficients are indicated with *, **, *** which 
stand for 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels respectively.   t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Outcome (Pr default) 
All firms 
selection 
All firms 
Outcome (Pr default) 
Existing firms only 
selection 
Existing firms 
Outcome (Pr default) 
New firms only 
Granted 
New firms 
Constant -7.381 -0.049 -6.397 -4.921 -7.745 -0.963*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.054) (-0.004) (-0.006) (-0.000) (-3.248) 
Owner risk       
Credit grade (ref AA)       
A 0.409** -0.463*** 0.488** -0.460*** 0.329 -0.288*** 
 (2.409) (-6.883) (2.385) (-5.941) (1.573) (-3.934) 
B 0.370** -0.712*** 0.523** -0.717*** 0.262 -0.503*** 
 (2.027) (-9.908) (2.390) (-8.611) (1.095) (-6.556) 
C 0.411* -1.148*** 0.748*** -1.249*** 0.309 -0.939*** 
 (1.904) (-14.327) (2.787) (-13.023) (0.971) (-11.052) 
D 0.655*** -1.460*** 0.866*** -1.454*** 0.486 -0.860*** 
 (2.927) (-15.749) (3.175) (-13.356) (1.498) (-9.581) 
E 0.696** -1.807*** 0.652* -1.892*** 0.098 -1.176*** 
 (2.384) (-16.231) (1.774) (-14.001) (0.235) (-10.493) 
HR 0.696** -2.337*** 0.940** -2.396*** 0.111 -1.694*** 
 (1.988) (-20.443) (2.188) (-17.455) (0.210) (-15.070) 
Homeowner 0.075 0.062 0.028 -0.001 0.036 0.009 
 (0.703) (1.477) (0.223) (-0.028) (0.309) (0.184) 
Income Range (ref $ 0 – unable to verify)       
$1 - $24,999 -0.128 0.315***  0.219*  0.082 
 (-0.576) (3.340)  (1.907)  (0.766) 
 $25,000 - $49,999 -0.128 0.580***  0.497***  0.333*** 
 (-0.576) (6.859)  (5.196)  (3.807) 
$50,000 - $74,999 -0.230 0.581***  0.507***  0.365*** 
 (-1.151) (7.586)  (5.748)  (4.488) 
$75,000 - $99,999 -0.212 0.680***  0.600***  0.422*** 
 (-1.029) (8.761)  (6.732)  (5.147) 
Table 6-6 continues 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Outcome (Pr default) 
All firms 
selection 
All firms 
Outcome (Pr default) 
Existing firms only 
selection 
Existing firms 
Outcome (Pr default) 
New firms only 
Granted 
New firms 
$100 000 plus -0.184 0.642***  0.522***  0.384*** 
 (-0.795) (7.346)  (5.215)  (4.219) 
Firm Risk       
  Existing_firm -0.038 0.007     
 (-0.345) (0.162)     
Loan characteristics       
Requested amount ($1,000) 0.055*** -0.164*** 0.059*** -0.151*** 0.027*** -0.108*** 
 (5.221) (-14.005) (4.644) (-10.938) (1.358) (-8.711) 
Interest rate (%) 0.051*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.037*** 0.036** 
 (6.225) (4.249) (5.462) (3.177) (2.695) (2.422) 
Information Attributes       
   Image included -0.289*** 0.362*** -0.177 0.353*** -0.087*** 0.192*** 
 (-2.651) (8.091) (-1.323) (6.521) (-0.640) (4.155) 
   elaboration -0.566 0.353** -0.125 0.709*** 0.257 0.594** 
 (-1.205) (2.056) (-0.161) (2.652) (0.343) (2.331) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 11,952 11,952 8,403 8,403 8,403 8,403 
-2 log likelihood -3157 -3157 -2264 -2264 -2419 -2419 
 
LR  test of independence                                                    chi2(1) = 1.16 ; p=0.001 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6-6 continues 
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Table 6-7: Average returns of top 5 percent lenders 
 
Lender ROI Rate Net Gain 
Age of 
loans Billed Loans Amount Lent Balance 
1 NPX 9.3% 18.90% $6, 408 36 23 $47, 205 $0 
2 time4aloan 6.9% 16.90% $1, 313 36 10 $13, 968 $0 
3 HighonLife 6.0% 29.60% $4, 153 36 8 $45, 288 $0 
4 LoanChimp 6.0% 12.50% $4,  076 36 10 $55, 367 $0 
5 kindness-percolator5 5.9% 17.40% $943 36 9 $12, 178 $0 
6 MJARRBank 5.8% 11.50% $1, 089 36 15 $14, 595 $0 
7 Lucyqq 5.7% 9.50% $7, 435 36 23 $124, 668 $0 
8 ms-ufj 5.3% 12.20% $1, 474 36 12 $24, 200 $0 
9 moremoneymarK 5.2% 10.60% $2, 239 36 10 $42,181 $0 
10 interest-jedi0 5.0% 11.40% $1, 308 36 26 $20,287 $0 
Average results  for top 5 percent of lenders 6.1% 15.0% $3, 044.80 36 17 $39, 999.40 $0 
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Figure 6-1: Average default and unemployment rates over time 
 
Source: Unemployment data U.S. Census Bureau 2008, 2009, 2013 www.bls.gov 
 
   
Figure 6-2: Prosper credit grade proportion change over time depicting borrower risk pool 
 
Source: www.Prosper.com 2007 -2013 
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Figure 6-3: P2P average returns vs. bank cash deposit vs. treasury bonds 
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Source: Cash deposit data 2008-2013 www.bankrate.com ; Treasury bonds data 2008-2013 www.treasury.gov 
 
Figure 6-4 Percent distribution of returns for all funded loans 
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Figure 6-5: Distribution of returns by loan size 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Distribution of returns by credit rating 
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Figure 6-7: Are there repeat winners? 
 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Distribution of returns by Firm Age 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions, contributions and limitations 
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7.0 Introduction  
Differences in the severity of information problems may help explain why certain types of small 
businesses obtain external finance from traditional lending institutions, whereas other types tend 
to rely more on informal investors.  Of cause information problems may also keep firms from 
obtaining external funding at all.  In this dissertation, we set out to examine empirically the 
impact of P2P lending in the financing of small business ventures. We follow entrepreneurial 
finance literature in raising three key questions concerned with credit extension; cost of credit 
and loan default. We gathered and created a unique data set taken from Prosper.com, one of the 
dominating P2P lending websites; which formed the basis of our analysis.  
Overall, one of the key findings of the study shows that P2P lending depicts a new small 
business venture loan market, where previously underserved early stage entrepreneurs and those 
looking for small amounts are able to access unsecured credit through the relaxation of collateral.  
Although collateral is not required, we show that the supply of loans tends to flow to the least 
risky entrepreneurs; those who are homeowners, with high credit ratings.  In our findings, we 
also show that firm level characteristics (including the age of the firm), have little impact on loan 
supply while reducing information asymmetries through giving volunteering information 
improves access to loans. In general, our findings are both interesting and important as they 
suggest that P2P lending is a low risk form of debt finance. In this sense, lenders act like 
traditional debt financiers. However, the way in which they appraise funding opportunities 
characterise typical decision making of equity investors such as Business Angels and VC, who 
tend to focus more on people, rather than the business itself.  
In terms of the cost of credit, we observe that with average lending of between 18 percent and 20 
percent, P2P lending is a very expensive form of debt finance. Banks typically refuse to extend 
credit given such high interest rates as this tends to alter the borrower pool such that only the 
riskiest of borrowers have projects that generate returns that are high enough to be able to re-pay 
these interest rates.  In effect, the bank supply curve is backward bending above 10 percent on 
conventional terms of lending.  Consequently, if we were to characterise P2P lending we would 
effectively conclude that it is typically a high cost finance with required returns expected to be 
likely in the levels of Business Angels and VC equity investments. 
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So, if within the P2P lending market it is the relatively low risk borrowers who get the loans, 
then a natural question to address is why couldn’t these low risk borrowers access conventional 
bank loans? Moreover, why were they willing to offer high interest rates?  One probable 
explanation is the condition of the credit market. Our analysis is based on data covering the 
period 2008 - 2013, arguably characterised as the height of the recession. According to SBA 
(2012) small business lending from banks constricted during this period. Suddenly, businesses 
who were perfectly good risk able to access credit from banks during buoyant economic times, 
were suddenly unable to tap into bank lending because banks tightened their lending standards to 
small firms. Subsequently, borrowers, keen to have access to capital, were hoping to attract 
possible lenders with their good credit record and high interest rates; just so they can keep their 
businesses afloat. Consequently, we find that P2P lending platforms provided an alternative form 
of venture finance in times of recession, when traditional financiers were unavailable. 
In terms of lender return and default, we find that the expected return to lenders is 3.26 percent, 
which is above the opportunity cost of capital in the US. Therefore, P2P lending is profitable 
from the investor point of view, albeit in a narrow sense. In general, the results suggest that 
average lenders on P2P platforms are amateurs, who actually have a higher risk tolerance. For 
these lenders, the risk of losing a small proportion (as little as $25) per investment in the overall 
portfolio of loans is offset by the potential gain from high interest rates charged for loans.  
However, default is found to be related to risk as predicted by conventional theory, in both 
formal credit rating and also additional information and track records. Moreover, a key finding is 
that default seems to also be associated with the cost of credit, which presents an interesting 
dilemma for lenders. Consequently, at a first glance, we inferred from our finding that lenders 
would have to consider a potential trade off between lowering the interest rates they charge 
borrowers in order to circumvent default. However, it is also plausible that some lenders extend 
credit to firms in this context for fun - as some form of ‘gambling’. Hence it would not be 
necessary to consider a potential trade off between interest rates and default. In this case, lenders 
would simply accept loan requests from borrowers offering high interest rates with the view that 
knowing that if the borrowers pay back the loan, they win big. However, if some of the loans in 
the portfolio result in default, the loss is not too big.   
Furthermore, it is also reasonable to consider that some of the lenders choose to extend credit in 
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this context driven by philanthropic reasons. This is supported by evidence we found earlier that 
lenders in this market are forgiving – there is a subset of low risk borrowers with previous 
delinquencies, who have managed to rebuild their credit history, extended funding in this 
context. Therefore, lenders driven by philanthropy might not necessarily have wealth 
maximisation as his main goal for funding these firms. 
Interestingly, our results show that return from the top 5 percent of lenders average at 6.1 percent 
per annum. Given the fact that P2P lending is generally a young market, and the fact that 
majority of lenders attracted to P2P lending are relatively uninformed amateurs in making 
investment decisions, the results suggest that if the amateur lenders do indeed learn, it then 
becomes plausible that in time the returns in this market may generally converge to be better 
(and gravitate towards the 6.1 percent achieved by top 5 percent). However, if the P2P lending 
platforms continue to attract a pool of amateur lenders, the average returns of 3.26 percent may 
render the market somewhat unsustainable in the long run.    Given all that has been presented so 
far, P2P lending may come across as an inefficient use of resources. For example, if we were to 
follow the line of argument that lenders may choose to engage in P2P lending for idiosyncratic 
reasons such as fun or gambling etc and philanthropic reasons, it then becomes reasonable to 
infer that perhaps P2P lending may possibly result as an inefficient use of resources. However, 
the fact that P2P lending is profitable for an average, risk loving, uninformed lender, may 
suggest that this instrument may somewhat be an alternative form of financial instrument (albeit 
with some form of inefficient tendencies).  
7.1 Key contributions 
So how do our results inform theory? To recap, Stiglitz and Weiss put forward four key 
parameters underpinning their theory of information asymmetry problems, namely: conducting 
due diligence, collateral, refraining from high interest rates to avoid moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues, and the inferred face to face borrower-lender interactions. From our results, we 
find that some weights of these parameter values are likely to change in Stiglitz-Weiss model.  
Firstly, the general insight we get from our research is that due diligence, although still an 
important factor, in the P2P lending context it is conducted by the ‘crowd’. This new feature, 
unique to P2P lending was not taken into consideration in the Stiglitz and Weiss framework – 
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where credit risk appraisal was done by relatively one person. Consequently we introduce 
collecting intelligence as a means of eradicating information asymmetry issues. Furthermore, our 
results shift focus from 1-to-1 physical interactions between borrowers and lenders inferred in 
Stiglitz-Weiss theory and highlights the 1-to many borrower lender typology over the internet. 
Effectively rendering physical contact, which was previously seen an important aspect of 
reducing information asymmetry issues in theory, relatively less important. 
Furthermore, In terms of due diligence, the crowd also introduces another distinctive change 
based in the notion that lenders in this context may have philanthropy ambitions which they may 
consider when appraising credit risk. For example, a lender taking into consideration 
philanthropic ambitions may look for different credit risk when compared to a lender whose sole 
ambition is to maximise returns. This may effectively alter access to credit, the cost of credit and 
subsequently the P2P borrower pool. 
Second, we see from our results that collateral is being taken out; which was such an important 
determinant in reducing both adverse selection and moral hazard issues in Stiglitz-Weiss theory. 
In the P2P lending it is unimportant.  
Third, Similar to theory, a key finding in our analysis is that cost of capital is associated with 
default. However, this finding represent some sort of  interesting dilemma for lenders in the P2P 
lending context, given that lenders do not seem to be easily put off by the high interest rates 
offered by prospective borrowers and the relative default risk.  Our results suggest that these 
lenders are more risk loving, with a different utility to that of the traditional banks (typically 
concave) discussed in Stiglitz and Weiss theory. Unlike the 1-to-1 lender borrower typology of 
traditional banks, where high interest rates may result in huge losses; in the P2P lending market 
the many-to-1 lender borrower typology result in the idea of fun being introduced; where lenders 
may be extending credit because they like it especially given the fact that if the investment fails, 
the losses may not be that big.  
Fourth, the general insight we get from our study is that borrower reputation, stipulated by credit 
grades, is the single most important determinant of credit allocation, the cost of capital and loan 
default predictions. The significant of using the credit grade helps to reduce the problem of 
selecting credit worthy risk and reducing moral hazard.  The cost of defaulting will result in 
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poorer scores – which are quantifiable to 24 percent in reduction of probability of funding and 
increase of 80 basis points interest rates for an otherwise average risk borrower.  With the 
advancement of internet, reputations which were previously curtailed within the 1-to-1 lending 
typology from banks, where if a borrower defaults on credit in one region or country for 
example, would not have an effect if the borrower were to move to another country has since  
have completely changed.  But with internet age loan default may quickly go viral. The 
consequence of 1-to- many borrower-lender interactions relative to reputation over the internet 
and the ease with which default may go viral makes reputation to be a very important aspect 
within the P2P lending context. 
In sum, we contend that the lessons we leant from our results about asymmetric information 
issues are quiet different to those developed in Stiglitz-Weiss model.  Reputation is very 
important in this market (this was not highlighted by Stiglitz). We learn that physical contact and 
collateral becomes less important in reducing information asymmetries. We also learn about the 
importance of three key new features collective intelligence of the crowd, an aspect of 
philanthropy present when appraising credit risk and the general element of fun which may drive 
lenders when choosing to allocate and price credit. Their model will have to be updated to take 
into consideration the facts raised above in their theory of information asymmetry in order to 
reflect our finding.  
Our results also have key practical implications. The fact that P2P lending relaxes collateral 
requirements and the fact that reputation is the single most important variant in P2P lending 
renders our results generalizable to the microfinance institutions, especially those in developing 
countries. The relaxation of collateral makes P2P a viable alternative to small business funding 
in developing countries, especially given the fact that it is in these regions where the wealth 
distributions tend to be skewed unfavourably. The importance of reputation simply highlights 
infrastructure that already exists, used by microfinance in developing countries. Hence this 
renders our results somewhat generalizable. The fact that the internet is an underlying layer in 
operationalizing P2P lending in developing countries, perhaps there is scope of using mobile 
smart phones instead of traditional computers – given that this technology is already entranced in 
developing countries. 
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7.2 Limitations 
Like most studies that use secondary data, our data were not specifically collected for small 
business study; hence we have some limitations. First, ideally, any analysis of small business 
funding ought to include those applicants who chose not to apply for credit - even though they 
could potentially qualify for credit (Hanley and Germa, 2006). 
Second, the data do not contain borrower demographic variables and human capital variables. 
Previous studies (see for example Coleman, 2000; Cressy, 1996; Burke et al, 2000) have found 
these to be important in influencing credit access and the cost of credit.  Our study is therefore 
not immune to omitted variable bias.  
Third, majority of our data (in terms of loan volumes) comes from the period 2008; the nearest 
crisis and post-crisis period may not be very representative, but it stimulated an innovative ways 
of interrelation between lenders and borrowers. Hence, as part of future research, it would be 
interesting to see whether factors driving the likelihood of attaining small business funds in this 
market vary in more cheerful – post crisis market conditions (Cowling et al, 2012).  
Overall, in terms of our finding, we interpret two of our key findings with caution. First, is the 
interpretation of the variable Bid_count; which we use to measure the level of information 
asymmetries reduced by the intelligence of the crowd. In this study, we simply use the count 
(number) of lenders that extend credit as an indicator of some form of due diligence coming 
through.  It is possible that other effects may actually be at play. For, instance, herding behavior 
may be a possible explanation; where lenders gravitate to loan requests based on other features 
that we are unaware of and hence did not investigate here. For instance, there are blogs that 
lenders use to share information and communicate about the loan requests, which were not 
available to the researches due to regulatory issues; hence they were unavailable in our data.  
Since, P2P context continues to evolve, some of the data has since been made public to anyone 
who registers and joins the site as a lender. Therefore one area of future research would be to 
look closer at the collective intelligence of the crowd and ascertain more precisely what forces 
are at play use to overcome problems lending under asymmetric information. 
Second, the same caution goes for the elaboration variable. Due to the sheer volume of the 
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number of cases (N =12, 526); we have created this variable as a binary indicator – showing 
whether the small business borrower tells a story or not. A better measure would have been to 
disentangle and look at the actual contents of the story.  Moreover, borrowers also had private 
conversations with lenders in the form of Questions/Answers; where lenders could ask borrowers 
any questions based on their loan request. Similarly, these were not made public due to 
regulatory constraints. Hence they are unavailable for our data. However, some of these 
restrictions have since been lifted such that any lender, that registers on the platform they can 
have access to full disclosure of any conversation that potential borrowers may have had with 
prospective lenders. This would make an interesting extension of the research. Finally, since this 
market is new and continues to grow, there will be more opportunity to track the data and see 
how the return evolves over time. 
 Research dissemination 
In  terms  of  disseminating  our  research  to  a  wider  academic  community,  we  have  
developed  two empirical papers from the three  chapters, which have been disseminated through 
academic conferences as follows:   
 Paper titled: “New technology same old story: factors driving credit allocation for small 
business loan on commercial Peer-to-Peer lending websites”  accepted at the 6th Annual 
conference academy of innovation and entrepreneurship (AIE, 2013), Oxford University, UK 
 Presenter at policy conference: “New technology same old story: factors driving credit 
allocation for small business loan on commercial Peer-to-Peer lending websites” 11th Annual 
International Conference on Finance, Athens, Greece (2013) 
 Presenter at policy conference, “What’s in store for tomorrow’s SME finance: the case of 
Crowd Funding”, Strategies to Overcome Poverty and Inequality: Towards Carnegie 3 , 
University of Cape Town, South Africa (2012) 
 Presenter paper titled: Research methods in entrepreneurship: “what determines the 
endowment of quality entrepreneurs in an economy”,19th European Doctoral Programme 
Association in Management and Business Administration Seminar, Soreze, France (2010)
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Table 7-1:  Summary of findings 
This table shows the developed hypotheses, predicted relationships and what we found as determinants of: credit 
allocation, the cost of credit and loan default for P2P small business loans. 
Hypothesis Predicted 
relationship 
Found 
relationship 
Factors driving credit approval   
H1a  small business borrowers, who own their homes, demonstrate better credit 
risk (relative to those that rent) and therefore are more likely to be 
extended credit by prospective lenders 
+ + 
H2a  small business borrowers, with high credit ratings, demonstrate better 
credit risk and therefore are more likely to be extended credit by 
prospective lenders 
+ + 
H3a  small business borrowers who have successfully paid back a previous loan 
are more  likely to be extended credit  
+ + 
H4a  existing firms are more likely to be funded (relative to new business start-
ups) in the P2Plending context 
+ Variable 
insignificant 
H5  the likelihood of a partially funded loan receiving additional credit will 
increase with the total number of already extended offers  
+ + 
H6a  small business borrowers who use text elaborations are more likely to be 
funded in the P2P lending context 
+ Variable 
insignificant 
H7a  small business borrowers who have previous failures are less likely to 
access funds in the P2P lending context 
- - 
H8a  small business borrowers who post pictures are likely to get funded by 
lenders in the P2P lending context 
+ + 
   
Factors driving cost of credit   
H1b  small business borrowers, who own their homes, demonstrate better credit 
risk (relative to those that rent) and therefore are more likely to pay lower 
interest rates 
- Variable 
insignificant 
H2b  small business borrowers, with high credit ratings, demonstrate better 
credit risk and therefore are more likely to pay lower interest rates 
- - 
H3b  small business borrowers who have successfully paid back a previous loan 
are more likely to pay lower interest rates  
- Variable 
insignificant 
H4b  existing firms are more likely to pay lower interest rates (relative to new 
business start-ups) in the P2Plending context 
- Variable 
insignificant 
H6b  small business borrowers who use text elaborations are more likely to be 
pay cheaper interest rates in the P2P lending context 
- Variable 
insignificant 
H7b  small business borrowers who have previous failures are more likely to pay 
higher interest rates 
+ Variable 
insignificant 
H8b  small business owners who post pictures are likely to pay lower interest 
rates in the P2P lending context 
- - 
   
Factors driving default activity   
H1c  small business borrowers, who own their homes, demonstrate better credit 
risk (relative to those that rent) and therefore are less likely to default 
- Variable 
insignificant 
H2c  small business borrowers, with high credit ratings, demonstrate better 
credit risk and therefore are less likely to default 
- - 
H3c  small business borrowers who have successfully paid back a previous loan 
are less likely to default   
- - 
H4c  existing firms are less likely to default (relative to new business start-ups) 
in the P2P the lending context 
- Variable 
insignificant 
H6c  small business borrowers who use text elaborations are more (less) likely 
to be  default 
+/- Variable 
insignificant 
H7c  small business borrowers who have previous failures are more likely to 
default 
+ Variable 
insignificant 
H8c  small business owners who post pictures are more (less) likely to default +/- - 
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